Summary
OpenPanel before 3.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the profile values functionality. An authenticated attacker may craft the property parameter to bypass project scoping and read profiles, events, and sessions belonging to other tenants.
OpenPanel before 3.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the profile values functionality. An authenticated attacker may craft the property parameter to bypass project scoping and read profiles, events, and sessions belonging to other tenants.
Affected context
The vulnerability may occur in OpenPanel deployments that expose the profile.values functionality to authenticated users and construct database queries using the property parameter. It becomes particularly risky where tenant or project boundaries rely on dynamically assembled SQL conditions, including project_id scoping, without robust parameterization.
The vulnerability may occur in OpenPanel deployments that expose the profile.values functionality to authenticated users and construct database queries using the property parameter. It becomes particularly risky where tenant or project boundaries rely on dynamically assembled SQL conditions, including project_id scoping, without robust parameterization.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated profile.values application endpoint or function
- Required access: A valid OpenPanel user account with access to the affected functionality
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted property parameter
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input may influence a SQL expression, allowing injected SELECT, FROM, and WHERE clauses and potentially disabling the intended project_id restriction
- Attack surface: The authenticated profile.values application endpoint or function
- Required access: A valid OpenPanel user account with access to the affected functionality
- Trigger point: Processing of a crafted property parameter
- Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input may influence a SQL expression, allowing injected SELECT, FROM, and WHERE clauses and potentially disabling the intended project_id restriction
Why this happens
The underlying bug is insufficient separation between user-controlled input and SQL syntax. The application appears to incorporate the property parameter into a dynamically constructed query without consistently using parameterized statements or an allowlisted expression model.
This maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), because attacker-controlled input can alter the intended structure and scope of a database query.
The underlying bug is insufficient separation between user-controlled input and SQL syntax. The application appears to incorporate the property parameter into a dynamically constructed query without consistently using parameterized statements or an allowlisted expression model.
This maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), because attacker-controlled input can alter the intended structure and scope of a database query.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read profiles belonging to other projects or tenants.
- Sensitive event records may be disclosed.
- User or application session data could be exposed.
- Cross-tenant confidentiality boundaries may be weakened.
- Extracted information could support further account or infrastructure attacks.
- An attacker may read profiles belonging to other projects or tenants.
- Sensitive event records may be disclosed.
- User or application session data could be exposed.
- Cross-tenant confidentiality boundaries may be weakened.
- Extracted information could support further account or infrastructure attacks.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that user input cannot become executable SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database values.
- Replace dynamic SQL property expressions with a strict allowlist of supported fields and operations.
- Enforce tenant and project authorization independently of client-supplied query conditions.
- Apply least-privilege database permissions to limit readable tables and columns.
- Avoid exposing sensitive fields through generic profile or query interfaces.
- Validate inputs using positive schemas and treat authentication as insufficient for cross-tenant authorization.
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that user input cannot become executable SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database values.
- Replace dynamic SQL property expressions with a strict allowlist of supported fields and operations.
- Enforce tenant and project authorization independently of client-supplied query conditions.
- Apply least-privilege database permissions to limit readable tables and columns.
- Avoid exposing sensitive fields through generic profile or query interfaces.
- Validate inputs using positive schemas and treat authentication as insufficient for cross-tenant authorization.
How teams detect issues like this
High-level detection approaches include:
- Static analysis for string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to build SQL statements from request parameters.
- Code review checks for dynamic column, table, SELECT, FROM, or WHERE fragments derived from user input.
- Runtime monitoring for unusual query structures, comment markers, unexpected clauses, or cross-project access patterns.
- Database audit policies that alert when a tenant-scoped endpoint reads records outside the caller's authorized project.
- Automated security testing that verifies authorization boundaries and rejects unsupported query expressions.
High-level detection approaches include:
- Static analysis for string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to build SQL statements from request parameters.
- Code review checks for dynamic column, table, SELECT, FROM, or WHERE fragments derived from user input.
- Runtime monitoring for unusual query structures, comment markers, unexpected clauses, or cross-project access patterns.
- Database audit policies that alert when a tenant-scoped endpoint reads records outside the caller's authorized project.
- Automated security testing that verifies authorization boundaries and rejects unsupported query expressions.
