Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in RhaPHP's Mp Module Media Proxy allows a remote attacker to influence the URL processed by the image function.
When the application makes outbound requests based on attacker-controlled input without adequate destination controls, the attacker may access internal services or retrieve unintended resources.
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in RhaPHP's Mp Module Media Proxy allows a remote attacker to influence the URL processed by the image function.
When the application makes outbound requests based on attacker-controlled input without adequate destination controls, the attacker may access internal services or retrieve unintended resources.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the Mp Module Media Proxy, specifically in the image function in application/mp/controller/Show.php. It becomes risky when the url argument can be supplied remotely and the server follows or retrieves that URL without sufficiently restricting destinations, schemes, redirects, or network reachability.
The vulnerability occurs in the Mp Module Media Proxy, specifically in the image function in application/mp/controller/Show.php. It becomes risky when the url argument can be supplied remotely and the server follows or retrieves that URL without sufficiently restricting destinations, schemes, redirects, or network reachability.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable media proxy functionality
- Required access: Access sufficient to invoke the affected endpoint and provide the
urlargument; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration - Trigger point: Processing of the attacker-influenced URL by the
imagefunction - Why exploitation is possible: The server performs outbound resource retrieval without adequately enforcing a trusted destination policy
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable media proxy functionality
- Required access: Access sufficient to invoke the affected endpoint and provide the
urlargument; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration - Trigger point: Processing of the attacker-influenced URL by the
imagefunction - Why exploitation is possible: The server performs outbound resource retrieval without adequately enforcing a trusted destination policy
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient validation and authorization of a server-side URL request. An application accepts a user-controlled URL and uses it as a destination for server-initiated network access without reliably constraining hosts, schemes, ports, redirects, or resolved addresses.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an attacker can cause a server to make requests to locations that the attacker could not directly reach.
The underlying issue is insufficient validation and authorization of a server-side URL request. An application accepts a user-controlled URL and uses it as a destination for server-initiated network access without reliably constraining hosts, schemes, ports, redirects, or resolved addresses.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an attacker can cause a server to make requests to locations that the attacker could not directly reach.
Potential impact
- An attacker may retrieve data from internal or otherwise restricted services
- Cloud or platform metadata may be exposed where the runtime permits access
- Internal administrative interfaces could be probed or contacted
- The application may be used to reach services behind network boundaries
- Network reconnaissance and follow-on attacks could become easier
- An attacker may retrieve data from internal or otherwise restricted services
- Cloud or platform metadata may be exposed where the runtime permits access
- Internal administrative interfaces could be probed or contacted
- The application may be used to reach services behind network boundaries
- Network reconnaissance and follow-on attacks could become easier
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-provided URLs and enforcing a narrowly defined outbound-request policy.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only explicitly approved schemes, hosts, ports, and resource types
- Resolving hostnames and rejecting private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and otherwise restricted address ranges
- Rechecking destinations after redirects and preventing unsafe redirect chains
- Preferencing server-side retrieval through a constrained proxy or fixed upstream allowlist
- Applying outbound network segmentation and least-privilege service permissions
- Limiting response size, request duration, and accessible protocols
- Avoiding direct URL fetching when a safer identifier-based retrieval design is possible
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-provided URLs and enforcing a narrowly defined outbound-request policy.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only explicitly approved schemes, hosts, ports, and resource types
- Resolving hostnames and rejecting private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and otherwise restricted address ranges
- Rechecking destinations after redirects and preventing unsafe redirect chains
- Preferencing server-side retrieval through a constrained proxy or fixed upstream allowlist
- Applying outbound network segmentation and least-privilege service permissions
- Limiting response size, request duration, and accessible protocols
- Avoiding direct URL fetching when a safer identifier-based retrieval design is possible
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for HTTP clients called with request parameters or other untrusted URL values
- Code review checks for missing scheme, host, port, redirect, and IP-range validation
- Dynamic testing with controlled external endpoints and blocked internal-address cases
- Egress monitoring for unexpected connections to private, metadata, loopback, or link-local ranges
- Web application firewall and API policy rules restricting URL-fetching behavior
- Automated security review tools that flag user-controlled server-side request destinations
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for HTTP clients called with request parameters or other untrusted URL values
- Code review checks for missing scheme, host, port, redirect, and IP-range validation
- Dynamic testing with controlled external endpoints and blocked internal-address cases
- Egress monitoring for unexpected connections to private, metadata, loopback, or link-local ranges
- Web application firewall and API policy rules restricting URL-fetching behavior
- Automated security review tools that flag user-controlled server-side request destinations
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
