Summary
A critical command-injection vulnerability in pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool can allow a database user to cause operating-system commands to run on the host running pgAdmin.
The risk arises when crafted query text, database session settings, and mismatched quote parsing cause a command clause to escape the tool's intended export wrapper. The command executes with the privileges of the operating-system account running pgAdmin.
A critical command-injection vulnerability in pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool can allow a database user to cause operating-system commands to run on the host running pgAdmin.
The risk arises when crafted query text, database session settings, and mismatched quote parsing cause a command clause to escape the tool's intended export wrapper. The command executes with the privileges of the operating-system account running pgAdmin.
Affected context
The issue affects pgAdmin 4 deployments using the Import/Export Data tool before version 9.19, particularly where non-administrative database roles have that permission. It occurs when pgAdmin validates query quoting differently from the psql parser and relies on connection-specific escape behavior that cannot be determined safely during validation.
The exposure is greater when pgAdmin runs with broad operating-system privileges or has access to sensitive files, credentials, networks, or other administrative services.
The issue affects pgAdmin 4 deployments using the Import/Export Data tool before version 9.19, particularly where non-administrative database roles have that permission. It occurs when pgAdmin validates query quoting differently from the psql parser and relies on connection-specific escape behavior that cannot be determined safely during validation.
The exposure is greater when pgAdmin runs with broad operating-system privileges or has access to sensitive files, credentials, networks, or other administrative services.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data query handling and its host-side psql invocation
- Required access: A database role able to use the Import/Export Data tool; administrative database privileges are not inherently required
- Trigger point: Processing and execution of an export query wrapped in a psql copy command
- Relevant condition: The database session can use a setting that changes backslash and quote interpretation, such as disabling standard-conforming strings
- Why exploitation is possible: pgAdmin's delimiter validation can disagree with psql's parser, allowing syntax that was considered inside the wrapper to be interpreted as a separate command clause by psql
- Attack surface: pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data query handling and its host-side psql invocation
- Required access: A database role able to use the Import/Export Data tool; administrative database privileges are not inherently required
- Trigger point: Processing and execution of an export query wrapped in a psql copy command
- Relevant condition: The database session can use a setting that changes backslash and quote interpretation, such as disabling standard-conforming strings
- Why exploitation is possible: pgAdmin's delimiter validation can disagree with psql's parser, allowing syntax that was considered inside the wrapper to be interpreted as a separate command clause by psql
Why this happens
The underlying bug is a parser differential caused by incomplete validation of backslashes in double-quoted identifiers. pgAdmin treated an escaped double quote as terminating an identifier, while psql applied the connection's escape rules to the quote that opened the token and interpreted the identifier differently.
This mismatch allowed a closing delimiter to evade pgAdmin's wrapper check and enabled command execution through a psql command clause. The issue maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-115: Mis-categorization of Errors relevant to the flawed interpretation and validation of structured input.
The underlying bug is a parser differential caused by incomplete validation of backslashes in double-quoted identifiers. pgAdmin treated an escaped double quote as terminating an identifier, while psql applied the connection's escape rules to the quote that opened the token and interpreted the identifier differently.
This mismatch allowed a closing delimiter to evade pgAdmin's wrapper check and enabled command execution through a psql command clause. The issue maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-115: Mis-categorization of Errors relevant to the flawed interpretation and validation of structured input.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute operating-system commands on the pgAdmin host
- The attacker could access, modify, or destroy files available to the pgAdmin account
- The compromise could expose database credentials, configuration data, or exported records
- The attacker may pivot to connected database systems, cloud services, or internal networks
- The incident could result in data theft, tampering, persistence, or service disruption
- An attacker may execute operating-system commands on the pgAdmin host
- The attacker could access, modify, or destroy files available to the pgAdmin account
- The compromise could expose database credentials, configuration data, or exported records
- The attacker may pivot to connected database systems, cloud services, or internal networks
- The incident could result in data theft, tampering, persistence, or service disruption
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell-sensitive command construction and ensuring that every parser involved in validation and execution follows the same safe grammar.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Rejecting backslashes and other parser-sensitive characters in quoted identifiers and string contexts when their meaning depends on server settings
- Avoiding construction of shell or psql command text from user-controlled query content
- Using structured APIs with explicit argument separation instead of command-string composition
- Applying strict allowlists and grammar-aware validation before invoking host-side tools
- Granting Import/Export Data permissions only to roles that require them
- Running pgAdmin under a dedicated, least-privileged operating-system account with restricted filesystem and network access
- Keeping sensitive credentials out of the pgAdmin process environment and accessible files
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell-sensitive command construction and ensuring that every parser involved in validation and execution follows the same safe grammar.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Rejecting backslashes and other parser-sensitive characters in quoted identifiers and string contexts when their meaning depends on server settings
- Avoiding construction of shell or psql command text from user-controlled query content
- Using structured APIs with explicit argument separation instead of command-string composition
- Applying strict allowlists and grammar-aware validation before invoking host-side tools
- Granting Import/Export Data permissions only to roles that require them
- Running pgAdmin under a dedicated, least-privileged operating-system account with restricted filesystem and network access
- Keeping sensitive credentials out of the pgAdmin process environment and accessible files
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine source review, runtime monitoring, and authorization analysis:
- Use static analysis to identify concatenation of user-controlled SQL or query text into shell, psql, or command-execution arguments
- Review code for custom quote, parenthesis, or delimiter balancing that differs from the parser used for execution
- Flag validation logic whose behavior depends on database session settings that are not fixed or known
- Monitor pgAdmin child-process creation, especially unexpected psql command arguments and host-level process launches
- Audit Import/Export Data permissions and investigate unusual export activity by low-privilege roles
- Enforce code-review and automated security rules for command injection and parser-differential patterns
Detection can combine source review, runtime monitoring, and authorization analysis:
- Use static analysis to identify concatenation of user-controlled SQL or query text into shell, psql, or command-execution arguments
- Review code for custom quote, parenthesis, or delimiter balancing that differs from the parser used for execution
- Flag validation logic whose behavior depends on database session settings that are not fixed or known
- Monitor pgAdmin child-process creation, especially unexpected psql command arguments and host-level process launches
- Audit Import/Export Data permissions and investigate unusual export activity by low-privilege roles
- Enforce code-review and automated security rules for command injection and parser-differential patterns
