Summary
A lockout enforcement weakness in pgAdmin 4 server mode allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass failed-login limits and make unlimited password guesses against internal accounts.
Additional authentication and account-management paths could avoid pgAdmin's protections, potentially enabling administrator account compromise and unauthorized password changes or resets.
A lockout enforcement weakness in pgAdmin 4 server mode allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass failed-login limits and make unlimited password guesses against internal accounts.
Additional authentication and account-management paths could avoid pgAdmin's protections, potentially enabling administrator account compromise and unauthorized password changes or resets.
Affected context
The issue occurs in pgAdmin 4 server mode when internal accounts are protected by a failed-login limit but alternate authentication views, username matching behavior, or configured authentication sources do not apply the same controls. It may also affect deployments where accounts from different authentication sources share email addresses. Desktop mode is not affected.
The issue occurs in pgAdmin 4 server mode when internal accounts are protected by a failed-login limit but alternate authentication views, username matching behavior, or configured authentication sources do not apply the same controls. It may also affect deployments where accounts from different authentication sources share email addresses. Desktop mode is not affected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: pgAdmin 4 server-mode login, password verification, password-change, and password-reset endpoints
- Required access: No prior authentication is required for password-guessing or applicable reset flows; some actions depend on access to an account-management endpoint
- Trigger point: Repeated authentication attempts or account operations routed through paths that do not enforce the internal-account lockout policy
- Why exploitation is possible: Failed attempts may not be counted consistently across authentication views, username casing, or configured authentication providers, allowing the normal limit to be bypassed
- Attack surface: pgAdmin 4 server-mode login, password verification, password-change, and password-reset endpoints
- Required access: No prior authentication is required for password-guessing or applicable reset flows; some actions depend on access to an account-management endpoint
- Trigger point: Repeated authentication attempts or account operations routed through paths that do not enforce the internal-account lockout policy
- Why exploitation is possible: Failed attempts may not be counted consistently across authentication views, username casing, or configured authentication providers, allowing the normal limit to be bypassed
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is inconsistent enforcement of authentication and account-management policy across multiple views and identity sources. The lockout state was associated with an exact username and was not reliably applied when email matching ignored case or when alternate authentication mechanisms handled the request.
This maps primarily to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts. Related authorization and identity-boundary failures map to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because password verification, reset behavior, and configuration disclosure were not always restricted to the correct authenticated account or authentication source.
The underlying flaw is inconsistent enforcement of authentication and account-management policy across multiple views and identity sources. The lockout state was associated with an exact username and was not reliably applied when email matching ignored case or when alternate authentication mechanisms handled the request.
This maps primarily to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts. Related authorization and identity-boundary failures map to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, because password verification, reset behavior, and configuration disclosure were not always restricted to the correct authenticated account or authentication source.
Potential impact
- An attacker may perform unlimited password guesses against internal accounts
- Administrator or other privileged accounts could be compromised
- Account passwords may be changed or reset without the intended policy checks
- Saved server credentials could become exposed or unusable after unauthorized password changes
- An attacker may gain access to server configuration information
- Accounts belonging to different authentication sources could be affected by cross-source reset confusion
- An attacker may perform unlimited password guesses against internal accounts
- Administrator or other privileged accounts could be compromised
- Account passwords may be changed or reset without the intended policy checks
- Saved server credentials could become exposed or unusable after unauthorized password changes
- An attacker may gain access to server configuration information
- Accounts belonging to different authentication sources could be affected by cross-source reset confusion
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing one consistent authentication policy across every login and account-management path.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying failed-attempt counting and lockout decisions after identity normalization, including case-insensitive username or email handling
- Rejecting or isolating alternate framework-provided authentication views that bypass application policy
- Ensuring password-bearing submissions cannot silently fall back to authentication providers that do not enforce equivalent verification and throttling
- Binding password changes, resets, and configuration disclosure to the authenticated user's own internal account and source
- Separating internal-account lockout behavior from external authentication mechanisms
- Using rate limiting, progressive delays, monitoring, and least privilege as additional safeguards
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing one consistent authentication policy across every login and account-management path.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Applying failed-attempt counting and lockout decisions after identity normalization, including case-insensitive username or email handling
- Rejecting or isolating alternate framework-provided authentication views that bypass application policy
- Ensuring password-bearing submissions cannot silently fall back to authentication providers that do not enforce equivalent verification and throttling
- Binding password changes, resets, and configuration disclosure to the authenticated user's own internal account and source
- Separating internal-account lockout behavior from external authentication mechanisms
- Using rate limiting, progressive delays, monitoring, and least privilege as additional safeguards
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess this weakness through:
- Static analysis and code review for duplicated login handlers with inconsistent lockout, throttling, or audit behavior
- Tests that vary username casing, authentication provider configuration, and endpoint routing
- Review of password reset and change flows for account-source and ownership checks
- Integration tests confirming every failed internal password attempt increments the same counter
- Policy enforcement requiring centralized authentication middleware and consistent audit events
- Monitoring for repeated failures distributed across endpoint variants, casing variants, or authentication sources
Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify unprotected authentication routes, but endpoint and configuration coverage should be validated manually.
Organizations can assess this weakness through:
- Static analysis and code review for duplicated login handlers with inconsistent lockout, throttling, or audit behavior
- Tests that vary username casing, authentication provider configuration, and endpoint routing
- Review of password reset and change flows for account-source and ownership checks
- Integration tests confirming every failed internal password attempt increments the same counter
- Policy enforcement requiring centralized authentication middleware and consistent audit events
- Monitoring for repeated failures distributed across endpoint variants, casing variants, or authentication sources
Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify unprotected authentication routes, but endpoint and configuration coverage should be validated manually.
