Summary
GiantappMan LiveWallPaper 2.6.8.0 on Windows contains an authentication weakness in the SignalR Hub handling of /LiveWallpaper/UploadFile. A remote attacker may be able to reach or manipulate this functionality without proving identity, potentially uploading files or invoking protected behavior; public exploit information increases the urgency of assessment.
GiantappMan LiveWallPaper 2.6.8.0 on Windows contains an authentication weakness in the SignalR Hub handling of /LiveWallpaper/UploadFile. A remote attacker may be able to reach or manipulate this functionality without proving identity, potentially uploading files or invoking protected behavior; public exploit information increases the urgency of assessment.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Windows deployments of GiantappMan LiveWallPaper 2.6.8.0 when the SignalR Hub exposes the /LiveWallpaper/UploadFile processing path without consistently enforcing authentication. Risk depends on network reachability, endpoint configuration, and whether authorization checks are applied before file handling.
The issue occurs in Windows deployments of GiantappMan LiveWallPaper 2.6.8.0 when the SignalR Hub exposes the /LiveWallpaper/UploadFile processing path without consistently enforcing authentication. Risk depends on network reachability, endpoint configuration, and whether authorization checks are applied before file handling.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible SignalR Hub endpoint
- Required access: No valid authentication may be required when the vulnerable processing path is reachable
- Trigger point: Requests handled by
/LiveWallpaper/UploadFile - Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may process attacker-controlled requests before confirming that the caller is authenticated and authorized
- Attack surface: Network-accessible SignalR Hub endpoint
- Required access: No valid authentication may be required when the vulnerable processing path is reachable
- Trigger point: Requests handled by
/LiveWallpaper/UploadFile - Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may process attacker-controlled requests before confirming that the caller is authenticated and authorized
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authentication enforcement failure. A sensitive SignalR Hub operation appears to accept or process requests without reliably establishing the caller's identity, which maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication. The related CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function describes the specific condition in which a security-sensitive function is exposed without an effective authentication requirement.
The underlying bug is an authentication enforcement failure. A sensitive SignalR Hub operation appears to accept or process requests without reliably establishing the caller's identity, which maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication. The related CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function describes the specific condition in which a security-sensitive function is exposed without an effective authentication requirement.
Potential impact
- An unauthenticated remote party may access functionality intended for trusted users
- Attackers could upload or manipulate files through the affected operation
- The application may experience unauthorized content changes or service disruption
- Additional compromise could occur if uploaded content is later trusted or processed unsafely
- Attack activity could be conducted remotely without a normal user session
- An unauthenticated remote party may access functionality intended for trusted users
- Attackers could upload or manipulate files through the affected operation
- The application may experience unauthorized content changes or service disruption
- Additional compromise could occur if uploaded content is later trusted or processed unsafely
- Attack activity could be conducted remotely without a normal user session
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and authorization at the SignalR Hub boundary and again within sensitive handlers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authenticated identities before processing upload or file-management requests
- Apply explicit authorization policies based on least privilege
- Validate that the requested operation is permitted for the authenticated tenant, user, or role
- Restrict network exposure of administrative or upload-related endpoints
- Validate file names, types, size, and storage locations independently of authentication checks
- Store uploaded content outside executable or sensitive application paths
- Use deny-by-default access policies and avoid relying solely on client-side controls
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and authorization at the SignalR Hub boundary and again within sensitive handlers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authenticated identities before processing upload or file-management requests
- Apply explicit authorization policies based on least privilege
- Validate that the requested operation is permitted for the authenticated tenant, user, or role
- Restrict network exposure of administrative or upload-related endpoints
- Validate file names, types, size, and storage locations independently of authentication checks
- Store uploaded content outside executable or sensitive application paths
- Use deny-by-default access policies and avoid relying solely on client-side controls
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for SignalR hub methods that lack authentication or authorization attributes and policy enforcement
- Tests that invoke sensitive endpoints without credentials and verify consistent denial
- Review of routing, middleware, and hub configuration to confirm authentication is applied before handler execution
- Monitoring for anonymous requests, unusual upload activity, unexpected file changes, and repeated authorization failures
- Policy enforcement requiring security tests for externally reachable file-processing functions
- Automated review tools that flag missing authorization checks can provide an additional screening layer
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for SignalR hub methods that lack authentication or authorization attributes and policy enforcement
- Tests that invoke sensitive endpoints without credentials and verify consistent denial
- Review of routing, middleware, and hub configuration to confirm authentication is applied before handler execution
- Monitoring for anonymous requests, unusual upload activity, unexpected file changes, and repeated authorization failures
- Policy enforcement requiring security tests for externally reachable file-processing functions
- Automated review tools that flag missing authorization checks can provide an additional screening layer
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| jfyuhong. | jfyuhong.github.io/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
