Summary
HeyCyan App 1.0.103 for Android contains an improper access control vulnerability in its FileProvider component. Under deployment conditions that expose the provider or grant overly broad URI permissions, a remote attacker may access files or provider functionality that should be restricted.
HeyCyan App 1.0.103 for Android contains an improper access control vulnerability in its FileProvider component. Under deployment conditions that expose the provider or grant overly broad URI permissions, a remote attacker may access files or provider functionality that should be restricted.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Android deployments of HeyCyan App 1.0.103 where the FileProvider's exported state, URI permission grants, authority configuration, or shared-path definitions do not adequately restrict access. Exploitability depends on the provider being reachable through an exposed application interface or an overly broad content-URI permission.
The issue occurs in Android deployments of HeyCyan App 1.0.103 where the FileProvider's exported state, URI permission grants, authority configuration, or shared-path definitions do not adequately restrict access. Exploitability depends on the provider being reachable through an exposed application interface or an overly broad content-URI permission.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Android FileProvider and its content-URI interfaces
- Required access: Ability to reach the provider or an application component that exposes provider URIs; authentication requirements depend on the app's component configuration
- Trigger point: A request to access, query, or obtain a file-backed content URI
- Why exploitation is possible: Provider exposure or insufficient URI and path restrictions may allow access beyond the intended caller or file scope
- Attack surface: Android FileProvider and its content-URI interfaces
- Required access: Ability to reach the provider or an application component that exposes provider URIs; authentication requirements depend on the app's component configuration
- Trigger point: A request to access, query, or obtain a file-backed content URI
- Why exploitation is possible: Provider exposure or insufficient URI and path restrictions may allow access beyond the intended caller or file scope
Why this happens
The vulnerability reflects an access-control failure in the configuration or enforcement of an Android FileProvider. When exported status, URI grants, calling-application checks, or shared-path boundaries are too permissive, untrusted callers may obtain capabilities intended only for trusted application components. This maps primarily to CWE-284: Improper Access Control and may also involve CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment when permissions exceed the minimum required authority.
The vulnerability reflects an access-control failure in the configuration or enforcement of an Android FileProvider. When exported status, URI grants, calling-application checks, or shared-path boundaries are too permissive, untrusted callers may obtain capabilities intended only for trusted application components. This maps primarily to CWE-284: Improper Access Control and may also involve CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment when permissions exceed the minimum required authority.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read files exposed through the provider
- An attacker could access application data or temporary content outside the intended scope
- Sensitive tokens, documents, or cached information may be disclosed
- Unauthorized callers could potentially obtain broader file-provider capabilities
- The application may experience privacy or confidentiality impacts
- An attacker may read files exposed through the provider
- An attacker could access application data or temporary content outside the intended scope
- Sensitive tokens, documents, or cached information may be disclosed
- Unauthorized callers could potentially obtain broader file-provider capabilities
- The application may experience privacy or confidentiality impacts
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing least privilege at every FileProvider boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Keep the provider non-exported unless a documented cross-application use case requires exposure
- Grant URI permissions only to specific trusted callers and only for the required operation
- Restrict configured shared paths to narrowly scoped, non-sensitive directories
- Validate caller identity and requested resource scope before granting access
- Avoid placing credentials, private databases, or sensitive temporary files in provider-accessible locations
- Prefer short-lived, narrowly scoped content URIs over broad filesystem exposure
- Apply least-privilege permissions to provider-related components and storage locations
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing least privilege at every FileProvider boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Keep the provider non-exported unless a documented cross-application use case requires exposure
- Grant URI permissions only to specific trusted callers and only for the required operation
- Restrict configured shared paths to narrowly scoped, non-sensitive directories
- Validate caller identity and requested resource scope before granting access
- Avoid placing credentials, private databases, or sensitive temporary files in provider-accessible locations
- Prefer short-lived, narrowly scoped content URIs over broad filesystem exposure
- Apply least-privilege permissions to provider-related components and storage locations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify related risks through:
- Static analysis of Android manifests for exported providers and broad grant-permission settings
- Review of FileProvider path configuration for excessive directory scope or sensitive storage locations
- Code review of URI-generation and permission-granting logic
- Dynamic tests that attempt access from unauthorized applications and verify denial
- Policy checks requiring explicit justification for exported content providers and persistent URI grants
- Automated mobile security scanning and code review tools that flag provider exposure or insecure path declarations
Organizations can identify related risks through:
- Static analysis of Android manifests for exported providers and broad grant-permission settings
- Review of FileProvider path configuration for excessive directory scope or sensitive storage locations
- Code review of URI-generation and permission-granting logic
- Dynamic tests that attempt access from unauthorized applications and verify denial
- Policy checks requiring explicit justification for exported content providers and persistent URI grants
- Automated mobile security scanning and code review tools that flag provider exposure or insecure path declarations
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
