Summary
PrivateGPT 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the URI Artifact Loader. A remotely supplied URI value may cause the server to make requests to attacker-selected destinations when the file-loading function processes it.
PrivateGPT 1.0.0 and 1.0.1 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the URI Artifact Loader. A remotely supplied URI value may cause the server to make requests to attacker-selected destinations when the file-loading function processes it.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments that expose PrivateGPT's URI-based artifact or file-loading functionality and allow externally influenced values to reach the load_file_from_uri function. Risk depends on the server's network connectivity, access to internal services, and the controls applied to outbound requests.
The issue occurs in deployments that expose PrivateGPT's URI-based artifact or file-loading functionality and allow externally influenced values to reach the load_file_from_uri function. Risk depends on the server's network connectivity, access to internal services, and the controls applied to outbound requests.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely reachable URI Artifact Loader interface
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence the URI value processed by the server
- Trigger point: Retrieval of a file or artifact through
load_file_from_uri - Why exploitation is possible: The application may use an attacker-controlled destination for server-side requests without sufficiently restricting permitted schemes, hosts, ports, or network locations
- Attack surface: The remotely reachable URI Artifact Loader interface
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence the URI value processed by the server
- Trigger point: Retrieval of a file or artifact through
load_file_from_uri - Why exploitation is possible: The application may use an attacker-controlled destination for server-side requests without sufficiently restricting permitted schemes, hosts, ports, or network locations
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation and authorization of user-controlled URLs before the application performs outbound requests. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where a server is induced to access destinations selected by an external party rather than only approved resources.
The vulnerability is caused by insufficient validation and authorization of user-controlled URLs before the application performs outbound requests. This behavior maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where a server is induced to access destinations selected by an external party rather than only approved resources.
Potential impact
- The server may make requests to internal or otherwise inaccessible network services
- Attackers could retrieve information from services reachable by the application
- Cloud or container metadata may be exposed where network access permits
- Internal systems could receive unexpected requests or be probed
- Network segmentation and access-control assumptions could be weakened
- The server may make requests to internal or otherwise inaccessible network services
- Attackers could retrieve information from services reachable by the application
- Cloud or container metadata may be exposed where network access permits
- Internal systems could receive unexpected requests or be probed
- Network segmentation and access-control assumptions could be weakened
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in externally supplied URIs and restricting outbound connectivity.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only explicitly approved URI schemes, hosts, ports, and resource locations
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection establishment, including protections against DNS rebinding
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, and other sensitive network ranges unless specifically required
- Using controlled proxy or retrieval services with narrowly scoped network permissions
- Applying egress firewall rules and least-privilege service identities
- Avoiding direct access to cloud metadata endpoints from application workloads
- Returning only the minimum required content and enforcing request timeouts and size limits
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in externally supplied URIs and restricting outbound connectivity.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only explicitly approved URI schemes, hosts, ports, and resource locations
- Resolving and validating destinations before connection establishment, including protections against DNS rebinding
- Blocking loopback, link-local, private, and other sensitive network ranges unless specifically required
- Using controlled proxy or retrieval services with narrowly scoped network permissions
- Applying egress firewall rules and least-privilege service identities
- Avoiding direct access to cloud metadata endpoints from application workloads
- Returning only the minimum required content and enforcing request timeouts and size limits
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for SSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis and code review of URL-fetching, URI parsing, redirect handling, and HTTP client calls
- Checks for user-controlled values reaching outbound request functions without allowlisting
- Runtime monitoring of outbound connections to private, loopback, link-local, and metadata addresses
- Network policies that alert on unexpected egress destinations or protocols
- Tests covering redirects, alternate IP representations, DNS resolution changes, and non-HTTP schemes
Automated security review tools may help identify unvalidated URL-fetching paths, but network-level monitoring remains important.
Organizations can look for SSRF exposure through:
- Static analysis and code review of URL-fetching, URI parsing, redirect handling, and HTTP client calls
- Checks for user-controlled values reaching outbound request functions without allowlisting
- Runtime monitoring of outbound connections to private, loopback, link-local, and metadata addresses
- Network policies that alert on unexpected egress destinations or protocols
- Tests covering redirects, alternate IP representations, DNS resolution changes, and non-HTTP schemes
Automated security review tools may help identify unvalidated URL-fetching paths, but network-level monitoring remains important.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
