Summary
OpenRemote contains a missing authorization vulnerability in GatewayServiceResource, allowing authenticated users without administrative privileges to manage gateway tunnels. Under deployments where gateway tunnel endpoints are reachable by ordinary authenticated accounts, this could expose internal network paths or disrupt operator-managed tunnels.
OpenRemote contains a missing authorization vulnerability in GatewayServiceResource, allowing authenticated users without administrative privileges to manage gateway tunnels. Under deployments where gateway tunnel endpoints are reachable by ordinary authenticated accounts, this could expose internal network paths or disrupt operator-managed tunnels.
Affected context
The issue occurs in OpenRemote versions 1.2.0 through before 1.31.0 when GatewayServiceResource processes gateway tunnel operations without verifying that the authenticated principal has the required administrative role. Deployments that expose these endpoints to non-administrative users and have reachable edge gateways may be particularly affected.
The issue occurs in OpenRemote versions 1.2.0 through before 1.31.0 when GatewayServiceResource processes gateway tunnel operations without verifying that the authenticated principal has the required administrative role. Deployments that expose these endpoints to non-administrative users and have reachable edge gateways may be particularly affected.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Gateway tunnel management endpoints exposed through the OpenRemote service
- Required access: A valid authenticated user account; administrative privileges may not be required
- Trigger point: Requests that create, query, or remove gateway tunnels
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately restrict tunnel operations to permitted administrative roles
- Attack surface: Gateway tunnel management endpoints exposed through the OpenRemote service
- Required access: A valid authenticated user account; administrative privileges may not be required
- Trigger point: Requests that create, query, or remove gateway tunnels
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately restrict tunnel operations to permitted administrative roles
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from an authorization control failure in which access to a sensitive gateway-management operation is authenticated but not sufficiently authorized. This maps to CWE-862 because the application does not consistently enforce the required permission check before allowing tunnel lifecycle operations. The insecure pattern is treating successful authentication as sufficient access to a privileged network-control function.
The vulnerability results from an authorization control failure in which access to a sensitive gateway-management operation is authenticated but not sufficiently authorized. This maps to CWE-862 because the application does not consistently enforce the required permission check before allowing tunnel lifecycle operations. The insecure pattern is treating successful authentication as sufficient access to a privileged network-control function.
Potential impact
- An attacker may establish persistent bidirectional TCP circuits through an edge gateway
- An attacker could reach services or network segments accessible from the edge gateway
- Unauthorized users may disrupt or tear down operator-managed gateway tunnels
- Internal traffic exposure, lateral movement, or network reconnaissance may become possible
- Gateway connectivity and operational availability could be affected
- An attacker may establish persistent bidirectional TCP circuits through an edge gateway
- An attacker could reach services or network segments accessible from the edge gateway
- Unauthorized users may disrupt or tear down operator-managed gateway tunnels
- Internal traffic exposure, lateral movement, or network reconnaissance may become possible
- Gateway connectivity and operational availability could be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every gateway
tunnel operation, not merely verifying that a caller is authenticated.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require an explicit administrative or narrowly scoped tunnel-management permission
- Apply server-side authorization checks consistently to create, query, and delete operations
- Use deny-by-default policies for gateway and network-control endpoints
- Reduce the reach and privileges of edge gateway connections
- Restrict which networks and services gateway tunnels can access
- Review existing sessions, tunnels, and audit records after authorization policy changes
- Separate operator and ordinary-user roles using least-privilege access models
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every gateway
tunnel operation, not merely verifying that a caller is authenticated.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require an explicit administrative or narrowly scoped tunnel-management permission
- Apply server-side authorization checks consistently to create, query, and delete operations
- Use deny-by-default policies for gateway and network-control endpoints
- Reduce the reach and privileges of edge gateway connections
- Restrict which networks and services gateway tunnels can access
- Review existing sessions, tunnels, and audit records after authorization policy changes
- Separate operator and ordinary-user roles using least-privilege access models
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis and code review checks confirming authorization before each sensitive resource action
- API policy tests that exercise gateway tunnel operations with ordinary authenticated roles
- Signals where non-administrative accounts create, query, or terminate gateway tunnels
- Unexpected persistent tunnel lifetimes, repeated tunnel teardown events, or access to unusual internal destinations
- Centralized audit logging that records the principal, role, gateway, operation, and outcome
- Policy enforcement requiring explicit permission mappings for network-control endpoints
Automated API security testing and authorization review tools may help identify
inconsistent role enforcement across related endpoints.
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis and code review checks confirming authorization before each sensitive resource action
- API policy tests that exercise gateway tunnel operations with ordinary authenticated roles
- Signals where non-administrative accounts create, query, or terminate gateway tunnels
- Unexpected persistent tunnel lifetimes, repeated tunnel teardown events, or access to unusual internal destinations
- Centralized audit logging that records the principal, role, gateway, operation, and outcome
- Policy enforcement requiring explicit permission mappings for network-control endpoints
Automated API security testing and authorization review tools may help identify
inconsistent role enforcement across related endpoints.
