/

CVE-2026-114575

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

Command Injection (CWE-77) in TOTOLINK A950RG Module

CVE-2026-114575

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

OS Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A command injection vulnerability in the TOTOLINK A950RG UploadCustomModule function allows attacker-controlled FileMd5 input to influence command execution. Because the affected function is reachable remotely, an attacker who can access the relevant interface may execute operating-system commands with the device's privileges.

A command injection vulnerability in the TOTOLINK A950RG UploadCustomModule function allows attacker-controlled FileMd5 input to influence command execution. Because the affected function is reachable remotely, an attacker who can access the relevant interface may execute operating-system commands with the device's privileges.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in TOTOLINK A950RG firmware version 4.1.2cu.5268_B20221104, within the UploadCustomModule function of lib/cste_modules/product.so. Risk is present when the remotely reachable module-upload workflow accepts the FileMd5 argument and incorporates it into command processing without sufficiently separating data from shell syntax.

The vulnerability occurs in TOTOLINK A950RG firmware version 4.1.2cu.5268_B20221104, within the UploadCustomModule function of lib/cste_modules/product.so. Risk is present when the remotely reachable module-upload workflow accepts the FileMd5 argument and incorporates it into command processing without sufficiently separating data from shell syntax.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The device's remotely reachable custom-module upload interface
  • Required access: Network access to the exposed interface; authentication requirements are deployment-dependent and are not established by the available description
  • Trigger point: Processing of the FileMd5 argument by UploadCustomModule
  • Why exploitation is possible: The argument is insufficiently constrained before being used in a command-execution context, allowing input to alter the intended command structure
  • Attack surface: The device's remotely reachable custom-module upload interface
  • Required access: Network access to the exposed interface; authentication requirements are deployment-dependent and are not established by the available description
  • Trigger point: Processing of the FileMd5 argument by UploadCustomModule
  • Why exploitation is possible: The argument is insufficiently constrained before being used in a command-execution context, allowing input to alter the intended command structure

Why this happens

The underlying bug is improper neutralization of special elements in an operating-system command. Input supplied through FileMd5 is treated as trusted command data rather than as a strictly validated value, allowing attacker-controlled content to affect command interpretation. This maps primarily to CWE-77, Command Injection, and is also related to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.

The underlying bug is improper neutralization of special elements in an operating-system command. Input supplied through FileMd5 is treated as trusted command data rather than as a strictly validated value, allowing attacker-controlled content to affect command interpretation. This maps primarily to CWE-77, Command Injection, and is also related to CWE-74, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the router
  • The device could be taken over or its configuration could be altered
  • Network traffic, credentials, or stored data could be exposed
  • The router could be used for persistence, service disruption, or attacks against other systems
  • Compromised devices could contribute to botnet or broader network activity
  • An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the router
  • The device could be taken over or its configuration could be altered
  • Network traffic, credentials, or stored data could be exposed
  • The router could be used for persistence, service disruption, or attacks against other systems
  • Compromised devices could contribute to botnet or broader network activity

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally centers on removing shell interpretation from module

processing and reducing trust in request parameters.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer direct APIs, fixed argument arrays, or library calls instead of invoking a shell
  • Apply strict allowlist validation for FileMd5 values, such as enforcing the expected format and length
  • Reject unexpected characters and normalize input before any downstream processing
  • Ensure upload and module-management interfaces require appropriate authentication and authorization
  • Run related services with the least privileges needed for their function
  • Segment device-management interfaces from untrusted networks and limit administrative exposure
  • Add regression tests covering metacharacters, malformed values, and boundary conditions

Mitigation generally centers on removing shell interpretation from module

processing and reducing trust in request parameters.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Prefer direct APIs, fixed argument arrays, or library calls instead of invoking a shell
  • Apply strict allowlist validation for FileMd5 values, such as enforcing the expected format and length
  • Reject unexpected characters and normalize input before any downstream processing
  • Ensure upload and module-management interfaces require appropriate authentication and authorization
  • Run related services with the least privileges needed for their function
  • Segment device-management interfaces from untrusted networks and limit administrative exposure
  • Add regression tests covering metacharacters, malformed values, and boundary conditions

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this vulnerability class through:

  • Static analysis rules that identify request data reaching system, shell, or process-spawning APIs
  • Code review searches for string concatenation or interpolation involving FileMd5-like parameters
  • Review of native-library wrappers and firmware handlers that construct external commands
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command interpreters, or unusual outbound connections from the device
  • Network policy alerts for access to management and upload endpoints from untrusted segments
  • Automated security scanning and software composition review integrated into firmware development workflows

Organizations can look for this vulnerability class through:

  • Static analysis rules that identify request data reaching system, shell, or process-spawning APIs
  • Code review searches for string concatenation or interpolation involving FileMd5-like parameters
  • Review of native-library wrappers and firmware handlers that construct external commands
  • Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command interpreters, or unusual outbound connections from the device
  • Network policy alerts for access to management and upload endpoints from untrusted segments
  • Automated security scanning and software composition review integrated into firmware development workflows

Sources

SourceLink
gist.github.comgist.github.com/H3rmesk1t/3a629799af33425e07571182e539a794
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-114575
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/1021292
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/424943
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/424943/cti
totolink.nettotolink.net/

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The described attack can be launched remotely against the affected

upload functionality, although actual exposure depends on network reachability

and any authentication or authorization controls protecting the interface.

The available description does not establish whether authentication is

required. Access to the relevant remote interface and permission to reach

the UploadCustomModule workflow are the important prerequisites.

Avoid shell-based command construction, validate FileMd5 against a strict

allowlist, and use parameterized process or library APIs when external

operations are necessary.

Treat all request parameters as untrusted, enforce least privilege, isolate

management interfaces, and use static analysis, code review, and runtime

monitoring to detect data flows into command-execution functions.

Yes. The described attack can be launched remotely against the affected

upload functionality, although actual exposure depends on network reachability

and any authentication or authorization controls protecting the interface.

The available description does not establish whether authentication is

required. Access to the relevant remote interface and permission to reach

the UploadCustomModule workflow are the important prerequisites.

Avoid shell-based command construction, validate FileMd5 against a strict

allowlist, and use parameterized process or library APIs when external

operations are necessary.

Treat all request parameters as untrusted, enforce least privilege, isolate

management interfaces, and use static analysis, code review, and runtime

monitoring to detect data flows into command-execution functions.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.