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CVE-2026-11457

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Injection in JimuReport Test-Connection Endpoint (CWE-74) in JeeWMS

CVE-2026-11457

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Injection

CWE:

CWE-74, CWE-707

Impact:

Arbitrary Injection into Backend Interpreter / Potential Remote Code or Command Execution Depending on Sink

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The JimuReport test-connection endpoint in JeeWMS improperly handles database connection parameters, allowing crafted values in dbType, dbDriver, dbUrl, dbUsername, and dbPassword to be interpreted as executable content.

An attacker over the network can exploit this injection flaw to manipulate backend behavior, potentially influencing database connectivity or executing unintended commands depending on the downstream sink.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in JeeWMS deployments that expose the JimuReport test-connection endpoint at /base-boot/jmreport/testConnection.

The issue arises when the application accepts user-supplied database connection parameters (dbType, dbDriver, dbUrl, dbUsername, dbPassword) and forwards them directly into lower-level APIs or interpreters without robust validation or escaping.

Any environment where this endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks, including internal but multi-tenant environments, is at elevated risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP/S access to the JimuReport test-connection endpoint /base-boot/jmreport/testConnection.
  • Required access: Network-level access; no indication of authentication being strictly required for exploitation.
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted dbType, dbDriver, dbUrl, dbUsername, or dbPassword parameters that the backend uses to construct connection strings or driver configurations.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint processes attacker-controlled parameters and integrates them into interpreter or framework contexts (e.g., connection strings, driver loading mechanisms) without proper sanitization, encoding, or allow-listing, enabling injection into the underlying processing layer.

Why this happens

The core bug is a classic injection issue, where untrusted input is incorporated into commands or configuration destined for an interpreter or complex backend subsystem without robust validation.

This maps to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, and CWE-707: Improper Neutralization, indicating that the application fails to neutralize or constrain special characters and structures that have syntactic meaning for the downstream consumer (e.g., database drivers, connection frameworks, or scripting layers).

Instead of treating database connection parameters as strictly constrained data, the endpoint appears to allow arbitrary values to influence how backend components are loaded or invoked, creating a path for attackers to inject unexpected behavior.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may be able to alter database connection targets, potentially redirecting connections to attacker-controlled servers.
  • Exploitation could lead to disclosure of database credentials or connection details if error responses or logs expose sensitive information.
  • Depending on how parameters are used, attackers could trigger arbitrary driver loading or gain execution capability within the application context.
  • Denial of service may occur if malicious parameters cause repeated connection failures or resource exhaustion.
  • In multi-tenant or shared environments, manipulation of connection parameters could result in cross-tenant data access.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on strictly constraining and isolating database connection metadata passed into backend components.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Allow-listing: Restrict dbType and dbDriver to known, predefined values selected from server-side lists rather than accepting arbitrary strings.
  • Structured configuration: Build connection strings and driver settings from fixed templates populated with validated fields, avoiding string concatenation or template evaluation on raw user input.
  • Input validation and normalization: Apply strict validation on dbUrl, dbUsername, and dbPassword, limiting them to expected character sets and formats and rejecting values containing control characters or syntax meaningful to downstream interpreters.
  • Separation of concerns: Disallow end users from directly controlling low-level driver selection or arbitrary connection targets; instead, map high-level choices (e.g., "use reporting database") to predefined configurations.
  • Least privilege: Run the reporting/test-connection functionality with minimal privileges and restricted network reach, reducing the impact of successful injection attempts.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Configure rules to flag instances where HTTP parameters like dbType, dbDriver, dbUrl, dbUsername, or dbPassword are concatenated into connection strings, passed directly into driver loaders, or used in reflection/instantiation APIs without validation.
  • Code review cues: Reviewers should scrutinize "test connection" or "dynamic data source" features, ensuring that only predefined configuration profiles are selectable and that no raw input reaches interpreter or driver configuration contexts.
  • Logging and anomaly monitoring: Monitor for unusual patterns in test-connection requests, such as unexpected driver names, unusual URLs, or failed connection bursts, and correlate with error logs that show malformed connection strings or unexpected driver loading attempts.
  • Policy enforcement: Introduce coding standards that ban dynamic driver loading or arbitrary connection targets driven by user input, and enforce these through CI pipeline checks and architectural reviews.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/0d000721999/evc1/issues/1
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-11457
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/828509
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/369076
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/369076/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it is remotely exploitable by anyone who can send HTTP/S requests to the /base-boot/jmreport/testConnection endpoint, assuming it is exposed on a reachable network path.

The advisory does not specify authentication requirements. In many implementations, test-connection endpoints are insufficiently protected, so administrators should not assume that authentication is required unless they have explicitly enforced it.

The safest pattern is to eliminate user control over low-level database connection parameters: provide only server-side–defined connection profiles, restrict driver and type selection to fixed lists, and ensure all connection metadata is validated and composed using safe, structured APIs rather than string concatenation.

To prevent similar issues, design endpoints so that untrusted input never directly influences interpreters, connection frameworks, or dynamic loading mechanisms. Enforce strict validation, prefer configuration-by-identifier (selecting from predefined options), apply security-focused code reviews to "test connection" and configuration endpoints, and integrate automated checks that flag dynamic construction of commands or connection strings from user input.

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