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CVE-2026-114262

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Unrestricted Upload (CWE-434) in File Management System

CVE-2026-114262

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Unrestricted File Upload

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-434

Impact:

Unauthorized File Placement and Potential Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A remotely reachable file upload weakness in the File Management System's FileController.php allows insufficiently restricted files to be submitted through the store function. If an attacker can reach the upload endpoint, they may upload malicious or otherwise dangerous content, with further impact depending on storage, validation, and server execution controls.

A remotely reachable file upload weakness in the File Management System's FileController.php allows insufficiently restricted files to be submitted through the store function. If an attacker can reach the upload endpoint, they may upload malicious or otherwise dangerous content, with further impact depending on storage, validation, and server execution controls.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in the file application's store function within app/Http/Controllers/FileController.php. It may affect deployments where the upload endpoint is remotely accessible and uploaded content is not consistently constrained by type, filename, size, storage location, or execution policy. Because the project uses a rolling-release model, affected deployment states may vary and should be evaluated based on the deployed code and configuration.

The vulnerability occurs in the file application's store function within app/Http/Controllers/FileController.php. It may affect deployments where the upload endpoint is remotely accessible and uploaded content is not consistently constrained by type, filename, size, storage location, or execution policy. Because the project uses a rolling-release model, affected deployment states may vary and should be evaluated based on the deployed code and configuration.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: A remotely accessible file-upload endpoint handled by the store function
  • Required access: The ability to reach the endpoint, with any authentication or authorization requirements determined by the deployment
  • Trigger point: Processing and storing a submitted file through FileController.php
  • Why exploitation is possible: Upload validation or storage controls may allow content that should be rejected, including files with dangerous types or executable characteristics
  • Attack surface: A remotely accessible file-upload endpoint handled by the store function
  • Required access: The ability to reach the endpoint, with any authentication or authorization requirements determined by the deployment
  • Trigger point: Processing and storing a submitted file through FileController.php
  • Why exploitation is possible: Upload validation or storage controls may allow content that should be rejected, including files with dangerous types or executable characteristics

Why this happens

The underlying issue is insufficient restriction of user-controlled file uploads. This maps primarily to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, where an application accepts and stores uploaded content without reliably enforcing an allowlist, safe naming policy, size limits, content verification, and non-executable storage boundaries. The related CWE-284: Improper Access Control may apply when authorization controls do not adequately limit who can upload files or where those files can be placed.

The underlying issue is insufficient restriction of user-controlled file uploads. This maps primarily to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, where an application accepts and stores uploaded content without reliably enforcing an allowlist, safe naming policy, size limits, content verification, and non-executable storage boundaries. The related CWE-284: Improper Access Control may apply when authorization controls do not adequately limit who can upload files or where those files can be placed.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may place unauthorized or malicious files on the server
  • Uploaded content could be served to users and contribute to phishing or stored-content attacks
  • The application may experience resource exhaustion through oversized or excessive uploads
  • Server-side code execution could occur if uploaded files are stored in an executable location and interpreted by the runtime
  • Stored files could enable follow-on compromise or unauthorized data access
  • An attacker may place unauthorized or malicious files on the server
  • Uploaded content could be served to users and contribute to phishing or stored-content attacks
  • The application may experience resource exhaustion through oversized or excessive uploads
  • Server-side code execution could occur if uploaded files are stored in an executable location and interpreted by the runtime
  • Stored files could enable follow-on compromise or unauthorized data access

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in uploaded content and separating file storage from application execution.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Permit only narrowly defined file types using extension, MIME, and content-signature checks together
  • Generate server-side filenames and prevent user-controlled paths or filenames from influencing storage
  • Store uploads outside executable and publicly served directories where practical
  • Apply restrictive size, quantity, and request-rate limits
  • Enforce authorization before accepting uploads and before allowing uploaded content to be retrieved
  • Disable script execution in upload locations and serve content with safe response headers
  • Scan or quarantine higher-risk content and record upload activity for review
  • Run the application with least privilege so upload handling cannot modify sensitive locations

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in uploaded content and separating file storage from application execution.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Permit only narrowly defined file types using extension, MIME, and content-signature checks together
  • Generate server-side filenames and prevent user-controlled paths or filenames from influencing storage
  • Store uploads outside executable and publicly served directories where practical
  • Apply restrictive size, quantity, and request-rate limits
  • Enforce authorization before accepting uploads and before allowing uploaded content to be retrieved
  • Disable script execution in upload locations and serve content with safe response headers
  • Scan or quarantine higher-risk content and record upload activity for review
  • Run the application with least privilege so upload handling cannot modify sensitive locations

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine static analysis, code review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:

  • Search for upload handlers that directly trust request filenames, extensions, MIME types, or client-supplied paths
  • Review whether uploaded files are stored beneath web roots or directories capable of executing scripts
  • Check for missing allowlists, content validation, size limits, authorization checks, and generated filenames
  • Monitor upload logs for unusual extensions, repeated failures, excessive volume, or unexpected destinations
  • Enforce CI policies requiring approved upload-validation and storage patterns
  • Use automated code review or security scanning tools to flag unrestricted file-upload flows

Detection can combine static analysis, code review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:

  • Search for upload handlers that directly trust request filenames, extensions, MIME types, or client-supplied paths
  • Review whether uploaded files are stored beneath web roots or directories capable of executing scripts
  • Check for missing allowlists, content validation, size limits, authorization checks, and generated filenames
  • Monitor upload logs for unusual extensions, repeated failures, excessive volume, or unexpected destinations
  • Enforce CI policies requiring approved upload-validation and storage patterns
  • Use automated code review or security scanning tools to flag unrestricted file-upload flows

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/MomoTommy/file-management-system/issues/2
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-114262
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/1018614
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/424694
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/424694/cti

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when the affected upload endpoint is reachable over the network and the attacker satisfies any authentication or authorization requirements enforced by the deployment.

Not necessarily. The required access depends on the application's route protection and authorization rules; access to the upload operation is the key prerequisite.

Accept only narrowly allowlisted content, validate files server-side, generate storage names, and place uploads in a non-executable location outside the public application path where possible.

Treat uploaded files as untrusted data, enforce authorization and resource limits, disable execution in upload directories, and continuously review upload handlers through code analysis and runtime monitoring.

It may be remotely exploitable when the affected upload endpoint is reachable over the network and the attacker satisfies any authentication or authorization requirements enforced by the deployment.

Not necessarily. The required access depends on the application's route protection and authorization rules; access to the upload operation is the key prerequisite.

Accept only narrowly allowlisted content, validate files server-side, generate storage names, and place uploads in a non-executable location outside the public application path where possible.

Treat uploaded files as untrusted data, enforce authorization and resource limits, disable execution in upload directories, and continuously review upload handlers through code analysis and runtime monitoring.

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