Summary
A remotely reachable flaw in the file-management-system-php application allows the file upload functionality to accept files without sufficient restriction.
If an attacker can reach the affected upload operation, they may upload unauthorized content, potentially enabling code execution or other server-side impact depending on storage and execution controls.
A remotely reachable flaw in the file-management-system-php application allows the file upload functionality to accept files without sufficient restriction.
If an attacker can reach the affected upload operation, they may upload unauthorized content, potentially enabling code execution or other server-side impact depending on storage and execution controls.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the save_files function of admin_class.php when handling the Upload input. It may affect deployments where the upload endpoint is remotely accessible and uploaded content is not constrained by robust type, name, size, storage, and execution policies. The practical impact depends on authentication requirements, web-server behavior, and filesystem permissions.
The issue occurs in the save_files function of admin_class.php when handling the Upload input. It may affect deployments where the upload endpoint is remotely accessible and uploaded content is not constrained by robust type, name, size, storage, and execution policies. The practical impact depends on authentication requirements, web-server behavior, and filesystem permissions.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible file-upload functionality
- Required access: Network access to the affected application; authentication requirements are deployment-dependent
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Uploadargument by thesave_filesfunction - Why exploitation is possible: Inadequate restrictions may allow attacker-controlled files to be accepted and stored without sufficiently enforcing permitted content types or safe storage behavior
- Attack surface: The remotely accessible file-upload functionality
- Required access: Network access to the affected application; authentication requirements are deployment-dependent
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Uploadargument by thesave_filesfunction - Why exploitation is possible: Inadequate restrictions may allow attacker-controlled files to be accepted and stored without sufficiently enforcing permitted content types or safe storage behavior
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an unrestricted file-upload condition mapped to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The upload handler does not adequately constrain attacker-controlled file content, type, naming, or destination before accepting it. This insecure pattern can allow files outside the application's intended upload policy to enter the server environment.
The underlying bug is an unrestricted file-upload condition mapped to CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The upload handler does not adequately constrain attacker-controlled file content, type, naming, or destination before accepting it. This insecure pattern can allow files outside the application's intended upload policy to enter the server environment.
Potential impact
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded content could be served to users or interpreted by the web server
- The application may experience stored content injection or defacement
- Server-side code execution could occur if executable uploads are accepted in an executable location
- Compromise could expand according to the application's filesystem and process privileges
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded content could be served to users or interpreted by the web server
- The application may experience stored content injection or defacement
- Server-side code execution could occur if executable uploads are accepted in an executable location
- Compromise could expand according to the application's filesystem and process privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating every uploaded file as untrusted and enforcing a narrowly defined upload policy.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only required file types using content-aware validation rather than filename checks alone
- Restricting file names, extensions, sizes, and archive behavior
- Storing uploads outside executable or publicly served directories where feasible
- Serving uploaded content with non-executable handling and restrictive content types
- Using generated server-side names and isolating uploaded files from application code
- Applying least-privilege permissions to the application process and upload directories
- Requiring appropriate authorization and applying request-size and rate controls
Mitigation generally focuses on treating every uploaded file as untrusted and enforcing a narrowly defined upload policy.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowing only required file types using content-aware validation rather than filename checks alone
- Restricting file names, extensions, sizes, and archive behavior
- Storing uploads outside executable or publicly served directories where feasible
- Serving uploaded content with non-executable handling and restrictive content types
- Using generated server-side names and isolating uploaded files from application code
- Applying least-privilege permissions to the application process and upload directories
- Requiring appropriate authorization and applying request-size and rate controls
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine source review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:
- Use static analysis to identify upload handlers that trust user-controlled names, extensions, MIME types, or destinations
- Review code paths involving
move_uploaded_file, filesystem writes, multipart request parsing, and dynamic path construction - Check whether upload directories are executable, publicly exposed, or writable by overly privileged processes
- Monitor web and filesystem events for unexpected extensions, executable content, path traversal indicators, and anomalous upload volume
- Enforce repository and CI policies requiring allowlisted upload types and non-executable storage
- Automated code-review tools may help identify missing validation and unsafe upload-to-web-root patterns
Detection can combine source review, runtime monitoring, and policy enforcement:
- Use static analysis to identify upload handlers that trust user-controlled names, extensions, MIME types, or destinations
- Review code paths involving
move_uploaded_file, filesystem writes, multipart request parsing, and dynamic path construction - Check whether upload directories are executable, publicly exposed, or writable by overly privileged processes
- Monitor web and filesystem events for unexpected extensions, executable content, path traversal indicators, and anomalous upload volume
- Enforce repository and CI policies requiring allowlisted upload types and non-executable storage
- Automated code-review tools may help identify missing validation and unsafe upload-to-web-root patterns
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
