Summary
Trigger.dev contains a missing authentication and ownership-verification flaw in the supervisor workload server. An attacker with network access and a valid run/snapshot pair may access environment variables and run tokens or manipulate runs belonging to other deployments.
Trigger.dev contains a missing authentication and ownership-verification flaw in the supervisor workload server. An attacker with network access and a valid run/snapshot pair may access environment variables and run tokens or manipulate runs belonging to other deployments.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments using Trigger.dev's supervisor workload server through version 4.7.6. Risk is present when the server exposes the attempts/start endpoint without sufficiently verifying the caller's identity and ownership of the referenced run and snapshot.
The issue occurs in deployments using Trigger.dev's supervisor workload server through version 4.7.6. Risk is present when the server exposes the attempts/start endpoint without sufficiently verifying the caller's identity and ownership of the referenced run and snapshot.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible supervisor workload server endpoint
- Required access: Network connectivity and a valid run/snapshot pair
- Trigger point: Request handling for the attempts/start endpoint
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint does not adequately authenticate the caller or verify that the referenced run belongs to the caller's deployment
- Attack surface: Network-accessible supervisor workload server endpoint
- Required access: Network connectivity and a valid run/snapshot pair
- Trigger point: Request handling for the attempts/start endpoint
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint does not adequately authenticate the caller or verify that the referenced run belongs to the caller's deployment
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an authentication control failure: a sensitive workload-management endpoint accepts requests without reliably establishing the caller's identity and authorization context. Because ownership is not verified before run data is returned or lifecycle actions are performed, a caller may interact with resources belonging to another deployment. This behavior maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
The underlying defect is an authentication control failure: a sensitive workload-management endpoint accepts requests without reliably establishing the caller's identity and authorization context. Because ownership is not verified before run data is returned or lifecycle actions are performed, a caller may interact with resources belonging to another deployment. This behavior maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
Potential impact
- An attacker may obtain resolved environment variables containing sensitive configuration
- An attacker may obtain run JWTs that could enable further access
- Unauthorized users could start, complete, or suspend runs belonging to other tenants
- Cross-tenant workflow integrity could be compromised
- Exposed credentials or tokens could enable additional actions within connected services
- An attacker may obtain resolved environment variables containing sensitive configuration
- An attacker may obtain run JWTs that could enable further access
- Unauthorized users could start, complete, or suspend runs belonging to other tenants
- Cross-tenant workflow integrity could be compromised
- Exposed credentials or tokens could enable additional actions within connected services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and resource-level authorization at every sensitive workload endpoint.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring a strongly authenticated service identity before processing run-control requests
- Verifying that the authenticated identity owns or is explicitly authorized for the referenced run and snapshot
- Applying deny-by-default authorization for cross-deployment access
- Limiting the scope, lifetime, and permissions of returned run tokens
- Avoiding exposure of resolved environment variables unless they are strictly required
- Enforcing tenant isolation at the API, data-access, and workload layers
- Recording and rate-limiting sensitive lifecycle operations
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and resource-level authorization at every sensitive workload endpoint.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Requiring a strongly authenticated service identity before processing run-control requests
- Verifying that the authenticated identity owns or is explicitly authorized for the referenced run and snapshot
- Applying deny-by-default authorization for cross-deployment access
- Limiting the scope, lifetime, and permissions of returned run tokens
- Avoiding exposure of resolved environment variables unless they are strictly required
- Enforcing tenant isolation at the API, data-access, and workload layers
- Recording and rate-limiting sensitive lifecycle operations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static and semantic analysis of endpoints that perform sensitive actions without authentication middleware
- Code review checks confirming identity and resource-ownership validation before data access or state changes
- API policy enforcement requiring authenticated principals for workload-management routes
- Integration tests that attempt cross-tenant access using valid resource identifiers
- Monitoring for attempts to start, complete, or suspend runs outside the caller's deployment context
Automated application-security review tools may help identify missing authentication and authorization checks, but endpoint behavior should also be verified with authenticated and cross-tenant test cases.
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static and semantic analysis of endpoints that perform sensitive actions without authentication middleware
- Code review checks confirming identity and resource-ownership validation before data access or state changes
- API policy enforcement requiring authenticated principals for workload-management routes
- Integration tests that attempt cross-tenant access using valid resource identifiers
- Monitoring for attempts to start, complete, or suspend runs outside the caller's deployment context
Automated application-security review tools may help identify missing authentication and authorization checks, but endpoint behavior should also be verified with authenticated and cross-tenant test cases.
