Summary
LavaLite CMS contains a missing authentication vulnerability in its Filer module, allowing unauthenticated requests to access file download and display routes. If these routes accept attacker-controlled disk names and paths without adequate authorization, private uploads stored locally or on configured S3-compatible disks may be disclosed.
LavaLite CMS contains a missing authentication vulnerability in its Filer module, allowing unauthenticated requests to access file download and display routes. If these routes accept attacker-controlled disk names and paths without adequate authorization, private uploads stored locally or on configured S3-compatible disks may be disclosed.
Affected context
The issue may affect LavaLite CMS deployments using the Filer module when the filer/download or filer/display routes are exposed and do not require authentication or authorization checks. Risk is higher when private uploads are stored on local disks or configured remote S3 disks that can be selected through request parameters.
The issue may affect LavaLite CMS deployments using the Filer module when the filer/download or filer/display routes are exposed and do not require authentication or authorization checks. Risk is higher when private uploads are stored on local disks or configured remote S3 disks that can be selected through request parameters.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Publicly reachable Filer download and display routes
- Required access: No authenticated account may be required
- Trigger point: A request to
filer/downloadorfiler/displaywith attacker-controlled disk and path values - Why exploitation is possible: The affected routes may retrieve files before verifying the caller's identity and permission to access the requested storage object
- Attack surface: Publicly reachable Filer download and display routes
- Required access: No authenticated account may be required
- Trigger point: A request to
filer/downloadorfiler/displaywith attacker-controlled disk and path values - Why exploitation is possible: The affected routes may retrieve files before verifying the caller's identity and permission to access the requested storage object
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is a missing authentication or authorization boundary around file retrieval functionality. The Filer controller accepts requests that identify storage locations and file paths without consistently requiring an authenticated, authorized user, mapping to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. This allows a sensitive file operation to be reachable through an unauthenticated interface.
The underlying flaw is a missing authentication or authorization boundary around file retrieval functionality. The Filer controller accepts requests that identify storage locations and file paths without consistently requiring an authenticated, authorized user, mapping to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. This allows a sensitive file operation to be reachable through an unauthenticated interface.
Potential impact
- Unauthenticated attackers may download private uploaded files
- Sensitive documents, media, or configuration data could be disclosed
- Files stored on configured remote S3 disks may be exposed
- Disclosed information could support follow-on account or application compromise
- Unauthenticated attackers may download private uploaded files
- Sensitive documents, media, or configuration data could be disclosed
- Files stored on configured remote S3 disks may be exposed
- Disclosed information could support follow-on account or application compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on placing strong identity and authorization checks in front of every file retrieval operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authentication for download and display routes that serve non-public files
- Authorize access against the specific file, owner, tenant, and storage context
- Avoid accepting unrestricted disk names or paths from clients
- Use opaque file identifiers and server-side mappings instead of user-supplied storage paths
- Apply least-privilege permissions to local storage and S3-compatible credentials
- Keep private and public storage separate, with secure-by-default access policies
- Validate and normalize file references while preventing path traversal and cross-tenant access
Mitigation generally focuses on placing strong identity and authorization checks in front of every file retrieval operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require authentication for download and display routes that serve non-public files
- Authorize access against the specific file, owner, tenant, and storage context
- Avoid accepting unrestricted disk names or paths from clients
- Use opaque file identifiers and server-side mappings instead of user-supplied storage paths
- Apply least-privilege permissions to local storage and S3-compatible credentials
- Keep private and public storage separate, with secure-by-default access policies
- Validate and normalize file references while preventing path traversal and cross-tenant access
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for controller routes that perform file access without authentication or authorization middleware
- Code review checks for request parameters controlling disk selection, object keys, or filesystem paths
- Route and policy inventories identifying file-serving endpoints exposed publicly
- Dynamic testing that verifies unauthenticated requests cannot retrieve private objects
- Monitoring for repeated file retrieval requests, unusual disk names, and access to files outside a user's expected scope
- Policy enforcement requiring authorization tests for every endpoint that returns stored content
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for controller routes that perform file access without authentication or authorization middleware
- Code review checks for request parameters controlling disk selection, object keys, or filesystem paths
- Route and policy inventories identifying file-serving endpoints exposed publicly
- Dynamic testing that verifies unauthenticated requests cannot retrieve private objects
- Monitoring for repeated file retrieval requests, unusual disk names, and access to files outside a user's expected scope
- Policy enforcement requiring authorization tests for every endpoint that returns stored content
