Summary
Vvveb contains an authenticated insecure direct object reference in the admin
auth-token endpoint, allowing an administrator to read or overwrite another
administrator's API tokens. The issue becomes risky when administrative users
can submit or influence identifiers that select another administrator's token
record without an effective ownership or authorization check.
Vvveb contains an authenticated insecure direct object reference in the admin
auth-token endpoint, allowing an administrator to read or overwrite another
administrator's API tokens. The issue becomes risky when administrative users
can submit or influence identifiers that select another administrator's token
record without an effective ownership or authorization check.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Vvveb installations using the administrative
auth-token endpoint in versions before the security fix. It is relevant when
multiple administrators have API tokens and the endpoint relies on
user-supplied object references without consistently verifying that the
requesting administrator is authorized to access the referenced token.
The vulnerability affects Vvveb installations using the administrative
auth-token endpoint in versions before the security fix. It is relevant when
multiple administrators have API tokens and the endpoint relies on
user-supplied object references without consistently verifying that the
requesting administrator is authorized to access the referenced token.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated administrative
admin/auth-tokenendpoint - Required access: A valid administrator account
- Trigger point: A request that references another administrator's token record
- Why exploitation is possible: Server-side authorization checks do not
adequately bind the requested token to the authenticated administrator
- Attack surface: The authenticated administrative
admin/auth-tokenendpoint - Required access: A valid administrator account
- Trigger point: A request that references another administrator's token record
- Why exploitation is possible: Server-side authorization checks do not
adequately bind the requested token to the authenticated administrator
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The endpoint
appears to accept an identifier for an administrator's API token but does not
reliably verify that the authenticated administrator owns or is otherwise
permitted to manage the referenced object. This maps to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is commonly associated with insecure direct object
reference patterns.
The underlying bug is an object-level authorization failure. The endpoint
appears to accept an identifier for an administrator's API token but does not
reliably verify that the authenticated administrator owns or is otherwise
permitted to manage the referenced object. This maps to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is commonly associated with insecure direct object
reference patterns.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read API tokens belonging to other administrators
- An attacker could overwrite or invalidate another administrator's token
- Exposed tokens may enable unauthorized access to connected services
- Compromised tokens can facilitate account or application takeover
- Administrative workflows and integrations may be disrupted
- An attacker may read API tokens belonging to other administrators
- An attacker could overwrite or invalidate another administrator's token
- Exposed tokens may enable unauthorized access to connected services
- Compromised tokens can facilitate account or application takeover
- Administrative workflows and integrations may be disrupted
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the object level
for every read and write operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target administrator from the authenticated session where possible
- Enforcing ownership or explicit permission checks server-side
- Avoiding reliance on client-supplied identifiers for authorization decisions
- Using deny-by-default policies for token management operations
- Limiting token scope and privileges to the minimum necessary
- Protecting tokens with secure storage, rotation, revocation, and careful
response handling
- Applying consistent authorization middleware across administrative endpoints
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at the object level
for every read and write operation.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target administrator from the authenticated session where possible
- Enforcing ownership or explicit permission checks server-side
- Avoiding reliance on client-supplied identifiers for authorization decisions
- Using deny-by-default policies for token management operations
- Limiting token scope and privileges to the minimum necessary
- Protecting tokens with secure storage, rotation, revocation, and careful
response handling
- Applying consistent authorization middleware across administrative endpoints
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for direct database lookups using
request-supplied object identifiers
- Review of authorization middleware and ownership checks on token endpoints
- Tests that attempt cross-administrator reads, updates, and deletions using
authenticated test accounts
- API gateway or policy rules that restrict token-management operations to
approved administrative scopes
- Audit logging and monitoring for unusual token access, replacement, or
revocation activity
Automated security testing and code review tools may help flag missing
object-level authorization checks.
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for direct database lookups using
request-supplied object identifiers
- Review of authorization middleware and ownership checks on token endpoints
- Tests that attempt cross-administrator reads, updates, and deletions using
authenticated test accounts
- API gateway or policy rules that restrict token-management operations to
approved administrative scopes
- Audit logging and monitoring for unusual token access, replacement, or
revocation activity
Automated security testing and code review tools may help flag missing
object-level authorization checks.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
