Summary
Yonyou KSOA 9.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the HTTP GET parameter handler of /worksheet/del_workplan.jsp, where the ID parameter is used unsafely in database queries.
An attacker who can send crafted HTTP requests to this endpoint may manipulate backend SQL statements, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting data remotely.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in Yonyou KSOA 9.0 within the web interface that handles work plan deletion at /worksheet/del_workplan.jsp.
It manifests when the ID parameter from an HTTP GET request is passed into SQL statements without proper neutralization.
The issue is relevant in deployments where this endpoint is reachable over a network (e.g., intranet or internet) and is protected only by the application's normal access controls.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint
/worksheet/del_workplan.jspon a Yonyou KSOA 9.0 server - Required access: Network reachability to the application; further authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Supplying a crafted
IDquery parameter in a GET request (e.g.,/worksheet/del_workplan.jsp?ID=...) - Why exploitation is possible: The server-side logic concatenates or embeds the
IDparameter directly into a SQL query without robust parameterization or context-appropriate output encoding, allowing attacker-controlled fragments to alter query structure (CWE-89, CWE-74).
Why this happens
This vulnerability arises from constructing SQL queries by directly incorporating untrusted HTTP GET parameters into query strings.
Instead of using parameterized queries or prepared statements, the code appears to interpolate the ID value into the SQL, treating user-controlled input as part of the query logic.
This pattern maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where unvalidated input can modify the intended SQL command.
Because this happens at the HTTP parameter handling layer, it also relates to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component, as unsafe input is forwarded to the database without appropriate context-aware sanitization.
Potential impact
- Attackers could retrieve data they are not authorized to view, including sensitive business records.
- Attackers could modify or delete existing records, impacting data integrity and availability.
- Attackers could create or escalate application-level accounts if user data is stored in the affected database.
- Attackers might leverage database-specific functions to run additional commands or pivot to other parts of the infrastructure, depending on configuration.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on removing direct string concatenation of user input in SQL and constraining what the database will accept:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all database operations that consume HTTP parameters, ensuring that
IDand similar values are always bound as data, not as query text. - Apply strict server-side validation for identifier fields such as
ID(for example, enforcing numeric or UUID formats) before passing values to the database layer. - Centralize data-access logic so that query construction follows a consistent, safe pattern rather than ad-hoc string building in JSPs or controllers.
- Limit database privileges for the application account to only the operations and tables that are strictly necessary, reducing the impact of any injected query.
- Employ defense-in-depth by placing the application behind a security gateway or WAF configured to detect and block common SQL injection patterns, while not relying on it as the sole protection.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-centric review with runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis: Configure SAST tools or custom rules to flag dynamic SQL construction that concatenates HTTP parameters (especially within JSPs and DAO classes) and to highlight usage patterns lacking prepared statements or parameter binding.
- Code review: During manual reviews, look for
Statementor string-built SQL usage in request-handling code, especially aroundIDparameters in/worksheet/del_workplan.jspand related modules; require parameterized access patterns as a coding standard. - Logging and monitoring: Analyze database and application logs for anomalous query patterns, such as unexpected syntax errors, tautological conditions, or appended comment markers typical of SQL injection attempts.
- Security testing: Integrate automated DAST or interactive testing tools into QA pipelines to exercise HTTP parameters with injection payloads and detect unexpected database responses, aligning test cases with known public exploit patterns for this issue.

