/

CVE-2026-112044

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Improper Authentication (CWE-287) in eShop Catalog API

CVE-2026-112044

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A high-severity improper authentication vulnerability affects the Catalog API in dotnet eShop. A remote attacker may be able to access protected functionality or data when authentication checks do not correctly verify the caller's identity.

A high-severity improper authentication vulnerability affects the Catalog API in dotnet eShop. A remote attacker may be able to access protected functionality or data when authentication checks do not correctly verify the caller's identity.

Affected context

The issue is associated with the AddApplicationServices function in the Catalog API's Extensions.cs file. It may affect deployments where authentication middleware, service registration, or authorization integration does not consistently enforce identity verification for remotely reachable API operations.

The issue is associated with the AddApplicationServices function in the Catalog API's Extensions.cs file. It may affect deployments where authentication middleware, service registration, or authorization integration does not consistently enforce identity verification for remotely reachable API operations.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Remotely reachable Catalog API endpoints
  • Required access: Network access to the affected service; valid credentials may not be required if an authentication boundary can be bypassed
  • Trigger point: Processing a request through authentication or authorization components configured by the affected service-registration path
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application may fail to properly validate or enforce the caller's authenticated identity before allowing access to protected functionality
  • Attack surface: Remotely reachable Catalog API endpoints
  • Required access: Network access to the affected service; valid credentials may not be required if an authentication boundary can be bypassed
  • Trigger point: Processing a request through authentication or authorization components configured by the affected service-registration path
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application may fail to properly validate or enforce the caller's authenticated identity before allowing access to protected functionality

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an authentication-enforcement failure in the application configuration or request-processing path. Authentication controls may be missing, incorrectly registered, inconsistently applied, or unable to distinguish an authenticated principal from an unauthenticated request. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where the application does not adequately establish or verify the identity of a requester before granting access.

The underlying bug is an authentication-enforcement failure in the application configuration or request-processing path. Authentication controls may be missing, incorrectly registered, inconsistently applied, or unable to distinguish an authenticated principal from an unauthenticated request. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where the application does not adequately establish or verify the identity of a requester before granting access.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may access protected API functionality without proper authentication
  • Sensitive catalog or service data could be disclosed
  • Unauthorized users could modify application-managed data where write operations are exposed
  • The weakness could enable follow-on attacks against dependent services or administrative workflows
  • An attacker may access protected API functionality without proper authentication
  • Sensitive catalog or service data could be disclosed
  • Unauthorized users could modify application-managed data where write operations are exposed
  • The weakness could enable follow-on attacks against dependent services or administrative workflows

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authentication and authorization mandatory, consistently configured, and difficult to bypass.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing authentication by default for protected API routes
  • Applying explicit authorization policies to every sensitive operation
  • Validating issuer, audience, signature, expiration, and required claims for tokens
  • Separating authentication from authorization and verifying both at the service boundary
  • Using secure-by-default middleware and endpoint configuration
  • Reducing trust in client-supplied identity, role, and privilege claims
  • Running services with least privilege and limiting data access by authenticated identity
  • Testing unauthenticated, malformed, expired, and cross-tenant requests in automated security checks

Mitigation generally focuses on making authentication and authorization mandatory, consistently configured, and difficult to bypass.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Enforcing authentication by default for protected API routes
  • Applying explicit authorization policies to every sensitive operation
  • Validating issuer, audience, signature, expiration, and required claims for tokens
  • Separating authentication from authorization and verifying both at the service boundary
  • Using secure-by-default middleware and endpoint configuration
  • Reducing trust in client-supplied identity, role, and privilege claims
  • Running services with least privilege and limiting data access by authenticated identity
  • Testing unauthenticated, malformed, expired, and cross-tenant requests in automated security checks

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine static analysis, configuration review, runtime testing, and policy enforcement.

  • Search code and service-registration paths for protected endpoints lacking authentication or authorization requirements.
  • Review middleware ordering, fallback policies, default schemes, and endpoint metadata.
  • Test requests with missing, malformed, expired, and valid-but-insufficient credentials.
  • Monitor logs for repeated unauthorized requests followed by successful access without a corresponding authentication event.
  • Enforce repository and CI policies requiring authentication and authorization coverage for sensitive routes.

Automated code review and API security testing tools may help identify inconsistent security configuration, although findings should be validated against deployment behavior.

Detection can combine static analysis, configuration review, runtime testing, and policy enforcement.

  • Search code and service-registration paths for protected endpoints lacking authentication or authorization requirements.
  • Review middleware ordering, fallback policies, default schemes, and endpoint metadata.
  • Test requests with missing, malformed, expired, and valid-but-insufficient credentials.
  • Monitor logs for repeated unauthorized requests followed by successful access without a corresponding authentication event.
  • Enforce repository and CI policies requiring authentication and authorization coverage for sensitive routes.

Automated code review and API security testing tools may help identify inconsistent security configuration, although findings should be validated against deployment behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/dotnet/eShop/
github.comgithub.com/dotnet/eShop/issues/997
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-112044
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/1009026
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/421692
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/421692/cti

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. The described attack surface is the remotely reachable Catalog API, although practical exploitability depends on network exposure and the exact authentication configuration.

Not necessarily. If the defect allows an authentication boundary to be bypassed, an attacker may only need network access to the affected API. Deployment controls can change this requirement.

Require authentication and explicit authorization for every protected endpoint, validate identity claims at the service boundary, and use secure-by-default framework configuration.

Apply centralized authentication policies, review middleware and endpoint configuration, minimize client-supplied trust, and continuously test unauthenticated and insufficiently authorized requests.

Yes. The described attack surface is the remotely reachable Catalog API, although practical exploitability depends on network exposure and the exact authentication configuration.

Not necessarily. If the defect allows an authentication boundary to be bypassed, an attacker may only need network access to the affected API. Deployment controls can change this requirement.

Require authentication and explicit authorization for every protected endpoint, validate identity claims at the service boundary, and use secure-by-default framework configuration.

Apply centralized authentication policies, review middleware and endpoint configuration, minimize client-supplied trust, and continuously test unauthenticated and insufficiently authorized requests.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.