Summary
A remotely reachable SQL injection weakness affects the cache, del_cache, or arr2sql functionality in nemoTyrant manong. If attacker-controlled input reaches a database query without adequate separation or validation, an attacker may alter query behavior and access or modify database information.
A remotely reachable SQL injection weakness affects the cache, del_cache, or arr2sql functionality in nemoTyrant manong. If attacker-controlled input reaches a database query without adequate separation or validation, an attacker may alter query behavior and access or modify database information.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the func.php code associated with the cache, del_cache, and arr2sql functions. It may affect deployments using the identified rolling-release code lineage when remotely supplied values are incorporated into SQL statements without sufficiently trusted query construction and input handling.
The issue occurs in the func.php code associated with the cache, del_cache, and arr2sql functions. It may affect deployments using the identified rolling-release code lineage when remotely supplied values are incorporated into SQL statements without sufficiently trusted query construction and input handling.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely accessible application endpoint or request path that invokes the affected functions
- Required access: The ability to send requests accepted by the application; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-influenced data by the affected cache or SQL-construction functionality
- Why exploitation is possible: Input may reach database query construction without reliable parameterization, allowing control over SQL syntax or semantics
- Attack surface: A remotely accessible application endpoint or request path that invokes the affected functions
- Required access: The ability to send requests accepted by the application; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-influenced data by the affected cache or SQL-construction functionality
- Why exploitation is possible: Input may reach database query construction without reliable parameterization, allowing control over SQL syntax or semantics
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an injection flaw in which data supplied through an external request is treated as part of a database command. This maps primarily to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (SQL Injection) and is also related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component. The insecure pattern is building or modifying SQL statements from untrusted values instead of keeping query structure separate from data.
The underlying bug is an injection flaw in which data supplied through an external request is treated as part of a database command. This maps primarily to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command (SQL Injection) and is also related to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component. The insecure pattern is building or modifying SQL statements from untrusted values instead of keeping query structure separate from data.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read unauthorized database records
- An attacker could modify, insert, or delete stored data
- Database integrity and application behavior may be compromised
- Sensitive information could be disclosed
- In some deployments, database privileges may enable broader application or host impact
- An attacker may read unauthorized database records
- An attacker could modify, insert, or delete stored data
- Database integrity and application behavior may be compromised
- Sensitive information could be disclosed
- In some deployments, database privileges may enable broader application or host impact
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally centers on removing the flow of untrusted values into SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all variable database values
- Apply allowlist validation for identifiers, sort fields, and other values that cannot be bound as parameters
- Avoid dynamic SQL construction when a fixed query or query-builder abstraction is sufficient
- Use database accounts with only the permissions required by the affected operations
- Centralize query handling and enforce consistent input trust boundaries
- Return generic database errors and avoid exposing query details to remote callers
Mitigation generally centers on removing the flow of untrusted values into SQL syntax.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for all variable database values
- Apply allowlist validation for identifiers, sort fields, and other values that cannot be bound as parameters
- Avoid dynamic SQL construction when a fixed query or query-builder abstraction is sufficient
- Use database accounts with only the permissions required by the affected operations
- Centralize query handling and enforce consistent input trust boundaries
- Return generic database errors and avoid exposing query details to remote callers
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to construct SQL
- Code review of the
cache,del_cache, andarr2sqldata flows from request parameters to database calls - Rules requiring prepared statements or approved query-builder APIs
- Dynamic testing with safe, non-destructive injection probes in authorized environments
- Database activity monitoring for anomalous query patterns, privilege use, and unexpected data access
- CI policy enforcement that flags unparameterized queries and unsafe database APIs
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for string concatenation, interpolation, or formatting used to construct SQL
- Code review of the
cache,del_cache, andarr2sqldata flows from request parameters to database calls - Rules requiring prepared statements or approved query-builder APIs
- Dynamic testing with safe, non-destructive injection probes in authorized environments
- Database activity monitoring for anomalous query patterns, privilege use, and unexpected data access
- CI policy enforcement that flags unparameterized queries and unsafe database APIs
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
