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CVE-2026-111634

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in Helical Insight Reporting

CVE-2026-111634

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Unauthorized database access and data modification

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Helical Insight through version 7.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the report execution endpoint. An authenticated viewer may manipulate unescaped numeric or string report parameters to bypass SQL detection, potentially reading unintended tables or modifying data in the report's data source.

Helical Insight through version 7.0.0 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the report execution endpoint. An authenticated viewer may manipulate unescaped numeric or string report parameters to bypass SQL detection, potentially reading unintended tables or modifying data in the report's data source.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Helical Insight report execution workflows that send user-controlled parameter values to /executeDatasource. Risk is present when authenticated viewers can supply Numeric or String placeholder values, those values are incorporated into SQL without reliable parameterization, and the application's SQL detection control does not consistently identify injected syntax.

The vulnerability occurs in Helical Insight report execution workflows that send user-controlled parameter values to /executeDatasource. Risk is present when authenticated viewers can supply Numeric or String placeholder values, those values are incorporated into SQL without reliable parameterization, and the application's SQL detection control does not consistently identify injected syntax.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The /executeDatasource report execution endpoint
  • Required access: A valid authenticated account with viewer access to an applicable report
  • Trigger point: Processing report parameter values supplied as Numeric or String placeholders
  • Why exploitation is possible: Parameter values are not safely separated from SQL expressions, while the existing SqlDetect guard can be bypassed
  • Attack surface: The /executeDatasource report execution endpoint
  • Required access: A valid authenticated account with viewer access to an applicable report
  • Trigger point: Processing report parameter values supplied as Numeric or String placeholders
  • Why exploitation is possible: Parameter values are not safely separated from SQL expressions, while the existing SqlDetect guard can be bypassed

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is the construction or execution of database queries using unescaped user-controlled report parameters. Treating those values as trusted SQL fragments allows input to alter query structure rather than remain limited to data values. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'). Detection filters alone are not a reliable substitute for parameterized query APIs and strict type enforcement.

The underlying flaw is the construction or execution of database queries using unescaped user-controlled report parameters. Treating those values as trusted SQL fragments allows input to alter query structure rather than remain limited to data values. This behavior maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'). Detection filters alone are not a reliable substitute for parameterized query APIs and strict type enforcement.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read data from tables that the report was not intended to expose.
  • An attacker could modify or corrupt records in the report's data source.
  • Confidentiality and integrity of connected database information may be reduced.
  • A compromised reporting account may be used to access data beyond its intended business scope.
  • An attacker may read data from tables that the report was not intended to expose.
  • An attacker could modify or corrupt records in the report's data source.
  • Confidentiality and integrity of connected database information may be reduced.
  • A compromised reporting account may be used to access data beyond its intended business scope.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating the connection between user input and SQL structure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for every report parameter.
  • Enforce strict server-side typing and allowlists for Numeric and String parameters.
  • Avoid assembling SQL fragments through string concatenation or relying only on blacklist-based SQL detection.
  • Apply least-privilege database accounts that cannot modify data unless the report requires it.
  • Limit report viewers to the minimum data sources, schemas, and operations necessary.
  • Validate authorization at the report, parameter, and data-source levels.

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating the connection between user input and SQL structure.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries or prepared statements for every report parameter.
  • Enforce strict server-side typing and allowlists for Numeric and String parameters.
  • Avoid assembling SQL fragments through string concatenation or relying only on blacklist-based SQL detection.
  • Apply least-privilege database accounts that cannot modify data unless the report requires it.
  • Limit report viewers to the minimum data sources, schemas, and operations necessary.
  • Validate authorization at the report, parameter, and data-source levels.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this weakness through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying SQL construction that concatenates request or report parameters.
  • Code review checks for database calls that accept raw strings instead of bound parameters.
  • Tests using type-confusion and metacharacter inputs to verify that parameter values remain data.
  • Database audit logging for unexpected reads, updates, schema access, or query patterns from reporting accounts.
  • Policy enforcement requiring prepared statements, server-side validation, and least-privilege data-source identities.
  • Neutral automated security and code-review tools that flag unparameterized query construction.

Organizations can look for this weakness through:

  • Static analysis rules identifying SQL construction that concatenates request or report parameters.
  • Code review checks for database calls that accept raw strings instead of bound parameters.
  • Tests using type-confusion and metacharacter inputs to verify that parameter values remain data.
  • Database audit logging for unexpected reads, updates, schema access, or query patterns from reporting accounts.
  • Policy enforcement requiring prepared statements, server-side validation, and least-privilege data-source identities.
  • Neutral automated security and code-review tools that flag unparameterized query construction.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/helicalinsight/helicalinsight/blob/v7.0.0/server/core/src/main/java/com/helicalinsight/datasource/EfwdQueryProcessor.java#L220-L235
hackmd.iohackmd.io/@hieuPenguinnn/helicalinsight-efwd-parameter-sqli
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/helical-insight-through-7.0.0-sql-injection-via-executedatasource

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through the report execution interface when the endpoint is reachable and the attacker has a qualifying authenticated viewer account.

The described attack requires authentication and access to an applicable report. The account does not necessarily need administrative privileges if viewer-controlled parameters reach the vulnerable query path.

Use parameterized queries with strict server-side type validation, rather than escaping values or relying on SQL detection filters.

Review all report and filter parameters as untrusted input, enforce least-privilege database identities, test query boundaries, and require secure database-access patterns through code review and policy controls.

It may be exploitable through the report execution interface when the endpoint is reachable and the attacker has a qualifying authenticated viewer account.

The described attack requires authentication and access to an applicable report. The account does not necessarily need administrative privileges if viewer-controlled parameters reach the vulnerable query path.

Use parameterized queries with strict server-side type validation, rather than escaping values or relying on SQL detection filters.

Review all report and filter parameters as untrusted input, enforce least-privilege database identities, test query boundaries, and require secure database-access patterns through code review and policy controls.

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