Summary
Vvveb versions before the security fix contain an authentication bypass in the password reset functionality because user and token GET parameters are not sufficiently validated. An attacker who can reach the reset flow may be able to bypass intended account verification and take control of another user account.
Vvveb versions before the security fix contain an authentication bypass in the password reset functionality because user and token GET parameters are not sufficiently validated. An attacker who can reach the reset flow may be able to bypass intended account verification and take control of another user account.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Vvveb deployments using the password reset functionality with versions that do not adequately validate the supplied user and reset-token parameters. Risk is higher when the reset endpoint is publicly reachable and when tokens or account identifiers can be manipulated, reused, or accepted without strong server-side verification.
The issue occurs in Vvveb deployments using the password reset functionality with versions that do not adequately validate the supplied user and reset-token parameters. Risk is higher when the reset endpoint is publicly reachable and when tokens or account identifiers can be manipulated, reused, or accepted without strong server-side verification.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The password reset endpoint and its HTTP GET parameters
- Required access: Network access to the password reset functionality; an existing authenticated session may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of user and password-reset token parameters during account recovery
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient validation may allow the reset flow to accept an invalid, mismatched, or attacker-controlled identity or token context
- Attack surface: The password reset endpoint and its HTTP GET parameters
- Required access: Network access to the password reset functionality; an existing authenticated session may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of user and password-reset token parameters during account recovery
- Why exploitation is possible: Insufficient validation may allow the reset flow to accept an invalid, mismatched, or attacker-controlled identity or token context
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authentication design failure in the account recovery workflow. User-supplied identity and token parameters are not sufficiently bound to one another or rigorously validated before the reset operation proceeds, allowing the application to treat untrusted input as proof of authorization. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where a security-sensitive action can be completed without reliably verifying the claimant's identity.
The underlying bug is an authentication design failure in the account recovery workflow. User-supplied identity and token parameters are not sufficiently bound to one another or rigorously validated before the reset operation proceeds, allowing the application to treat untrusted input as proof of authorization. This behavior maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, where a security-sensitive action can be completed without reliably verifying the claimant's identity.
Potential impact
- An attacker may reset another user's password
- Unauthorized users could gain access to affected accounts
- Administrative or privileged accounts could be compromised
- Attackers may access, alter, or delete account-owned content
- Account takeover could enable further abuse of connected services
- An attacker may reset another user's password
- Unauthorized users could gain access to affected accounts
- Administrative or privileged accounts could be compromised
- Attackers may access, alter, or delete account-owned content
- Account takeover could enable further abuse of connected services
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation should focus on making password recovery a strongly verified, server-controlled process.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use cryptographically strong, single-use, short-lived reset tokens
- Bind each token to the intended account and validate that relationship server-side
- Avoid trusting user identity or authorization decisions from client-controlled GET parameters
- Invalidate tokens after use, password change, or suspicious recovery activity
- Apply rate limits, monitoring, and abuse detection to reset requests
- Require additional verification for privileged or high-risk accounts
- Run the application with least privilege and limit the impact of a compromised account
Mitigation should focus on making password recovery a strongly verified, server-controlled process.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use cryptographically strong, single-use, short-lived reset tokens
- Bind each token to the intended account and validate that relationship server-side
- Avoid trusting user identity or authorization decisions from client-controlled GET parameters
- Invalidate tokens after use, password change, or suspicious recovery activity
- Apply rate limits, monitoring, and abuse detection to reset requests
- Require additional verification for privileged or high-risk accounts
- Run the application with least privilege and limit the impact of a compromised account
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review rules identifying password reset decisions based directly on URL parameters
- Review of token generation, storage, expiration, single-use enforcement, and account binding
- Tests that alter, remove, replay, or mismatch user and reset-token parameters
- Monitoring for repeated reset attempts, unusual token use, and password changes from unexpected locations
- Policy enforcement requiring server-side authorization checks for all account recovery actions
- Automated security testing and code review tools that flag improper authentication patterns
Organizations can look for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review rules identifying password reset decisions based directly on URL parameters
- Review of token generation, storage, expiration, single-use enforcement, and account binding
- Tests that alter, remove, replay, or mismatch user and reset-token parameters
- Monitoring for repeated reset attempts, unusual token use, and password changes from unexpected locations
- Policy enforcement requiring server-side authorization checks for all account recovery actions
- Automated security testing and code review tools that flag improper authentication patterns
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
