Summary
A local privilege escalation vulnerability in TotalAV allows an unprivileged local user to forge the gRPC IPC authentication token used by a privileged SYSTEM service.
If the attacker can load or influence the relevant IPC component, the service may be abused to execute arbitrary code with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.
A local privilege escalation vulnerability in TotalAV allows an unprivileged local user to forge the gRPC IPC authentication token used by a privileged SYSTEM service.
If the attacker can load or influence the relevant IPC component, the service may be abused to execute arbitrary code with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM privileges.
Affected context
The issue occurs in TotalAV's interprocess communication architecture where a privileged SYSTEM service relies on an authentication token and loads the IPC.dll component. It becomes risky when an unprivileged local user can influence the component-loading or token-validation path in a way that allows forged authentication material to be accepted.
The issue occurs in TotalAV's interprocess communication architecture where a privileged SYSTEM service relies on an authentication token and loads the IPC.dll component. It becomes risky when an unprivileged local user can influence the component-loading or token-validation path in a way that allows forged authentication material to be accepted.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Local TotalAV gRPC IPC service and its supporting IPC.dll component
- Required access: An unprivileged local account or equivalent local code execution
- Trigger point: Authentication of an IPC request by the privileged SYSTEM service
- Why exploitation is possible: The service may trust attacker-influenced component or path behavior and accept a forged IPC authentication token, allowing privileged operations to be reached
- Attack surface: Local TotalAV gRPC IPC service and its supporting IPC.dll component
- Required access: An unprivileged local account or equivalent local code execution
- Trigger point: Authentication of an IPC request by the privileged SYSTEM service
- Why exploitation is possible: The service may trust attacker-influenced component or path behavior and accept a forged IPC authentication token, allowing privileged operations to be reached
Why this happens
The underlying weakness involves insufficiently constrained handling of paths or loaded components within a privileged IPC authentication workflow. When security-sensitive file resolution or component loading can be influenced by an unprivileged user, the attacker may affect which code or authentication behavior the SYSTEM service trusts.
This maps primarily to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'). The associated CWE-23 classification further reflects path manipulation that can escape intended directory boundaries or security assumptions.
The underlying weakness involves insufficiently constrained handling of paths or loaded components within a privileged IPC authentication workflow. When security-sensitive file resolution or component loading can be influenced by an unprivileged user, the attacker may affect which code or authentication behavior the SYSTEM service trusts.
This maps primarily to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'). The associated CWE-23 classification further reflects path manipulation that can escape intended directory boundaries or security assumptions.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- The vulnerability could enable complete local compromise of the affected host
- An attacker may disable security controls or tamper with protected files
- The compromise can facilitate persistence, credential access, or lateral movement
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
- The vulnerability could enable complete local compromise of the affected host
- An attacker may disable security controls or tamper with protected files
- The compromise can facilitate persistence, credential access, or lateral movement
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on separating unprivileged inputs from privileged IPC decisions and preventing attacker-controlled paths or modules from being trusted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Canonicalizing and validating paths against fixed, restricted directories
- Rejecting path components that escape approved locations
- Avoiding loading libraries or components from user-writable locations
- Binding IPC authentication to protected, non-forgeable credentials or operating-system identity checks
- Applying least privilege to services and limiting privileged operations exposed through IPC
- Restricting write access to service binaries, libraries, configuration files, and authentication material
Mitigation generally focuses on separating unprivileged inputs from privileged IPC decisions and preventing attacker-controlled paths or modules from being trusted.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Canonicalizing and validating paths against fixed, restricted directories
- Rejecting path components that escape approved locations
- Avoiding loading libraries or components from user-writable locations
- Binding IPC authentication to protected, non-forgeable credentials or operating-system identity checks
- Applying least privilege to services and limiting privileged operations exposed through IPC
- Restricting write access to service binaries, libraries, configuration files, and authentication material
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations commonly detect related weaknesses through:
- Static analysis for unsafe path joins, inadequate canonicalization, and library loading from writable directories
- Code review of privileged IPC handlers, token validation, and service-to-client trust decisions
- Monitoring for unexpected changes to IPC libraries, service paths, or authentication configuration
- Policy enforcement preventing privileged services from loading code or configuration from user-controlled locations
- Automated security review tools that flag path traversal and insecure privilege-boundary patterns
Organizations commonly detect related weaknesses through:
- Static analysis for unsafe path joins, inadequate canonicalization, and library loading from writable directories
- Code review of privileged IPC handlers, token validation, and service-to-client trust decisions
- Monitoring for unexpected changes to IPC libraries, service paths, or authentication configuration
- Policy enforcement preventing privileged services from loading code or configuration from user-controlled locations
- Automated security review tools that flag path traversal and insecure privilege-boundary patterns
