Summary
EasyCMS up to version 1.6 contains a SQL injection vulnerability in /UserAction.class.php where the _order parameter is concatenated into database queries without sufficient validation.
A remote attacker can manipulate this parameter to alter the SQL logic, potentially accessing, modifying, or deleting data, especially when the application runs with elevated database privileges.
Affected context
This vulnerability arises in EasyCMS installations up to 1.6 that expose functionality in /UserAction.class.php taking an _order argument (for example, to define sort order or query behavior).
The risk is highest when:
- The
_ordervalue is derived directly or indirectly from HTTP request parameters - The application dynamically constructs SQL queries using string concatenation
- The database account used by EasyCMS has broad privileges (SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE, or administrative operations)
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP endpoints handled by /UserAction.class.php that accept or influence the
_orderparameter. - Required access: Network access to the EasyCMS web interface; no prior authentication may be required depending on how the affected functionality is exposed.
- Trigger point: Submission of crafted input in the
_orderparameter (e.g., via query string, form field, or AJAX request) that is later embedded into SQL. - Why exploitation is possible: The
_orderargument is not strictly validated or constrained to an allowlist and is interpolated directly into SQL statements, allowing an attacker to change query structure or inject additional SQL clauses.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is the construction of SQL queries by concatenating untrusted input from the _order parameter into query strings instead of using parameterized queries or strict validation.
This maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where control characters and SQL syntax from user input alter the semantics of a query.
The presence of CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component reflects that data fed into the database (a downstream component) is not sanitized or constrained before use, allowing it to be interpreted as executable SQL rather than as data.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read sensitive data from database tables beyond what the application is intended to expose.
- An attacker may modify or delete user data, content, or configuration stored in the database.
- An attacker may create or escalate application accounts by manipulating authentication or authorization records.
- An attacker could potentially execute administrative database operations if the DB account has elevated privileges, impacting database availability or integrity.
- In certain environments, SQL injection can be chained with other weaknesses (e.g., xp_cmdshell, file writes, or stored procedures) to move toward remote code execution on the underlying server.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on preventing untrusted input from altering SQL structure and reducing the blast radius if a query is compromised.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Use of parameterized queries / prepared statements: Ensure all dynamic values are passed as parameters, not concatenated into SQL strings, including values used in ORDER BY, LIMIT, or other clauses when possible.
- Strict allowlisting for control parameters: For fields like
_orderthat control query shape (e.g., column names, sort direction), map user input to a fixed set of server-side constants rather than using raw values directly. - Input validation and normalization: Validate that parameters influencing query control are limited to expected characters and values (e.g., predefined column names,
ASC/DESC). - Least-privilege database accounts: Configure the application's database user with only the minimal privileges required (e.g., no
DROP,ALTER, or superuser capabilities) to reduce impact if injection occurs. - Centralized query-building utilities: Encapsulate SQL construction in reusable modules that enforce safe patterns and discourage ad-hoc string concatenation in controllers or action classes.
- Secure-by-default frameworks: Favor ORM or query-builder abstractions that make unsafe string concatenation unusual and highlight departures from safe patterns during code review.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior.
Static and code-review strategies:
- Search for SQL construction in EasyCMS code, especially in /UserAction.class.php, where input variables (such as
_order,$_GET,$_POST, or request objects) are concatenated into query strings. - Flag any use of dynamic ORDER BY, LIMIT, or WHERE clauses built via string concatenation rather than parameterized constructs or fixed mappings.
- Use static analysis rules that identify SQL strings assembled from user-controlled variables without parameter binding or allowlisting.
- During manual review, treat any controller logic that passes request parameters directly into query builders or raw SQL as high-risk and requiring justification.
Runtime and operational strategies:
- Monitor database logs for anomalous queries containing unexpected operators, comment markers, or UNION/SELECT chains indicative of injection probes.
- Employ web application firewalls (WAFs) or reverse proxies configured to detect generic SQL injection payload patterns while recognizing that these are a compensating control, not a primary fix.
- Integrate automated security testing (DAST/SAST) into CI pipelines to scan for known SQL injection patterns and regressions.

