Summary
KDE Dolphin contains an OS command injection vulnerability in handling crafted folder names used by the view-background double-click action. If a victim opens the affected view and double-clicks its background, attacker-controlled directory-name content may escape intended quoting and cause shell commands to execute with the victim's privileges.
KDE Dolphin contains an OS command injection vulnerability in handling crafted folder names used by the view-background double-click action. If a victim opens the affected view and double-clicks its background, attacker-controlled directory-name content may escape intended quoting and cause shell commands to execute with the victim's privileges.
Affected context
The issue occurs in KDE Dolphin versions 24.08.0 through 26.08.2 when a folder name is substituted into a command-related path placeholder used by slotDoubleClickViewBackground. Exploitation depends on a crafted directory name reaching this code path and a user double-clicking the view background, allowing the name to influence shell command interpretation.
The issue occurs in KDE Dolphin versions 24.08.0 through 26.08.2 when a folder name is substituted into a command-related path placeholder used by slotDoubleClickViewBackground. Exploitation depends on a crafted directory name reaching this code path and a user double-clicking the view background, allowing the name to influence shell command interpretation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: KDE Dolphin's view-background double-click handling
- Required access: Ability to create, place, or cause the victim to access a directory with a crafted name
- Trigger point: The victim double-clicks the background of the affected folder view
- Why exploitation is possible: Folder-name data is incorporated into a command context without reliably preventing shell metacharacters from altering command boundaries
- User interaction: Required; exploitation is not expected to occur solely from opening Dolphin
- Attack surface: KDE Dolphin's view-background double-click handling
- Required access: Ability to create, place, or cause the victim to access a directory with a crafted name
- Trigger point: The victim double-clicks the background of the affected folder view
- Why exploitation is possible: Folder-name data is incorporated into a command context without reliably preventing shell metacharacters from altering command boundaries
- User interaction: Required; exploitation is not expected to occur solely from opening Dolphin
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from treating a filesystem path or folder name as command-language content rather than as data. When attacker-controlled text is inserted into a shell command or command-like template without robust argument separation and escaping, quoting can be broken and shell metacharacters may be interpreted as operators. This behavior maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
The vulnerability results from treating a filesystem path or folder name as command-language content rather than as data. When attacker-controlled text is inserted into a shell command or command-like template without robust argument separation and escaping, quoting can be broken and shell metacharacters may be interpreted as operators. This behavior maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Dolphin process.
- Local files and user data could be read, modified, or deleted.
- Malware or persistence mechanisms could be installed in the affected user's account.
- The compromise could be used to access other resources available to the user.
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the Dolphin process.
- Local files and user data could be read, modified, or deleted.
- Malware or persistence mechanisms could be installed in the affected user's account.
- The compromise could be used to access other resources available to the user.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from path-handling workflows and reducing trust in filesystem metadata.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Invoke programs directly with structured argument arrays rather than constructing shell command strings.
- Treat folder names and paths strictly as data, with explicit argument boundaries.
- Avoid command templates that interpolate user-controlled or filesystem-derived text.
- Apply context-appropriate validation and reject unexpected control characters where feasible.
- Run desktop applications with least privilege and limit access to sensitive resources.
- Use secure-by-default process-launching APIs and centralize command execution behind reviewed interfaces.
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from path-handling workflows and reducing trust in filesystem metadata.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Invoke programs directly with structured argument arrays rather than constructing shell command strings.
- Treat folder names and paths strictly as data, with explicit argument boundaries.
- Avoid command templates that interpolate user-controlled or filesystem-derived text.
- Apply context-appropriate validation and reject unexpected control characters where feasible.
- Run desktop applications with least privilege and limit access to sensitive resources.
- Use secure-by-default process-launching APIs and centralize command execution behind reviewed interfaces.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying shell command construction with path, filename, or folder-name variables.
- Code review checks for string interpolation, concatenation, or placeholder substitution in process-launching code.
- Testing with filenames containing shell-sensitive characters in isolated environments.
- Policy enforcement requiring structured process APIs instead of shell-evaluated commands.
- Endpoint monitoring for unexpected child processes launched by the file manager.
Automated code-review and software-composition tools may help identify related unsafe command-handling patterns.
Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying shell command construction with path, filename, or folder-name variables.
- Code review checks for string interpolation, concatenation, or placeholder substitution in process-launching code.
- Testing with filenames containing shell-sensitive characters in isolated environments.
- Policy enforcement requiring structured process APIs instead of shell-evaluated commands.
- Endpoint monitoring for unexpected child processes launched by the file manager.
Automated code-review and software-composition tools may help identify related unsafe command-handling patterns.
