Summary
Rovr through version 0.10.3 on Windows contains an OS command injection vulnerability in file-opening behavior. An attacker who can provide a maliciously named file may cause shell metacharacters to be interpreted as commands when the file is opened through open_file, potentially executing code with the user's privileges.
Rovr through version 0.10.3 on Windows contains an OS command injection vulnerability in file-opening behavior. An attacker who can provide a maliciously named file may cause shell metacharacters to be interpreted as commands when the file is opened through open_file, potentially executing code with the user's privileges.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Rovr deployments on Windows where files from an attacker-influenced location can be opened through the open_file functionality. Risk is higher when file names are passed to shell or command-processing routines without being treated strictly as data, particularly when the application runs with access to sensitive user or system resources.
The vulnerability affects Rovr deployments on Windows where files from an attacker-influenced location can be opened through the open_file functionality. Risk is higher when file names are passed to shell or command-processing routines without being treated strictly as data, particularly when the application runs with access to sensitive user or system resources.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Windows file-opening functionality exposed through Rovr
- Required access: Ability to place, transfer, or otherwise cause a maliciously named file to be available to Rovr
- Trigger point: Opening the crafted file through
open_file - Why exploitation is possible: File-name content is incorporated into command execution in a way that may allow shell metacharacters to alter command interpretation
- Attack surface: Windows file-opening functionality exposed through Rovr
- Required access: Ability to place, transfer, or otherwise cause a maliciously named file to be available to Rovr
- Trigger point: Opening the crafted file through
open_file - Why exploitation is possible: File-name content is incorporated into command execution in a way that may allow shell metacharacters to alter command interpretation
Why this happens
The underlying issue is OS command injection caused by treating attacker-controlled file-name data as part of a command rather than as a strictly bounded argument.
When shell-sensitive characters are passed to a command interpreter without safe argument handling or appropriate validation, the interpreter may execute unintended commands. This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
The underlying issue is OS command injection caused by treating attacker-controlled file-name data as part of a command rather than as a strictly bounded argument.
When shell-sensitive characters are passed to a command interpreter without safe argument handling or appropriate validation, the interpreter may execute unintended commands. This maps to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
Potential impact
- Arbitrary commands may execute with the privileges of the Rovr process
- User files or application data could be read, modified, or deleted
- Credentials and other sensitive information could be exposed
- The affected workstation could be used for persistence or further compromise
- Arbitrary commands may execute with the privileges of the Rovr process
- User files or application data could be read, modified, or deleted
- Credentials and other sensitive information could be exposed
- The affected workstation could be used for persistence or further compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that file names remain data throughout the file-opening workflow.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation when a direct process or file API is available
- Passing file paths as validated arguments through APIs that do not invoke a command interpreter
- Applying allowlists and canonicalization appropriate to the supported file types and paths
- Rejecting unexpected control characters and shell metacharacters where business requirements permit
- Restricting file-opening operations to approved directories and reducing process privileges
- Separating untrusted file handling from sensitive user or system resources
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that file names remain data throughout the file-opening workflow.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation when a direct process or file API is available
- Passing file paths as validated arguments through APIs that do not invoke a command interpreter
- Applying allowlists and canonicalization appropriate to the supported file types and paths
- Rejecting unexpected control characters and shell metacharacters where business requirements permit
- Restricting file-opening operations to approved directories and reducing process privileges
- Separating untrusted file handling from sensitive user or system resources
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying shell execution APIs that receive file names or other external input
- Code review checks for string concatenation or interpolation into Windows command lines
- Tests using benign metacharacter-containing file names to verify that they remain literal data
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child-process creation following file-opening operations
- Policy enforcement requiring direct process and file APIs instead of shell-mediated execution
Automated security review tools may help identify suspicious command construction patterns, but findings should be validated against the actual execution path.
Organizations can look for command-injection risks through:
- Static analysis rules identifying shell execution APIs that receive file names or other external input
- Code review checks for string concatenation or interpolation into Windows command lines
- Tests using benign metacharacter-containing file names to verify that they remain literal data
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child-process creation following file-opening operations
- Policy enforcement requiring direct process and file APIs instead of shell-mediated execution
Automated security review tools may help identify suspicious command construction patterns, but findings should be validated against the actual execution path.
