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CVE-2026-110208

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Missing Authorization (CWE-862) in Wukong AICRM API

CVE-2026-110208

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

AI provider API key disclosure and credential exfiltration

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Wukong AICRM contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the systemConfig controller that allows any authenticated user to access the stored AI provider API key. An attacker may retrieve the cleartext key or cause it to be forwarded to an attacker-controlled URL through the AI testing functionality.

Wukong AICRM contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the systemConfig controller that allows any authenticated user to access the stored AI provider API key. An attacker may retrieve the cleartext key or cause it to be forwarded to an attacker-controlled URL through the AI testing functionality.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Wukong AICRM deployments where authenticated users can reach the systemConfig endpoints without authorization checks that limit access by role or administrative privilege. It is particularly risky when the application stores AI provider credentials in a retrievable form and exposes functionality that uses a caller-supplied API destination.

The issue occurs in Wukong AICRM deployments where authenticated users can reach the systemConfig endpoints without authorization checks that limit access by role or administrative privilege. It is particularly risky when the application stores AI provider credentials in a retrievable form and exposes functionality that uses a caller-supplied API destination.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: The /systemConfig controller and its AI-related endpoints
  • Required access: A valid authenticated account; elevated privileges may not be required
  • Trigger point: Requests to retrieve the AI configuration or invoke the AI provider test function
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately restrict access to sensitive configuration data or prevent unauthorized use of stored credentials
  • Attack surface: The /systemConfig controller and its AI-related endpoints
  • Required access: A valid authenticated account; elevated privileges may not be required
  • Trigger point: Requests to retrieve the AI configuration or invoke the AI provider test function
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks do not adequately restrict access to sensitive configuration data or prevent unauthorized use of stored credentials

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authorization design failure in which authentication is treated as sufficient permission to access sensitive system configuration. The affected controller does not consistently enforce role- or resource-based authorization before returning the stored provider key or using it with a caller-selected destination. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because a protected operation lacks an effective permission check after the user has authenticated.

The underlying flaw is an authorization design failure in which authentication is treated as sufficient permission to access sensitive system configuration. The affected controller does not consistently enforce role- or resource-based authorization before returning the stored provider key or using it with a caller-selected destination. This behavior maps to CWE-862, Missing Authorization, because a protected operation lacks an effective permission check after the user has authenticated.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could obtain an AI provider API key
  • Exposed credentials may be reused against the provider
  • The key could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled host
  • Unauthorized API usage could incur financial or quota-related costs
  • Compromised provider credentials could enable data exposure or service abuse
  • An attacker could obtain an AI provider API key
  • Exposed credentials may be reused against the provider
  • The key could be forwarded to an attacker-controlled host
  • Unauthorized API usage could incur financial or quota-related costs
  • Compromised provider credentials could enable data exposure or service abuse

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every sensitive

controller action rather than relying on authentication alone.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting credential retrieval and provider testing to explicitly authorized administrative roles
  • Returning masked or non-reversible credential representations instead of cleartext secrets
  • Keeping provider credentials in a dedicated secret-management facility
  • Allowing outbound requests only to approved provider destinations
  • Separating configuration management permissions from ordinary application access
  • Applying least privilege to both application accounts and stored provider credentials
  • Avoiding designs that accept arbitrary destinations when making credential-bearing requests

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every sensitive

controller action rather than relying on authentication alone.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting credential retrieval and provider testing to explicitly authorized administrative roles
  • Returning masked or non-reversible credential representations instead of cleartext secrets
  • Keeping provider credentials in a dedicated secret-management facility
  • Allowing outbound requests only to approved provider destinations
  • Separating configuration management permissions from ordinary application access
  • Applying least privilege to both application accounts and stored provider credentials
  • Avoiding designs that accept arbitrary destinations when making credential-bearing requests

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis rules identifying controller methods that expose secrets without authorization annotations or checks
  • Code review signals such as direct returns of API keys from configuration objects
  • Tests that exercise sensitive endpoints with authenticated users lacking administrative roles
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual access to system configuration routes
  • Egress policies and alerts for requests from the application to unapproved destinations
  • Secret-scanning and API-usage monitoring for leaked or unexpectedly used provider keys

Automated security testing and code review tools can help identify missing

authorization checks and sensitive-data exposure patterns.

Organizations can look for:

  • Static analysis rules identifying controller methods that expose secrets without authorization annotations or checks
  • Code review signals such as direct returns of API keys from configuration objects
  • Tests that exercise sensitive endpoints with authenticated users lacking administrative roles
  • Runtime monitoring for unusual access to system configuration routes
  • Egress policies and alerts for requests from the application to unapproved destinations
  • Secret-scanning and API-usage monitoring for leaked or unexpectedly used provider keys

Automated security testing and code review tools can help identify missing

authorization checks and sensitive-data exposure patterns.

Frequently asked

questions

Any authenticated user may be able to exploit the issue if the deployment does

not impose additional authorization controls on the affected systemConfig

operations.

No. The relevant prerequisite is application authentication. The application

may disclose or use its already stored provider credential on the attacker's

behalf.

Enforce server-side, role-based authorization for every configuration and

testing operation, avoid returning cleartext secrets, and restrict outbound

destinations to an approved allowlist.

Apply deny-by-default access control, test endpoints with low-privilege

authenticated accounts, store secrets in dedicated secret managers, and

monitor both sensitive configuration access and unexpected outbound traffic.

Any authenticated user may be able to exploit the issue if the deployment does

not impose additional authorization controls on the affected systemConfig

operations.

No. The relevant prerequisite is application authentication. The application

may disclose or use its already stored provider credential on the attacker's

behalf.

Enforce server-side, role-based authorization for every configuration and

testing operation, avoid returning cleartext secrets, and restrict outbound

destinations to an approved allowlist.

Apply deny-by-default access control, test endpoints with low-privilege

authenticated accounts, store secrets in dedicated secret managers, and

monitor both sensitive configuration access and unexpected outbound traffic.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.