Summary
fuint's order-detail API does not adequately verify authentication before returning order information. An unauthenticated attacker may enumerate order identifiers and retrieve sensitive customer and order data when the endpoint is publicly reachable.
fuint's order-detail API does not adequately verify authentication before returning order information. An unauthenticated attacker may enumerate order identifiers and retrieve sensitive customer and order data when the endpoint is publicly reachable.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in fuint deployments exposing the /clientApi/order/detail endpoint without effective authentication enforcement. Risk is higher when order identifiers are predictable or sequential and the endpoint returns personal, contact, address, identity, or verification information without confirming that the requester is authorized to view the order.
The vulnerability occurs in fuint deployments exposing the /clientApi/order/detail endpoint without effective authentication enforcement. Risk is higher when order identifiers are predictable or sequential and the endpoint returns personal, contact, address, identity, or verification information without confirming that the requester is authorized to view the order.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The publicly reachable
/clientApi/order/detailHTTP endpoint - Required access: No authenticated account or valid
Access-Tokenis required - Trigger point: A request containing an order identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may disclose order records before verifying the caller's identity and authorization, while sequential identifiers can make record discovery easier
- Attack surface: The publicly reachable
/clientApi/order/detailHTTP endpoint - Required access: No authenticated account or valid
Access-Tokenis required - Trigger point: A request containing an order identifier
- Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint may disclose order records before verifying the caller's identity and authorization, while sequential identifiers can make record discovery easier
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a missing authentication control, mapped to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The order-detail handler treats a client request as sufficient to access a protected business object instead of requiring a valid authenticated session or token before processing the request. If authorization is also not enforced for the specific order, this pattern can expose records belonging to other members.
The underlying issue is a missing authentication control, mapped to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function. The order-detail handler treats a client request as sufficient to access a protected business object instead of requiring a valid authenticated session or token before processing the request. If authorization is also not enforced for the specific order, this pattern can expose records belonging to other members.
Potential impact
- Attackers may retrieve members' order details without authentication
- Personal information, including names, phone numbers, and addresses, could be disclosed
- National identification numbers and WeChat openIds may be exposed
- Verification codes or other sensitive order data can be revealed
- Large-scale privacy breaches may occur through identifier enumeration
- Attackers may retrieve members' order details without authentication
- Personal information, including names, phone numbers, and addresses, could be disclosed
- National identification numbers and WeChat openIds may be exposed
- Verification codes or other sensitive order data can be revealed
- Large-scale privacy breaches may occur through identifier enumeration
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and object-level authorization at the server-side boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require a valid, non-expired authentication token before invoking order-detail logic
- Verify that the authenticated principal is permitted to access the requested order
- Avoid relying on client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Use non-predictable public identifiers and apply rate limits to lookup endpoints
- Minimize returned fields and redact identity, contact, and verification data unless necessary
- Apply least privilege to service accounts and data-access layers
- Return consistent responses that do not reveal whether unauthorized records exist
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication and object-level authorization at the server-side boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require a valid, non-expired authentication token before invoking order-detail logic
- Verify that the authenticated principal is permitted to access the requested order
- Avoid relying on client-supplied identifiers as proof of ownership
- Use non-predictable public identifiers and apply rate limits to lookup endpoints
- Minimize returned fields and redact identity, contact, and verification data unless necessary
- Apply least privilege to service accounts and data-access layers
- Return consistent responses that do not reveal whether unauthorized records exist
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of weakness through:
- Static analysis and route reviews that identify sensitive handlers lacking authentication middleware
- Code review checks for authorization decisions occurring after data retrieval
- API tests that request protected resources without tokens and with tokens belonging to different users
- Monitoring for high-volume sequential order-ID requests and repeated unauthenticated failures or successes
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication and object-level authorization for endpoints serving personal data
Automated API security and code-review tools may help identify missing access-control checks, but findings should be validated against application ownership rules.
Organizations can detect this class of weakness through:
- Static analysis and route reviews that identify sensitive handlers lacking authentication middleware
- Code review checks for authorization decisions occurring after data retrieval
- API tests that request protected resources without tokens and with tokens belonging to different users
- Monitoring for high-volume sequential order-ID requests and repeated unauthenticated failures or successes
- Policy enforcement requiring authentication and object-level authorization for endpoints serving personal data
Automated API security and code-review tools may help identify missing access-control checks, but findings should be validated against application ownership rules.
