Summary
Risesoft-y9 Digital-Infrastructure contains a path traversal vulnerability in the FileManager storeFile endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may manipulate path-related parameters to write or overwrite files in locations writable by the service, potentially enabling code execution when those files are later processed.
Risesoft-y9 Digital-Infrastructure contains a path traversal vulnerability in the FileManager storeFile endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker may manipulate path-related parameters to write or overwrite files in locations writable by the service, potentially enabling code execution when those files are later processed.
Affected context
The issue affects deployments of Risesoft-y9 Digital-Infrastructure versions 9.6.5 through 9.6.11 where the FileManager storeFile functionality accepts client-controlled path and filename values. Risk is higher when the service account can write to executable, configuration, or otherwise security-sensitive locations and when the endpoint is reachable without authentication.
The issue affects deployments of Risesoft-y9 Digital-Infrastructure versions 9.6.5 through 9.6.11 where the FileManager storeFile functionality accepts client-controlled path and filename values. Risk is higher when the service account can write to executable, configuration, or otherwise security-sensitive locations and when the endpoint is reachable without authentication.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The HTTP
POST /rest/storeFileendpoint - Required access: Network access to the endpoint; authentication may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled
fullPathandfileNameparameters - Why exploitation is possible: Path values are not sufficiently constrained to the intended storage directory, allowing writes outside the expected location when the service has appropriate filesystem permissions
- Attack surface: The HTTP
POST /rest/storeFileendpoint - Required access: Network access to the endpoint; authentication may not be required
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled
fullPathandfileNameparameters - Why exploitation is possible: Path values are not sufficiently constrained to the intended storage directory, allowing writes outside the expected location when the service has appropriate filesystem permissions
Why this happens
The vulnerability results from insufficient canonicalization and validation of user-controlled filesystem paths. When an application combines attacker-supplied directory and filename values with filesystem operations without enforcing a trusted storage root, traversal sequences or absolute paths may escape the intended directory. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal.
The vulnerability results from insufficient canonicalization and validation of user-controlled filesystem paths. When an application combines attacker-supplied directory and filename values with filesystem operations without enforcing a trusted storage root, traversal sequences or absolute paths may escape the intended directory. This maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, commonly known as path traversal.
Potential impact
- An attacker may create or overwrite service-writable files
- Application configuration or data may be modified
- Sensitive files could be damaged or replaced where permissions allow
- Code execution may occur if a written file is later loaded or executed by the service
- The affected application or host may be compromised
- The vulnerability could support persistence or follow-on attacks
- An attacker may create or overwrite service-writable files
- Application configuration or data may be modified
- Sensitive files could be damaged or replaced where permissions allow
- Code execution may occur if a written file is later loaded or executed by the service
- The affected application or host may be compromised
- The vulnerability could support persistence or follow-on attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict storage boundary and reducing trust in client-supplied path components.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths canonically and verify that they remain under an approved storage directory
- Prefer server-generated filenames and opaque object identifiers over client-controlled paths
- Reject absolute paths, traversal sequences, unexpected separators, and ambiguous encodings
- Apply allowlists for permitted file types and storage locations where appropriate
- Ensure the service account has only the filesystem permissions required for its function
- Keep writable directories separate from executable code, application configuration, and sensitive data
- Require authentication and authorization for file-management operations when feasible
- Use secure-by-default storage APIs that do not accept unrestricted filesystem paths
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict storage boundary and reducing trust in client-supplied path components.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths canonically and verify that they remain under an approved storage directory
- Prefer server-generated filenames and opaque object identifiers over client-controlled paths
- Reject absolute paths, traversal sequences, unexpected separators, and ambiguous encodings
- Apply allowlists for permitted file types and storage locations where appropriate
- Ensure the service account has only the filesystem permissions required for its function
- Keep writable directories separate from executable code, application configuration, and sensitive data
- Require authentication and authorization for file-management operations when feasible
- Use secure-by-default storage APIs that do not accept unrestricted filesystem paths
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for filesystem APIs that concatenate or resolve paths using request parameters
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization, prefix-boundary validation, or filename allowlists
- Dynamic testing of file endpoints with traversal variants, encoded separators, absolute paths, and alternate path representations
- Web application firewall or API policy rules that monitor suspicious path components and unexpected write targets
- Audit logging for file creation, overwrites, and writes outside approved directories
- Automated security testing tools that identify path traversal and arbitrary file-write behavior
Detection approaches commonly include:
- Static analysis for filesystem APIs that concatenate or resolve paths using request parameters
- Code review checks for missing canonicalization, prefix-boundary validation, or filename allowlists
- Dynamic testing of file endpoints with traversal variants, encoded separators, absolute paths, and alternate path representations
- Web application firewall or API policy rules that monitor suspicious path components and unexpected write targets
- Audit logging for file creation, overwrites, and writes outside approved directories
- Automated security testing tools that identify path traversal and arbitrary file-write behavior
