/

CVE-2026-110115

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Path Traversal (CWE-22) in Risesoft File Manager API

CVE-2026-110115

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized Arbitrary File Read and Credential Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Risesoft Digital-Infrastructure contains a path traversal vulnerability in the file retrieval handler. An unauthenticated attacker may use parent-directory segments in request parameters to read arbitrary files, potentially exposing database, Redis, and Nacos credentials when the endpoint is publicly reachable.

Risesoft Digital-Infrastructure contains a path traversal vulnerability in the file retrieval handler. An unauthenticated attacker may use parent-directory segments in request parameters to read arbitrary files, potentially exposing database, Redis, and Nacos credentials when the endpoint is publicly reachable.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in deployments using the Risesoft Digital-Infrastructure file manager and its unauthenticated /rest/retrieveFileStream endpoint. Risk increases when the fullPath and fileName parameters are combined without reliably constraining the resulting path to an approved storage directory, allowing requests to reach sensitive application or system files.

The vulnerability occurs in deployments using the Risesoft Digital-Infrastructure file manager and its unauthenticated /rest/retrieveFileStream endpoint. Risk increases when the fullPath and fileName parameters are combined without reliably constraining the resulting path to an approved storage directory, allowing requests to reach sensitive application or system files.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible file retrieval endpoint
  • Required access: No authentication may be required when the endpoint is exposed
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled fullPath and fileName parameters
  • Why exploitation is possible: Parent-directory segments can cause path resolution to escape the intended file storage location
  • Attack surface: Network-accessible file retrieval endpoint
  • Required access: No authentication may be required when the endpoint is exposed
  • Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled fullPath and fileName parameters
  • Why exploitation is possible: Parent-directory segments can cause path resolution to escape the intended file storage location

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient canonicalization and containment enforcement for user-controlled file paths. If path components are concatenated or resolved without verifying that the normalized result remains within an approved base directory, traversal sequences can reference files outside the intended resource tree. This behavior maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The underlying bug is insufficient canonicalization and containment enforcement for user-controlled file paths. If path components are concatenated or resolved without verifying that the normalized result remains within an approved base directory, traversal sequences can reference files outside the intended resource tree. This behavior maps to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

Potential impact

  • Sensitive configuration files may be disclosed
  • Database, Redis, or Nacos credentials could be exposed
  • Attackers may gain information useful for further compromise
  • Application secrets and internal service details could be revealed
  • Confidential business or user data may be read
  • Sensitive configuration files may be disclosed
  • Database, Redis, or Nacos credentials could be exposed
  • Attackers may gain information useful for further compromise
  • Application secrets and internal service details could be revealed
  • Confidential business or user data may be read

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict file access boundary and reducing trust in request-supplied path components.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve and canonicalize paths before access decisions
  • Verify that the normalized path remains within an approved base directory
  • Prefer server-side file identifiers or allowlisted resource names over raw paths
  • Reject traversal markers, encoded variants, and unexpected path separators as a secondary control
  • Require authentication and authorization for file retrieval operations
  • Avoid storing credentials and other high-value secrets in broadly readable application files
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to service accounts and runtime processes
  • Return generic errors without disclosing filesystem structure

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing a strict file access boundary and reducing trust in request-supplied path components.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Resolve and canonicalize paths before access decisions
  • Verify that the normalized path remains within an approved base directory
  • Prefer server-side file identifiers or allowlisted resource names over raw paths
  • Reject traversal markers, encoded variants, and unexpected path separators as a secondary control
  • Require authentication and authorization for file retrieval operations
  • Avoid storing credentials and other high-value secrets in broadly readable application files
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to service accounts and runtime processes
  • Return generic errors without disclosing filesystem structure

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations commonly detect path traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for concatenation of request parameters into filesystem paths
  • Code review checks for canonicalization followed by containment validation
  • Tests using encoded and mixed-separator traversal variants
  • Web application firewall or gateway policies for suspicious path segments
  • Monitoring for unauthenticated requests to file-download and retrieval endpoints
  • Alerts for access to configuration files or paths outside approved storage directories

Automated security review tools can help identify unsafe path construction and missing authorization checks.

Organizations commonly detect path traversal risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for concatenation of request parameters into filesystem paths
  • Code review checks for canonicalization followed by containment validation
  • Tests using encoded and mixed-separator traversal variants
  • Web application firewall or gateway policies for suspicious path segments
  • Monitoring for unauthenticated requests to file-download and retrieval endpoints
  • Alerts for access to configuration files or paths outside approved storage directories

Automated security review tools can help identify unsafe path construction and missing authorization checks.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/risesoft-y9/Digital-Infrastructure/blob/v9.6.11/y9-digitalbase-module/y9-module-filemanager/risenet-y9boot-webapp-filemanager/src/main/java/net/risesoft/y9public/controller/Y9FileController.java#L136-L166
hackmd.iohackmd.io/@1ExmmukzRMWN7B4gQ4W-4Q/digital-infrastructure-filemanager-path-traversal-rw
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/digital-infrastructure-9.6.5-through-9.6.11-path-traversal-via-filemanager-retrievefilestream

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the file retrieval endpoint is network-accessible and does not require authentication. Exploitation depends on the endpoint accepting attacker-controlled path parameters.

The described attack does not require authenticated access to the endpoint. Network reachability and the ability to submit file retrieval parameters are generally sufficient.

Resolve requested paths canonically, enforce containment within an allowlisted directory, and prefer opaque server-side resource identifiers instead of accepting raw filesystem paths.

Combine strict path validation with authorization, least-privilege filesystem permissions, negative and positive security testing, and monitoring for unusual file retrieval behavior.

Yes, when the file retrieval endpoint is network-accessible and does not require authentication. Exploitation depends on the endpoint accepting attacker-controlled path parameters.

The described attack does not require authenticated access to the endpoint. Network reachability and the ability to submit file retrieval parameters are generally sufficient.

Resolve requested paths canonically, enforce containment within an allowlisted directory, and prefer opaque server-side resource identifiers instead of accepting raw filesystem paths.

Combine strict path validation with authorization, least-privilege filesystem permissions, negative and positive security testing, and monitoring for unusual file retrieval behavior.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.