Summary
Ikaros 1.2.0 through 1.2.5 may allow an attacker who knows a valid account password to bypass the required TOTP verification step. Reuse or acceptance of a login temporary token as an authenticated credential could provide full account access, including access to the master administrator account.
Ikaros 1.2.0 through 1.2.5 may allow an attacker who knows a valid account password to bypass the required TOTP verification step. Reuse or acceptance of a login temporary token as an authenticated credential could provide full account access, including access to the master administrator account.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Ikaros authentication flows that issue a temporary login token before TOTP verification is complete. Risk is higher when the token can be accepted as a bearer JWT, refreshed into a longer-lived credential, or used through an HTTP Basic authentication path without confirming the second factor.
The vulnerability occurs in Ikaros authentication flows that issue a temporary login token before TOTP verification is complete. Risk is higher when the token can be accepted as a bearer JWT, refreshed into a longer-lived credential, or used through an HTTP Basic authentication path without confirming the second factor.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Ikaros web authentication and token-handling endpoints - Required access: A valid account password; additional access may be
needed to obtain or submit the temporary login token
- Trigger point: Authentication, token refresh, or HTTP Basic login
processing before TOTP completion
- Why exploitation is possible: The application may treat a temporary
pre-authentication token as proof of completed authentication instead of
binding it to the outstanding TOTP challenge and enforcing its limited
state
- Attack surface: Ikaros web authentication and token-handling endpoints - Required access: A valid account password; additional access may be
needed to obtain or submit the temporary login token
- Trigger point: Authentication, token refresh, or HTTP Basic login
processing before TOTP completion
- Why exploitation is possible: The application may treat a temporary
pre-authentication token as proof of completed authentication instead of
binding it to the outstanding TOTP challenge and enforcing its limited
state
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authentication-state validation failure mapped to CWE-287: Improper Authentication. A token issued during an incomplete login flow is accepted by one or more downstream authentication mechanisms as though it represented a fully verified session. This breaks the boundary between password validation, second-factor verification, and authenticated session issuance.
The underlying flaw is an authentication-state validation failure mapped to CWE-287: Improper Authentication. A token issued during an incomplete login flow is accepted by one or more downstream authentication mechanisms as though it represented a fully verified session. This breaks the boundary between password validation, second-factor verification, and authenticated session issuance.
Potential impact
- An attacker could bypass TOTP protection for a targeted account.
- The attacker may gain full account access and perform actions as the victim.
- A compromised privileged account could expose administrative functions and sensitive data.
- Compromise of the master administrator account could enable broad application takeover.
- An attacker could bypass TOTP protection for a targeted account.
- The attacker may gain full account access and perform actions as the victim.
- A compromised privileged account could expose administrative functions and sensitive data.
- Compromise of the master administrator account could enable broad application takeover.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication state consistently across every login and token-processing path. Temporary tokens should be short-lived, scoped to the specific pending authentication transaction, and unusable as bearer credentials until TOTP verification succeeds. Token refresh, HTTP Basic authentication, and alternate login paths should apply the same second-factor requirements. Session and administrator privileges should follow least-privilege principles, while sensitive actions can require step-up authentication. Reducing token exposure, invalidating temporary credentials after failed or completed challenges, and using secure-by-default session policies can further limit risk.
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authentication state consistently across every login and token-processing path. Temporary tokens should be short-lived, scoped to the specific pending authentication transaction, and unusable as bearer credentials until TOTP verification succeeds. Token refresh, HTTP Basic authentication, and alternate login paths should apply the same second-factor requirements. Session and administrator privileges should follow least-privilege principles, while sensitive actions can require step-up authentication. Reducing token exposure, invalidating temporary credentials after failed or completed challenges, and using secure-by-default session policies can further limit risk.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static analysis and code review for authentication branches that issue or accept tokens before MFA completion, token refresh handlers that do not validate authentication state, and alternate schemes that bypass the primary login flow. Security testing can compare access granted by temporary tokens with access granted after successful TOTP verification. Policy enforcement may require every privileged session and authentication mechanism to carry an explicit, verified MFA state. Automated application security testing and code review tools can help identify inconsistent authentication checks.
Detection approaches include static analysis and code review for authentication branches that issue or accept tokens before MFA completion, token refresh handlers that do not validate authentication state, and alternate schemes that bypass the primary login flow. Security testing can compare access granted by temporary tokens with access granted after successful TOTP verification. Policy enforcement may require every privileged session and authentication mechanism to carry an explicit, verified MFA state. Automated application security testing and code review tools can help identify inconsistent authentication checks.
