Summary
A remotely reachable flaw in phpwcms can allow an attacker to manipulate the POST_name argument and upload files without adequate restrictions. If the affected Extension Check processing is exposed and uploaded content is stored or served unsafely, the issue could lead to unauthorized file placement or further compromise.
A remotely reachable flaw in phpwcms can allow an attacker to manipulate the POST_name argument and upload files without adequate restrictions. If the affected Extension Check processing is exposed and uploaded content is stored or served unsafely, the issue could lead to unauthorized file placement or further compromise.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in phpwcms installations using the affected Extension Check processing in include/inc_front/content/cnt23.article.inc.php. Risk depends on whether the relevant endpoint is remotely accessible, whether uploaded content is sufficiently constrained, and whether the resulting files can be executed or served from a sensitive location.
The vulnerability occurs in phpwcms installations using the affected Extension Check processing in include/inc_front/content/cnt23.article.inc.php. Risk depends on whether the relevant endpoint is remotely accessible, whether uploaded content is sufficiently constrained, and whether the resulting files can be executed or served from a sensitive location.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely accessible phpwcms web request associated with
Extension Check processing
- Required access: The ability to submit requests to the exposed component;
normal authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled POST_name input - Why exploitation is possible: The upload workflow may fail to adequately
authorize, validate, restrict, or safely store the resulting file
- Attack surface: A remotely accessible phpwcms web request associated with
Extension Check processing
- Required access: The ability to submit requests to the exposed component;
normal authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled POST_name input - Why exploitation is possible: The upload workflow may fail to adequately
authorize, validate, restrict, or safely store the resulting file
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an insufficiently controlled file-upload path in which attacker-influenced input affects upload handling without comprehensive authorization and file validation. This maps primarily to CWE-434, Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, and may also involve CWE-284 where access-control checks do not properly limit who can invoke or use the upload functionality. The insecure pattern is trusting client supplied upload-related parameters and relying on weak or incomplete checks before accepting and storing files.
The underlying bug is an insufficiently controlled file-upload path in which attacker-influenced input affects upload handling without comprehensive authorization and file validation. This maps primarily to CWE-434, Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type, and may also involve CWE-284 where access-control checks do not properly limit who can invoke or use the upload functionality. The insecure pattern is trusting client supplied upload-related parameters and relying on weak or incomplete checks before accepting and storing files.
Potential impact
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded content could be served to users or interpreted by the application
- Server-side code execution could occur if dangerous files reach an executable location
- The application or hosted content could be defaced or tampered with
- Sensitive data could be exposed or modified
- The server could be used as a stepping stone for further attacks
- An attacker may place unauthorized files on the server
- Uploaded content could be served to users or interpreted by the application
- Server-side code execution could occur if dangerous files reach an executable location
- The application or hosted content could be defaced or tampered with
- Sensitive data could be exposed or modified
- The server could be used as a stepping stone for further attacks
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making upload handling deny-by-default and separating uploaded content from executable application paths. Common defensive patterns include enforcing authorization at the upload endpoint, reducing trust in client-controlled names and metadata, allowlisting file types based on validated content rather than extensions, generating server side filenames, limiting size and storage locations, and rejecting ambiguous or malformed inputs. Uploaded files are best stored outside executable directories and served through controlled download handling. Least-privilege filesystem permissions, isolated storage, and monitoring can reduce impact when validation controls fail.
Mitigation generally focuses on making upload handling deny-by-default and separating uploaded content from executable application paths. Common defensive patterns include enforcing authorization at the upload endpoint, reducing trust in client-controlled names and metadata, allowlisting file types based on validated content rather than extensions, generating server side filenames, limiting size and storage locations, and rejecting ambiguous or malformed inputs. Uploaded files are best stored outside executable directories and served through controlled download handling. Least-privilege filesystem permissions, isolated storage, and monitoring can reduce impact when validation controls fail.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static analysis for upload handlers that use client-controlled filenames, extensions, paths, or content types without strict validation. Code review should examine authorization checks, canonicalization, storage location, executable permissions, and whether uploaded content can be reached through the web server. Dynamic testing can verify rejection of disallowed types, path traversal attempts, oversized files, and unauthenticated access where authorization is expected. Policy enforcement can require centralized upload libraries, approved storage locations, and security checks in CI pipelines; automated review tools may help identify risky upload patterns.
Detection approaches include static analysis for upload handlers that use client-controlled filenames, extensions, paths, or content types without strict validation. Code review should examine authorization checks, canonicalization, storage location, executable permissions, and whether uploaded content can be reached through the web server. Dynamic testing can verify rejection of disallowed types, path traversal attempts, oversized files, and unauthenticated access where authorization is expected. Policy enforcement can require centralized upload libraries, approved storage locations, and security checks in CI pipelines; automated review tools may help identify risky upload patterns.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
