Summary
Komodo's periphery agent contains an OS command injection flaw in container management operations that incorporate a user-controlled container name into a shell command. An authenticated low-privileged user with the required server permissions may execute arbitrary commands as root on the managed host, including without having Komodo's Terminal permission.
Komodo's periphery agent contains an OS command injection flaw in container management operations that incorporate a user-controlled container name into a shell command. An authenticated low-privileged user with the required server permissions may execute arbitrary commands as root on the managed host, including without having Komodo's Terminal permission.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Komodo deployments where the periphery agent processes container names through the DestroyContainer or SearchContainerLog operations. It becomes risky when an authenticated user has Execute permission, or has both Read and Logs permissions, on a managed server and those names are passed to a shell without safe argument handling.
The vulnerability occurs in Komodo deployments where the periphery agent processes container names through the DestroyContainer or SearchContainerLog operations. It becomes risky when an authenticated user has Execute permission, or has both Read and Logs permissions, on a managed server and those names are passed to a shell without safe argument handling.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Komodo's authenticated container-management operations
- Required access: A user account with Execute, or Read plus Logs, permission on a managed server
- Trigger point: Processing a container name during container destruction or container-log searching
- Why exploitation is possible: The supplied name is interpolated into a command executed through
sh -cwithout adequate escaping or argument isolation - Privilege context: The resulting command may run with root privileges on the managed host
- Attack surface: Komodo's authenticated container-management operations
- Required access: A user account with Execute, or Read plus Logs, permission on a managed server
- Trigger point: Processing a container name during container destruction or container-log searching
- Why exploitation is possible: The supplied name is interpolated into a command executed through
sh -cwithout adequate escaping or argument isolation - Privilege context: The resulting command may run with root privileges on the managed host
Why this happens
The underlying bug is shell command construction from attacker-influenced input. By interpolating a container name into a command string and invoking that string through sh -c, the application allows shell metacharacters to alter command structure rather than treating the name solely as data. This behavior maps to CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
The underlying bug is shell command construction from attacker-influenced input. By interpolating a container name into a command string and invoking that string through sh -c, the application allows shell metacharacters to alter command structure rather than treating the name solely as data. This behavior maps to CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the managed host
- The attacker could obtain root-level control of the host
- Host files, containers, credentials, or service configurations may be accessed or modified
- Running workloads could be disrupted, altered, or used for lateral movement
- The vulnerability may enable data theft, persistence, or broader infrastructure compromise
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the managed host
- The attacker could obtain root-level control of the host
- Host files, containers, credentials, or service configurations may be accessed or modified
- Running workloads could be disrupted, altered, or used for lateral movement
- The vulnerability may enable data theft, persistence, or broader infrastructure compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from container
management paths and reducing the trust placed in user-controlled names.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or API invocation with an argument array rather than
sh -c - Treat container names as data and apply strict allowlisting and validation for identifiers
- Use robust argument-escaping mechanisms when a shell cannot be avoided
- Ensure authorization checks are enforced consistently for every container-management operation
- Run the periphery agent with the minimum host privileges required for its duties
- Isolate management agents from sensitive host resources and restrict their reachable interfaces
- Avoid granting Execute, Read, or Logs permissions more broadly than operationally necessary
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from container
management paths and reducing the trust placed in user-controlled names.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process or API invocation with an argument array rather than
sh -c - Treat container names as data and apply strict allowlisting and validation for identifiers
- Use robust argument-escaping mechanisms when a shell cannot be avoided
- Ensure authorization checks are enforced consistently for every container-management operation
- Run the periphery agent with the minimum host privileges required for its duties
- Isolate management agents from sensitive host resources and restrict their reachable interfaces
- Avoid granting Execute, Read, or Logs permissions more broadly than operationally necessary
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings where user-controlled values are concatenated into shell commands
- Calls to
sh -c, shell execution helpers, or process APIs receiving interpolated container names - Code-review signals such as string-built commands, missing argument separation, or absent identifier validation
- Authorization tests covering combinations of Execute, Read, and Logs permissions
- Audit records for unexpected container-management requests or unusual root-level processes launched by the periphery agent
- Policy checks that prohibit shell invocation for operations that can use direct APIs or structured argument lists
Automated security review tools may help identify command-construction patterns during development.
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings where user-controlled values are concatenated into shell commands
- Calls to
sh -c, shell execution helpers, or process APIs receiving interpolated container names - Code-review signals such as string-built commands, missing argument separation, or absent identifier validation
- Authorization tests covering combinations of Execute, Read, and Logs permissions
- Audit records for unexpected container-management requests or unusual root-level processes launched by the periphery agent
- Policy checks that prohibit shell invocation for operations that can use direct APIs or structured argument lists
Automated security review tools may help identify command-construction patterns during development.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| kb. | kb.cert.org/ |
