Summary
A critical command injection vulnerability affects the Edimax BR-6208AC 1.32 router through the /goform/formWlanMP web endpoint. A remote attacker who can reach the affected service may manipulate the readE2P argument to cause operating-system commands to execute with the device's available privileges.
A critical command injection vulnerability affects the Edimax BR-6208AC 1.32 router through the /goform/formWlanMP web endpoint. A remote attacker who can reach the affected service may manipulate the readE2P argument to cause operating-system commands to execute with the device's available privileges.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Edimax BR-6208AC firmware 1.32 when the /goform/formWlanMP request handler processes the readE2P argument without adequately separating intended data from operating-system command syntax. Risk depends on network exposure, access controls, and the privileges available to the affected web service. The product is no longer supported by its maintainer, which may limit remediation options.
The issue occurs in Edimax BR-6208AC firmware 1.32 when the /goform/formWlanMP request handler processes the readE2P argument without adequately separating intended data from operating-system command syntax. Risk depends on network exposure, access controls, and the privileges available to the affected web service. The product is no longer supported by its maintainer, which may limit remediation options.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The router's remotely reachable web management or form-processing service
- Required access: Network access to the affected endpoint; authentication requirements may depend on the device's configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
readE2Pargument by/goform/formWlanMP - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into an operating-system command path without sufficiently strong command and argument separation
- Attack surface: The router's remotely reachable web management or form-processing service
- Required access: Network access to the affected endpoint; authentication requirements may depend on the device's configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
readE2Pargument by/goform/formWlanMP - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is incorporated into an operating-system command path without sufficiently strong command and argument separation
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by treating externally controlled request data as part of an operating-system command. If input reaches a shell or command interpreter without strict validation and safe argument handling, command syntax can be interpreted as executable instructions rather than ordinary data. This is consistent with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with the broader command-injection relationship described by CWE-74.
The vulnerability is caused by treating externally controlled request data as part of an operating-system command. If input reaches a shell or command interpreter without strict validation and safe argument handling, command syntax can be interpreted as executable instructions rather than ordinary data. This is consistent with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with the broader command-injection relationship described by CWE-74.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the router
- Device configuration and network settings could be modified
- Sensitive information may be accessed or altered
- The router could be used for persistence, traffic interception, or lateral movement
- Network availability could be reduced or the device could become part of a larger attack
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the router
- Device configuration and network settings could be modified
- Sensitive information may be accessed or altered
- The router could be used for persistence, traffic interception, or lateral movement
- Network availability could be reduced or the device could become part of a larger attack
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request-processing paths and reducing exposure of unsupported devices.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell-based operations with direct system APIs or fixed executable and argument mappings
- Applying strict allowlist validation for values accepted by the handler
- Ensuring user input is passed as data through APIs that do not invoke a shell
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted administrative networks
- Disabling unnecessary remote administration and enforcing strong access controls
- Segmenting legacy devices and limiting their privileges and reachable services
- Planning replacement with a maintained platform when vendor remediation is unavailable
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request-processing paths and reducing exposure of unsupported devices.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell-based operations with direct system APIs or fixed executable and argument mappings
- Applying strict allowlist validation for values accepted by the handler
- Ensuring user input is passed as data through APIs that do not invoke a shell
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted administrative networks
- Disabling unnecessary remote administration and enforcing strong access controls
- Segmenting legacy devices and limiting their privileges and reachable services
- Planning replacement with a maintained platform when vendor remediation is unavailable
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts commonly include:
- Static analysis for shell invocation APIs, command concatenation, and unsafely interpolated request parameters
- Code review of handlers that pass form fields or query parameters to system utilities
- Dynamic testing with benign boundary and metacharacter inputs in isolated environments
- Web and network monitoring for unusual requests to
/goform/formWlanMP, especially requests containing unexpectedreadE2Pvalues - Policy enforcement preventing unsupported network devices from being directly exposed to untrusted networks
- Neutral automated security review tools to flag command construction and missing input validation
Detection efforts commonly include:
- Static analysis for shell invocation APIs, command concatenation, and unsafely interpolated request parameters
- Code review of handlers that pass form fields or query parameters to system utilities
- Dynamic testing with benign boundary and metacharacter inputs in isolated environments
- Web and network monitoring for unusual requests to
/goform/formWlanMP, especially requests containing unexpectedreadE2Pvalues - Policy enforcement preventing unsupported network devices from being directly exposed to untrusted networks
- Neutral automated security review tools to flag command construction and missing input validation
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
