Summary
A command injection vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6208AC firmware allows commands to be incorporated into processing of the tftpsIP parameter at the /goform/formAutoFWupgrade endpoint.
Because the endpoint may be reachable remotely, an attacker who can access the affected management interface could potentially execute commands with the router's privileges. The issue is especially difficult to remediate because the affected product is no longer supported.
A command injection vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6208AC firmware allows commands to be incorporated into processing of the tftpsIP parameter at the /goform/formAutoFWupgrade endpoint.
Because the endpoint may be reachable remotely, an attacker who can access the affected management interface could potentially execute commands with the router's privileges. The issue is especially difficult to remediate because the affected product is no longer supported.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in Edimax BR-6208AC firmware version 1.32 when the /goform/formAutoFWupgrade request handler processes the tftpsIP argument without adequately separating user-controlled data from operating-system command syntax. Risk depends on whether the device's management interface is reachable by an attacker and whether the endpoint is enabled in the deployment.
The vulnerability occurs in Edimax BR-6208AC firmware version 1.32 when the /goform/formAutoFWupgrade request handler processes the tftpsIP argument without adequately separating user-controlled data from operating-system command syntax. Risk depends on whether the device's management interface is reachable by an attacker and whether the endpoint is enabled in the deployment.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP-based router management endpoint
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected management interface; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
tftpsIPparameter by/goform/formAutoFWupgrade - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input can reach command-processing logic without sufficient neutralization or strict validation
- Attack surface: HTTP-based router management endpoint
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected management interface; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
tftpsIPparameter by/goform/formAutoFWupgrade - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input can reach command-processing logic without sufficient neutralization or strict validation
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an OS command injection condition. The request handler appears to pass attacker-influenced input into a command execution context rather than treating it solely as a constrained data value.
This maps primarily to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader injection pattern. The insecure design combines untrusted request data with system command processing without a sufficiently restrictive trust boundary.
The underlying flaw is an OS command injection condition. The request handler appears to pass attacker-influenced input into a command execution context rather than treating it solely as a constrained data value.
This maps primarily to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader injection pattern. The insecure design combines untrusted request data with system command processing without a sufficiently restrictive trust boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the router
- Device settings or firmware-related processes could be altered
- Network traffic could be monitored, redirected, or disrupted
- The router could be used to attack other systems on connected networks
- Sensitive configuration data may be exposed
- Compromise could persist until the device is replaced or securely reinitialized
- An attacker may execute arbitrary commands on the router
- Device settings or firmware-related processes could be altered
- Network traffic could be monitored, redirected, or disrupted
- The router could be used to attack other systems on connected networks
- Sensitive configuration data may be exposed
- Compromise could persist until the device is replaced or securely reinitialized
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request processing and reducing trust in remotely supplied parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell command construction with structured APIs and fixed argument lists
- Applying strict allowlist validation for IP-address fields and rejecting unexpected syntax
- Separating firmware-update workflows from remotely exposed interfaces
- Restricting management access to trusted administration networks or secure management channels
- Applying least privilege to web-management and update processes
- Monitoring for replacement or retirement of unsupported devices where vendor fixes are unavailable
- Avoiding reliance on escaping alone as the primary injection defense
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request processing and reducing trust in remotely supplied parameters.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell command construction with structured APIs and fixed argument lists
- Applying strict allowlist validation for IP-address fields and rejecting unexpected syntax
- Separating firmware-update workflows from remotely exposed interfaces
- Restricting management access to trusted administration networks or secure management channels
- Applying least privilege to web-management and update processes
- Monitoring for replacement or retirement of unsupported devices where vendor fixes are unavailable
- Avoiding reliance on escaping alone as the primary injection defense
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for command injection risks through:
- Static analysis of request handlers that concatenate parameters into shell commands
- Code review signals involving shell invocation, dynamic command strings, or weak input validation
- Tests that verify IP-address parameters accept only canonical address formats
- Web-application firewall and router-management logs showing unusual requests to firmware-update endpoints
- Network policy checks confirming that administrative interfaces are not broadly exposed
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction using request-derived values
Organizations can look for command injection risks through:
- Static analysis of request handlers that concatenate parameters into shell commands
- Code review signals involving shell invocation, dynamic command strings, or weak input validation
- Tests that verify IP-address parameters accept only canonical address formats
- Web-application firewall and router-management logs showing unusual requests to firmware-update endpoints
- Network policy checks confirming that administrative interfaces are not broadly exposed
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction using request-derived values
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
