Summary
A high-severity command injection vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6208AC can allow a remote attacker to influence operating-system command execution through the /goform/formAccept endpoint.
The issue becomes risky when the submit-url parameter is processed without adequate validation or separation from command execution. The affected product is no longer supported by its maintainer.
A high-severity command injection vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6208AC can allow a remote attacker to influence operating-system command execution through the /goform/formAccept endpoint.
The issue becomes risky when the submit-url parameter is processed without adequate validation or separation from command execution. The affected product is no longer supported by its maintainer.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the web-management interface of Edimax BR-6208AC devices running the affected firmware. It requires the endpoint to be remotely reachable and the submit-url parameter to flow into an operating-system command or shell-related operation without sufficient input handling. Exposure may depend on administrative interface network settings and access controls.
The vulnerability occurs in the web-management interface of Edimax BR-6208AC devices running the affected firmware. It requires the endpoint to be remotely reachable and the submit-url parameter to flow into an operating-system command or shell-related operation without sufficient input handling. Exposure may depend on administrative interface network settings and access controls.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible router web-management endpoint
- Required access: Reachability of
/goform/formAccept; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration - Trigger point: Processing of the
submit-urlrequest parameter - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is insufficiently separated from operating-system command construction or execution
- Additional context: Public exploit information increases the likelihood of opportunistic scanning and attempted abuse
- Attack surface: Network-accessible router web-management endpoint
- Required access: Reachability of
/goform/formAccept; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration - Trigger point: Processing of the
submit-urlrequest parameter - Why exploitation is possible: User-controlled input is insufficiently separated from operating-system command construction or execution
- Additional context: Public exploit information increases the likelihood of opportunistic scanning and attempted abuse
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an OS command injection condition in which externally supplied data is incorporated into a command-processing path without reliable validation, escaping, or argument separation. This maps primarily to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader injection pattern. The insecure design treats a request parameter as trusted command-related input rather than as data subject to strict allowlisting and safe API boundaries.
The underlying bug is an OS command injection condition in which externally supplied data is incorporated into a command-processing path without reliable validation, escaping, or argument separation. This maps primarily to CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command, with CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component describing the broader injection pattern. The insecure design treats a request parameter as trusted command-related input rather than as data subject to strict allowlisting and safe API boundaries.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the router
- Device settings, traffic handling, or administrative controls could be altered
- Sensitive configuration data may be exposed
- The device could be used to monitor, redirect, or disrupt network traffic
- Compromised routers could support lateral movement or additional attacks
- Availability of the device or connected services could be affected
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the router
- Device settings, traffic handling, or administrative controls could be altered
- Sensitive configuration data may be exposed
- The device could be used to monitor, redirect, or disrupt network traffic
- Compromised routers could support lateral movement or additional attacks
- Availability of the device or connected services could be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request-handling paths and reducing trust in management-interface input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell-based operations with APIs that pass fixed arguments separately
- Applying strict allowlists for parameters that represent URLs, paths, or actions
- Rejecting unexpected characters, encodings, lengths, and parameter structures
- Avoiding command construction through string concatenation or interpolation
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted networks and authenticated administrators
- Running management processes with the minimum privileges required
- Isolating unsupported devices or replacing them with maintained equipment where practical
Mitigation generally focuses on removing shell interpretation from request-handling paths and reducing trust in management-interface input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing shell-based operations with APIs that pass fixed arguments separately
- Applying strict allowlists for parameters that represent URLs, paths, or actions
- Rejecting unexpected characters, encodings, lengths, and parameter structures
- Avoiding command construction through string concatenation or interpolation
- Restricting management interfaces to trusted networks and authenticated administrators
- Running management processes with the minimum privileges required
- Isolating unsupported devices or replacing them with maintained equipment where practical
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis searches for request parameters reaching shell execution, process-spawning, or command-wrapper APIs
- Code review checks for string concatenation or interpolation involving HTTP parameters
- Testing that management endpoints enforce allowlists and reject unexpected input
- Network monitoring for unusual requests to administrative endpoints and unexpected outbound connections
- Policy enforcement that limits exposure of router administration interfaces to trusted management networks
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction from externally controlled data
Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis searches for request parameters reaching shell execution, process-spawning, or command-wrapper APIs
- Code review checks for string concatenation or interpolation involving HTTP parameters
- Testing that management endpoints enforce allowlists and reject unexpected input
- Network monitoring for unusual requests to administrative endpoints and unexpected outbound connections
- Policy enforcement that limits exposure of router administration interfaces to trusted management networks
- Automated security review tools that flag command construction from externally controlled data
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
