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CVE-2026-108899

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

Improper Authorization (CWE-285) in Zoraxy Proxy Server

CVE-2026-108899

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-266, CWE-285

Impact:

Authentication Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Zoraxy contains an improper authorization flaw in the Path Exception Matcher used by its dynamic proxy authentication handling. A remotely located attacker may manipulate path-prefix matching to bypass intended Basic Authentication controls when a vulnerable proxy route is exposed.

Zoraxy contains an improper authorization flaw in the Path Exception Matcher used by its dynamic proxy authentication handling. A remotely located attacker may manipulate path-prefix matching to bypass intended Basic Authentication controls when a vulnerable proxy route is exposed.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Zoraxy's dynamic proxy authentication provider, specifically the handling of path exceptions in mod/dynamicproxy/authProviders.go. It becomes risky when externally reachable proxy routes rely on path-prefix matching to decide whether Basic Authentication is required and attacker-controlled request paths are evaluated inconsistently with the authorization policy.

The issue occurs in Zoraxy's dynamic proxy authentication provider, specifically the handling of path exceptions in mod/dynamicproxy/authProviders.go. It becomes risky when externally reachable proxy routes rely on path-prefix matching to decide whether Basic Authentication is required and attacker-controlled request paths are evaluated inconsistently with the authorization policy.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible Zoraxy dynamic proxy endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to an exposed proxy route; valid credentials are not necessarily required if the matching logic can be bypassed
  • Trigger point: Path-prefix evaluation during Basic Authentication handling
  • Why exploitation is possible: A manipulated request path may be treated as an authorization exception, causing authentication enforcement to differ from the intended route policy
  • Attack surface: Network-accessible Zoraxy dynamic proxy endpoint
  • Required access: Ability to send requests to an exposed proxy route; valid credentials are not necessarily required if the matching logic can be bypassed
  • Trigger point: Path-prefix evaluation during Basic Authentication handling
  • Why exploitation is possible: A manipulated request path may be treated as an authorization exception, causing authentication enforcement to differ from the intended route policy

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from insufficiently strict authorization decisions based on path-prefix matching. When path-derived exceptions are trusted without consistently canonicalizing and validating the effective request path, an attacker may cause a protected route to be classified as exempt from authentication. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is also related to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, because access privileges are incorrectly assigned based on ambiguous path-matching logic.

The vulnerability results from insufficiently strict authorization decisions based on path-prefix matching. When path-derived exceptions are trusted without consistently canonicalizing and validating the effective request path, an attacker may cause a protected route to be classified as exempt from authentication. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is also related to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, because access privileges are incorrectly assigned based on ambiguous path-matching logic.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may access proxy routes intended to require authentication
  • Protected application data or administrative functionality could be exposed
  • Downstream services may receive unauthorized requests
  • Account, session, or service-level security boundaries could be weakened
  • An attacker may access proxy routes intended to require authentication
  • Protected application data or administrative functionality could be exposed
  • Downstream services may receive unauthorized requests
  • Account, session, or service-level security boundaries could be weakened

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions independent of ambiguous path interpretation.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Canonicalizing and validating request paths before applying authorization rules
  • Using exact, normalized route matching where possible instead of broad prefix exceptions
  • Applying authentication by default and requiring explicit, narrowly scoped exclusions
  • Ensuring authentication and authorization checks use the same normalized path representation
  • Restricting proxy exposure and applying least privilege to downstream service accounts
  • Adding regression tests for encoded, normalized, nested, and boundary-adjacent paths

Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions independent of ambiguous path interpretation.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Canonicalizing and validating request paths before applying authorization rules
  • Using exact, normalized route matching where possible instead of broad prefix exceptions
  • Applying authentication by default and requiring explicit, narrowly scoped exclusions
  • Ensuring authentication and authorization checks use the same normalized path representation
  • Restricting proxy exposure and applying least privilege to downstream service accounts
  • Adding regression tests for encoded, normalized, nested, and boundary-adjacent paths

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static analysis and review rules for path-based authorization decisions
  • Code review signals involving prefix comparisons, exception lists, and inconsistent path normalization
  • Dynamic tests that compare protected-route behavior across equivalent and specially formatted paths
  • Policy checks requiring authentication-by-default for reverse-proxy routes
  • Monitoring for unauthenticated requests reaching endpoints designated as protected

Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify inconsistent authorization behavior during development.

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static analysis and review rules for path-based authorization decisions
  • Code review signals involving prefix comparisons, exception lists, and inconsistent path normalization
  • Dynamic tests that compare protected-route behavior across equivalent and specially formatted paths
  • Policy checks requiring authentication-by-default for reverse-proxy routes
  • Monitoring for unauthenticated requests reaching endpoints designated as protected

Automated security testing and code review tools may help identify inconsistent authorization behavior during development.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/carfeii/oss/blob/main/zoraxy.md#finding-1-path-exception-rules-for-basic-auth-zorxauth-and-captcha-match-on-raw-string-prefix-not-a-path-boundary
github.comgithub.com/tobychui/zoraxy/
github.comgithub.com/tobychui/zoraxy/commit/37cd0f27b17cd15cfa4af409bfec943146f5fdfe
github.comgithub.com/tobychui/zoraxy/pull/1291
github.comgithub.com/tobychui/zoraxy/releases/tag/v3.3.5-rc1
vuldb.comvuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-108899
vuldb.comvuldb.com/submit/976047
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/416690
vuldb.comvuldb.com/vuln/416690/cti

Frequently asked

questions

It may be remotely exploitable when a vulnerable Zoraxy proxy endpoint is network-accessible and its authentication policy depends on the affected path exception matching.

Not necessarily. The security issue concerns bypassing the condition that requires Basic Authentication, although access to a reachable proxy route remains necessary.

Use consistent path canonicalization and strict, default-deny authorization checks. Authentication should be required unless a narrowly defined exception is explicitly and safely validated.

Test authorization decisions against equivalent path representations, review all exception rules, minimize unauthenticated proxy routes, and enforce authentication policies through automated regression and security tests.

It may be remotely exploitable when a vulnerable Zoraxy proxy endpoint is network-accessible and its authentication policy depends on the affected path exception matching.

Not necessarily. The security issue concerns bypassing the condition that requires Basic Authentication, although access to a reachable proxy route remains necessary.

Use consistent path canonicalization and strict, default-deny authorization checks. Authentication should be required unless a narrowly defined exception is explicitly and safely validated.

Test authorization decisions against equivalent path representations, review all exception rules, minimize unauthenticated proxy routes, and enforce authentication policies through automated regression and security tests.

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