Summary
A critical command injection vulnerability in the TOZED X300 IPPingDiagnostics Handler allows attacker-controlled Host input to reach operating-system command execution.
Because the affected handler can be reached remotely, an unauthenticated or otherwise authorized network attacker may be able to execute commands on the device, depending on deployment exposure and access controls.
A critical command injection vulnerability in the TOZED X300 IPPingDiagnostics Handler allows attacker-controlled Host input to reach operating-system command execution.
Because the affected handler can be reached remotely, an unauthenticated or otherwise authorized network attacker may be able to execute commands on the device, depending on deployment exposure and access controls.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in TOZED X300 devices through version 6.01.3, specifically in the process_ping function of the IPPingDiagnostics Handler. It becomes risky when the handler accepts a remotely supplied Host value and incorporates that value into an operating-system command without sufficiently separating data from executable command syntax.
The vulnerability occurs in TOZED X300 devices through version 6.01.3, specifically in the process_ping function of the IPPingDiagnostics Handler. It becomes risky when the handler accepts a remotely supplied Host value and incorporates that value into an operating-system command without sufficiently separating data from executable command syntax.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible IPPingDiagnostics Handler
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected diagnostic functionality; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Hostargument by theprocess_pingfunction - Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input is passed into an operating-system command execution path without effective command separation or validation
- Attack surface: Network-accessible IPPingDiagnostics Handler
- Required access: Network reachability to the affected diagnostic functionality; authentication requirements may depend on device configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of the
Hostargument by theprocess_pingfunction - Why exploitation is possible: Attacker-controlled input is passed into an operating-system command execution path without effective command separation or validation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is the construction or invocation of an operating-system command using insufficiently trusted input. When externally supplied data is concatenated into a shell command or passed to a command interpreter without strict separation, command syntax can be interpreted as executable instructions.
This maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command describing the broader command-injection class.
The underlying bug is the construction or invocation of an operating-system command using insufficiently trusted input. When externally supplied data is concatenated into a shell command or passed to a command interpreter without strict separation, command syntax can be interpreted as executable instructions.
This maps primarily to CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command, with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command describing the broader command-injection class.
Potential impact
- An attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the device
- Device configuration or operational data may be altered
- Sensitive information could be accessed or exfiltrated
- The device could be used for lateral movement within the network
- Availability may be disrupted through process, service, or resource manipulation
- An attacker could execute arbitrary commands on the device
- Device configuration or operational data may be altered
- Sensitive information could be accessed or exfiltrated
- The device could be used for lateral movement within the network
- Availability may be disrupted through process, service, or resource manipulation
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that diagnostic inputs remain data rather than executable command content.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation when a direct library or system API can perform the required network diagnostic
- Passing arguments through structured process APIs that do not invoke a command shell
- Applying strict allowlist validation for hostnames, IP addresses, and permitted formats
- Separating user-controlled values from command construction and rejecting unexpected characters or encodings
- Running diagnostic handlers with the minimum operating-system privileges and filesystem access
- Restricting network exposure of management and diagnostic interfaces
- Centralizing input validation and enforcing secure coding policies for command execution paths
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring that diagnostic inputs remain data rather than executable command content.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Avoiding shell invocation when a direct library or system API can perform the required network diagnostic
- Passing arguments through structured process APIs that do not invoke a command shell
- Applying strict allowlist validation for hostnames, IP addresses, and permitted formats
- Separating user-controlled values from command construction and rejecting unexpected characters or encodings
- Running diagnostic handlers with the minimum operating-system privileges and filesystem access
- Restricting network exposure of management and diagnostic interfaces
- Centralizing input validation and enforcing secure coding policies for command execution paths
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for shell execution APIs, command interpreters, and string concatenation involving request parameters
- Code review checks for diagnostic handlers that pass network-provided values into process-spawning functions
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, shell invocation, or commands originating from the device management service
- Web and device telemetry reviews for unusual requests targeting diagnostic endpoints or malformed
Hostvalues - Policy enforcement that requires allowlist validation and non-shell process APIs for externally influenced arguments
- Automated security scanning and code review tools configured to identify CWE-77 and CWE-78 patterns
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis rules for shell execution APIs, command interpreters, and string concatenation involving request parameters
- Code review checks for diagnostic handlers that pass network-provided values into process-spawning functions
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, shell invocation, or commands originating from the device management service
- Web and device telemetry reviews for unusual requests targeting diagnostic endpoints or malformed
Hostvalues - Policy enforcement that requires allowlist validation and non-shell process APIs for externally influenced arguments
- Automated security scanning and code review tools configured to identify CWE-77 and CWE-78 patterns
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
