Summary
cc-connect through version 1.5.0 may accept MAX platform webhook updates without authentication when no webhook secret is configured. An attacker who can reach the webhook listener on port 8080 could forge updates using an allowed or administrative user ID and potentially execute privileged commands such as /shell on the host.
cc-connect through version 1.5.0 may accept MAX platform webhook updates without authentication when no webhook secret is configured. An attacker who can reach the webhook listener on port 8080 could forge updates using an allowed or administrative user ID and potentially execute privileged commands such as /shell on the host.
Affected context
The issue occurs in cc-connect's MAX platform adapter when webhook mode is enabled and the webhook listener is reachable. Risk is higher when no webhook_secret is configured and the adapter trusts user identifiers from incoming requests to authorize command execution.
The issue occurs in cc-connect's MAX platform adapter when webhook mode is enabled and the webhook listener is reachable. Risk is higher when no webhook_secret is configured and the adapter trusts user identifiers from incoming requests to authorize command execution.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The MAX platform webhook listener, typically exposed on port 8080
- Required access: Network reachability to the webhook endpoint; valid authentication is not required when the webhook secret is absent
- Trigger point: Processing of a forged webhook update containing an allowed or administrative
user_id - Why exploitation is possible: The adapter can accept and authorize webhook data without verifying that it originated from a trusted MAX platform source
- Attack surface: The MAX platform webhook listener, typically exposed on port 8080
- Required access: Network reachability to the webhook endpoint; valid authentication is not required when the webhook secret is absent
- Trigger point: Processing of a forged webhook update containing an allowed or administrative
user_id - Why exploitation is possible: The adapter can accept and authorize webhook data without verifying that it originated from a trusted MAX platform source
Why this happens
The underlying defect is an authentication enforcement failure. In webhook mode, the MAX platform adapter may process incoming updates when webhook_secret is not configured without requiring an alternative trusted authentication mechanism. Treating an attacker-controlled user identifier as sufficient authorization maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
The underlying defect is an authentication enforcement failure. In webhook mode, the MAX platform adapter may process incoming updates when webhook_secret is not configured without requiring an alternative trusted authentication mechanism. Treating an attacker-controlled user identifier as sufficient authorization maps to CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
Potential impact
- An attacker may forge MAX platform updates
- Unauthorized users could invoke privileged bot commands
- The
/shellcommand could enable execution of commands under the service account - The host environment could be modified or compromised
- Credentials, application data, or connected services could be exposed
- The service could be used for lateral movement or persistence
- An attacker may forge MAX platform updates
- Unauthorized users could invoke privileged bot commands
- The
/shellcommand could enable execution of commands under the service account - The host environment could be modified or compromised
- Credentials, application data, or connected services could be exposed
- The service could be used for lateral movement or persistence
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making webhook authentication mandatory rather than optional.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require a cryptographically validated webhook secret or equivalent request-signing mechanism
- Fail closed when the authentication configuration is missing, invalid, or incomplete
- Avoid using user-supplied identifiers as the sole basis for authorization
- Apply explicit authorization checks to privileged commands, including shell access
- Bind webhook listeners to trusted network boundaries and restrict ingress where possible
- Run the service with the minimum host and filesystem privileges required
- Separate administrative command handling from general webhook processing
Mitigation generally focuses on making webhook authentication mandatory rather than optional.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Require a cryptographically validated webhook secret or equivalent request-signing mechanism
- Fail closed when the authentication configuration is missing, invalid, or incomplete
- Avoid using user-supplied identifiers as the sole basis for authorization
- Apply explicit authorization checks to privileged commands, including shell access
- Bind webhook listeners to trusted network boundaries and restrict ingress where possible
- Run the service with the minimum host and filesystem privileges required
- Separate administrative command handling from general webhook processing
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings where webhook handlers process requests without authentication checks
- Code review signals showing optional secrets, fail-open branches, or user-ID-based authorization
- Tests covering missing, invalid, and rotated webhook secrets
- Runtime logs showing webhook requests accepted without signature or secret validation
- Network-policy and exposure reviews for listeners on port 8080
- Policy checks requiring authentication for endpoints capable of triggering administrative commands
Automated code review and security scanning tools may help identify webhook handlers that lack consistent authentication enforcement.
Organizations can look for:
- Static analysis findings where webhook handlers process requests without authentication checks
- Code review signals showing optional secrets, fail-open branches, or user-ID-based authorization
- Tests covering missing, invalid, and rotated webhook secrets
- Runtime logs showing webhook requests accepted without signature or secret validation
- Network-policy and exposure reviews for listeners on port 8080
- Policy checks requiring authentication for endpoints capable of triggering administrative commands
Automated code review and security scanning tools may help identify webhook handlers that lack consistent authentication enforcement.
