Summary
A critical OS command injection vulnerability in ppt2png allows attacker-controlled input or output path arguments to reach a shell command executed by Node.js.
When unsafe file names are passed to the affected processing function, an attacker may execute operating system commands with the privileges of the Node.js process.
A critical OS command injection vulnerability in ppt2png allows attacker-controlled input or output path arguments to reach a shell command executed by Node.js.
When unsafe file names are passed to the affected processing function, an attacker may execute operating system commands with the privileges of the Node.js process.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in ppt2png deployments through version 0.0.6 when input or output path values can be influenced by an attacker and are incorporated into commands executed through Node.js child-process functionality. Risk depends on whether the affected package processes untrusted file names, paths, or request parameters without separating data from shell syntax.
The vulnerability occurs in ppt2png deployments through version 0.0.6 when input or output path values can be influenced by an attacker and are incorporated into commands executed through Node.js child-process functionality. Risk depends on whether the affected package processes untrusted file names, paths, or request parameters without separating data from shell syntax.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The ppt2png conversion interface or application code that invokes
ppt2png.js - Required access: Ability to supply or influence input or output path arguments
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled path values by a child-process command execution call
- Why exploitation is possible: Unsanitized arguments are interpreted by a shell rather than being treated strictly as file-system data
- Attack surface: The ppt2png conversion interface or application code that invokes
ppt2png.js - Required access: Ability to supply or influence input or output path arguments
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled path values by a child-process command execution call
- Why exploitation is possible: Unsanitized arguments are interpreted by a shell rather than being treated strictly as file-system data
Why this happens
The underlying bug is OS command injection, mapped to CWE-78. The application passes attacker-influenced file names or paths to a shell-based process execution API without reliably separating command arguments from shell syntax. This insecure pattern allows data intended to identify files to alter the command interpreted by the operating system.
The underlying bug is OS command injection, mapped to CWE-78. The application passes attacker-influenced file names or paths to a shell-based process execution API without reliably separating command arguments from shell syntax. This insecure pattern allows data intended to identify files to alter the command interpreted by the operating system.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating system commands
- The Node.js process and its accessible files may be compromised
- Application data or generated documents could be modified or deleted
- Credentials, environment variables, or other secrets could be exposed
- The vulnerable host may be used for lateral movement or additional compromise
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating system commands
- The Node.js process and its accessible files may be compromised
- Application data or generated documents could be modified or deleted
- Credentials, environment variables, or other secrets could be exposed
- The vulnerable host may be used for lateral movement or additional compromise
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation for attacker-controlled values.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process-spawning APIs that pass arguments separately and do not invoke a shell
- Validate paths against an allowlist of permitted names, locations, and extensions
- Resolve paths within controlled directories and reject unexpected traversal or control characters
- Treat all file names and conversion parameters as untrusted input
- Run conversion workers with least-privilege operating-system accounts and restricted file-system access
- Apply resource limits and isolation so a compromised conversion process has minimal reach
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation for attacker-controlled values.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process-spawning APIs that pass arguments separately and do not invoke a shell
- Validate paths against an allowlist of permitted names, locations, and extensions
- Resolve paths within controlled directories and reject unexpected traversal or control characters
- Treat all file names and conversion parameters as untrusted input
- Run conversion workers with least-privilege operating-system accounts and restricted file-system access
- Apply resource limits and isolation so a compromised conversion process has minimal reach
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis searches for shell-executing child-process APIs receiving concatenated or interpolated values
- Code review checks for user-controlled paths flowing into command construction
- Runtime monitoring of child-process creation, unusual command arguments, and unexpected process trees
- Policy enforcement requiring direct argument passing and prohibiting shell execution for untrusted data
- Automated security review tools that identify command-injection data flows during development
Organizations can detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis searches for shell-executing child-process APIs receiving concatenated or interpolated values
- Code review checks for user-controlled paths flowing into command construction
- Runtime monitoring of child-process creation, unusual command arguments, and unexpected process trees
- Policy enforcement requiring direct argument passing and prohibiting shell execution for untrusted data
- Automated security review tools that identify command-injection data flows during development
