Summary
A code injection vulnerability in the HUION Inspiroy Frego S (L310) Windows Driver installer can allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code through insecure DLL-loading logic. The issue becomes risky when the installer loads a DLL from a location that an unprivileged user can influence.
A code injection vulnerability in the HUION Inspiroy Frego S (L310) Windows Driver installer can allow a local attacker to execute arbitrary code through insecure DLL-loading logic. The issue becomes risky when the installer loads a DLL from a location that an unprivileged user can influence.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the Windows driver installation workflow for the HUION Inspiroy Frego S (L310). It may be present when installer components resolve or load DLLs without sufficiently restricting search locations, validating module identity, or protecting relevant directories from local modification.
The vulnerability occurs in the Windows driver installation workflow for the HUION Inspiroy Frego S (L310). It may be present when installer components resolve or load DLLs without sufficiently restricting search locations, validating module identity, or protecting relevant directories from local modification.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HUION Windows driver installer and its DLL-loading logic
- Required access: Local access sufficient to place, replace, or influence a DLL in a searched location
- Trigger point: Execution of the affected installer workflow
- Why exploitation is possible: The installer may load attacker-controlled code as a trusted DLL without adequate path, signature, or origin validation
- Attack surface: HUION Windows driver installer and its DLL-loading logic
- Required access: Local access sufficient to place, replace, or influence a DLL in a searched location
- Trigger point: Execution of the affected installer workflow
- Why exploitation is possible: The installer may load attacker-controlled code as a trusted DLL without adequate path, signature, or origin validation
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an insecure dynamic library-loading pattern in which module resolution is influenced by locations or files that are not fully trusted. When installer code loads a malicious DLL as part of its normal execution, attacker-controlled content can be executed with the installer's privileges. This represents CWE-94 because externally influenced input controls code that the installer executes.
The underlying bug is an insecure dynamic library-loading pattern in which module resolution is influenced by locations or files that are not fully trusted. When installer code loads a malicious DLL as part of its normal execution, attacker-controlled content can be executed with the installer's privileges. This represents CWE-94 because externally influenced input controls code that the installer executes.
Potential impact
- A local attacker may execute arbitrary code with the installer's privileges
- The attacker could modify files or settings associated with the driver
- The compromise may enable persistence or further local system access
- Sensitive information accessible to the installer could be exposed
- A local attacker may execute arbitrary code with the installer's privileges
- The attacker could modify files or settings associated with the driver
- The compromise may enable persistence or further local system access
- Sensitive information accessible to the installer could be exposed
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making module loading explicit, constrained,
and resistant to local tampering.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Loading DLLs only from trusted, fixed directories
- Using secure library-loading APIs with restricted search paths
- Validating module signatures, identity, and expected architecture
- Protecting installer directories and temporary paths from unprivileged modification
- Avoiding elevated execution until inputs and dependencies are verified
- Applying least privilege to installer components wherever practical
Mitigation generally focuses on making module loading explicit, constrained,
and resistant to local tampering.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Loading DLLs only from trusted, fixed directories
- Using secure library-loading APIs with restricted search paths
- Validating module signatures, identity, and expected architecture
- Protecting installer directories and temporary paths from unprivileged modification
- Avoiding elevated execution until inputs and dependencies are verified
- Applying least privilege to installer components wherever practical
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis of dynamic library-loading APIs and relative DLL paths
- Code review checks for installer execution from writable directories
- Tests that place unexpected DLLs in candidate search locations
- Monitoring installer processes for loading modules outside approved directories
- Application-control and code-signing policies that restrict untrusted DLL execution
Automated security analysis tools may help identify unsafe loading patterns during development.
Organizations can look for this weakness through:
- Static analysis of dynamic library-loading APIs and relative DLL paths
- Code review checks for installer execution from writable directories
- Tests that place unexpected DLLs in candidate search locations
- Monitoring installer processes for loading modules outside approved directories
- Application-control and code-signing policies that restrict untrusted DLL execution
Automated security analysis tools may help identify unsafe loading patterns during development.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| huion. | huion.com |
| gist. | gist.github.com/ |
