Summary
A high-severity code injection vulnerability in @rog0x/mcp-git-tools 1.0.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the resolveBaseBranch function.
The issue becomes risky when remotely supplied branch or repository-related input reaches a code execution path without sufficient validation or safe handling.
A high-severity code injection vulnerability in @rog0x/mcp-git-tools 1.0.1 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code through the resolveBaseBranch function.
The issue becomes risky when remotely supplied branch or repository-related input reaches a code execution path without sufficient validation or safe handling.
Affected context
This issue affects deployments using @rog0x/mcp-git-tools 1.0.1 where the resolveBaseBranch function is exposed through a remotely reachable MCP or application interface.
Exploitation depends on attacker-controlled input being accepted by that function and processed in a way that permits code execution. The precise exposure depends on how the package is integrated, authenticated, and isolated.
This issue affects deployments using @rog0x/mcp-git-tools 1.0.1 where the resolveBaseBranch function is exposed through a remotely reachable MCP or application interface.
Exploitation depends on attacker-controlled input being accepted by that function and processed in a way that permits code execution. The precise exposure depends on how the package is integrated, authenticated, and isolated.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable interface that invokes
resolveBaseBranch - Required access: Ability to send requests or otherwise provide input to the exposed tool
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled input by the branch-resolution function
- Why exploitation is possible: Input reaches an unsafe execution-sensitive operation without adequate validation or separation from executable behavior
- Attack surface: A remotely reachable interface that invokes
resolveBaseBranch - Required access: Ability to send requests or otherwise provide input to the exposed tool
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled input by the branch-resolution function
- Why exploitation is possible: Input reaches an unsafe execution-sensitive operation without adequate validation or separation from executable behavior
Why this happens
The vulnerability is caused by an unsafe code-handling pattern in the resolveBaseBranch function, where externally influenced input can affect execution behavior.
This maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'). The underlying issue is treating data that should remain a branch or repository value as trusted input for an execution-capable operation, rather than constraining it to an explicitly allowed data format.
The vulnerability is caused by an unsafe code-handling pattern in the resolveBaseBranch function, where externally influenced input can affect execution behavior.
This maps to CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'). The underlying issue is treating data that should remain a branch or repository value as trusted input for an execution-capable operation, rather than constraining it to an explicitly allowed data format.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code in the process hosting the tool
- Application secrets and environment variables could be exposed
- Repository contents may be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
- The attacker could gain access to connected services using the process's privileges
- Additional systems could be affected if the runtime has excessive permissions
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code in the process hosting the tool
- Application secrets and environment variables could be exposed
- Repository contents may be modified, deleted, or exfiltrated
- The attacker could gain access to connected services using the process's privileges
- Additional systems could be affected if the runtime has excessive permissions
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring branch and repository inputs remain data throughout processing.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing dynamic execution or evaluation with explicit, non-executable APIs
- Applying allowlist-based validation for branch names and related identifiers
- Separating input parsing from command or code construction
- Avoiding shell interpretation when invoking Git or other external tools
- Using structured process APIs with argument boundaries preserved
- Limiting the tool's filesystem, network, repository, and operating-system privileges
- Enforcing authentication and authorization around remotely exposed tool functions
- Isolating the runtime so compromise does not automatically extend to other services
Mitigation generally focuses on ensuring branch and repository inputs remain data throughout processing.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing dynamic execution or evaluation with explicit, non-executable APIs
- Applying allowlist-based validation for branch names and related identifiers
- Separating input parsing from command or code construction
- Avoiding shell interpretation when invoking Git or other external tools
- Using structured process APIs with argument boundaries preserved
- Limiting the tool's filesystem, network, repository, and operating-system privileges
- Enforcing authentication and authorization around remotely exposed tool functions
- Isolating the runtime so compromise does not automatically extend to other services
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving dynamic evaluation, shell construction, or execution APIs near
resolveBaseBranch - Code-review changes that concatenate user-controlled branch or repository values into commands or executable expressions
- Tests that submit malformed, unexpected, or metacharacter-containing branch identifiers
- Runtime monitoring for unusual child-process creation, unexpected command interpreters, or access outside approved repositories
- Policy checks requiring allowlisted branch formats and structured subprocess invocation
Automated code-review and application-security tools may help identify execution-sensitive data flows, but findings should be validated against the package's actual integration.
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving dynamic evaluation, shell construction, or execution APIs near
resolveBaseBranch - Code-review changes that concatenate user-controlled branch or repository values into commands or executable expressions
- Tests that submit malformed, unexpected, or metacharacter-containing branch identifiers
- Runtime monitoring for unusual child-process creation, unexpected command interpreters, or access outside approved repositories
- Policy checks requiring allowlisted branch formats and structured subprocess invocation
Automated code-review and application-security tools may help identify execution-sensitive data flows, but findings should be validated against the package's actual integration.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| stillosdigitalholdings. | stillosdigitalholdings.com/ |
| npmjs. | npmjs.com/ |
