Summary
A command-injection vulnerability in @justice8096/sagemath-mcp-server may allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands through weaknesses in the escapeShellString and sanitizeCode functions. The risk arises when attacker-controlled input reaches a shell or command-execution path without reliable separation from executable syntax.
A command-injection vulnerability in @justice8096/sagemath-mcp-server may allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary operating-system commands through weaknesses in the escapeShellString and sanitizeCode functions. The risk arises when attacker-controlled input reaches a shell or command-execution path without reliable separation from executable syntax.
Affected context
The issue occurs in the SageMath MCP server's handling of input passed through escapeShellString and sanitizeCode. Deployments may be exposed when remote requests can influence values processed by these functions and those values are subsequently used in shell commands or other operating-system execution mechanisms.
The issue occurs in the SageMath MCP server's handling of input passed through escapeShellString and sanitizeCode. Deployments may be exposed when remote requests can influence values processed by these functions and those values are subsequently used in shell commands or other operating-system execution mechanisms.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remote MCP server request handling
- Required access: Ability to send requests that influence command-related input; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled data by
escapeShellStringorsanitizeCode - Why exploitation is possible: Input validation or shell escaping may fail to prevent command syntax from being interpreted by the operating system
- Attack surface: Remote MCP server request handling
- Required access: Ability to send requests that influence command-related input; authentication requirements depend on deployment configuration
- Trigger point: Processing of attacker-controlled data by
escapeShellStringorsanitizeCode - Why exploitation is possible: Input validation or shell escaping may fail to prevent command syntax from being interpreted by the operating system
Why this happens
The vulnerability is consistent with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The insecure pattern occurs when application data is incorporated into a shell command and relies on incomplete escaping or sanitization to distinguish data from executable command syntax. String-based filtering functions such as escapeShellString and sanitizeCode may not provide a complete security boundary across all command contexts, shells, or input encodings.
The vulnerability is consistent with CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The insecure pattern occurs when application data is incorporated into a shell command and relies on incomplete escaping or sanitization to distinguish data from executable command syntax. String-based filtering functions such as escapeShellString and sanitizeCode may not provide a complete security boundary across all command contexts, shells, or input encodings.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands
- The server process and its accessible data could be compromised
- Credentials, configuration values, or other secrets may be exposed
- The affected host or container could be used for lateral movement
- Application data may be modified, deleted, or poisoned
- An attacker may execute arbitrary operating-system commands
- The server process and its accessible data could be compromised
- Credentials, configuration values, or other secrets may be exposed
- The affected host or container could be used for lateral movement
- Application data may be modified, deleted, or poisoned
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation and reducing trust in remote input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process-execution APIs that pass arguments separately rather than invoking a shell
- Use fixed command and argument allowlists instead of constructing commands from request data
- Apply context-appropriate validation at trust boundaries and avoid treating sanitization as the sole control
- Run command-executing components with dedicated, least-privileged identities
- Restrict filesystem, network, and secret access available to the server process
- Isolate computational workloads in constrained environments with appropriate resource and system-call limits
Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating shell interpretation and reducing trust in remote input.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Prefer direct process-execution APIs that pass arguments separately rather than invoking a shell
- Use fixed command and argument allowlists instead of constructing commands from request data
- Apply context-appropriate validation at trust boundaries and avoid treating sanitization as the sole control
- Run command-executing components with dedicated, least-privileged identities
- Restrict filesystem, network, and secret access available to the server process
- Isolate computational workloads in constrained environments with appropriate resource and system-call limits
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for shell-spawning APIs, dynamic command construction, string interpolation, and concatenation near process execution
- Code review checks for custom escaping or sanitization functions used as substitutes for structured argument handling
- Tests using adversarial metacharacters and boundary conditions across supported platforms and shells
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command interpreters, or unusual process arguments
- Policy enforcement that blocks direct shell invocation where structured process APIs are available
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify command-execution paths, but findings should be validated against actual data flow.
Detection approaches may include:
- Static analysis for shell-spawning APIs, dynamic command construction, string interpolation, and concatenation near process execution
- Code review checks for custom escaping or sanitization functions used as substitutes for structured argument handling
- Tests using adversarial metacharacters and boundary conditions across supported platforms and shells
- Runtime monitoring for unexpected child processes, command interpreters, or unusual process arguments
- Policy enforcement that blocks direct shell invocation where structured process APIs are available
Automated code review and software composition analysis tools may help identify command-execution paths, but findings should be validated against actual data flow.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| stillosdigitalholdings. | stillosdigitalholdings.com/ |
| npmjs. | npmjs.com/ |
