Summary
A sensitive information exposure vulnerability in Backstage Scaffolder can disclose internal execution data from another user's Scaffolder task to an authenticated user with permission to read that task. If the exposed data includes credentials for an external service, the disclosure may enable unauthorized changes or other actions in that service.
A sensitive information exposure vulnerability in Backstage Scaffolder can disclose internal execution data from another user's Scaffolder task to an authenticated user with permission to read that task. If the exposed data includes credentials for an external service, the disclosure may enable unauthorized changes or other actions in that service.
Affected context
The issue occurs in deployments using the Backstage Scaffolder backend where authenticated users can read task details belonging to other users. Risk increases when task execution data includes secrets, tokens, connection details, or other sensitive values from external-service integrations.
The issue occurs in deployments using the Backstage Scaffolder backend where authenticated users can read task details belonging to other users. Risk increases when task execution data includes secrets, tokens, connection details, or other sensitive values from external-service integrations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Backstage Scaffolder task-reading functionality
- Required access: An authenticated Backstage account with permission to read another user's Scaffolder task
- Trigger point: Retrieval or display of task execution data
- Why exploitation is possible: Sensitive internal execution data may be exposed through an access-controlled task view without sufficient confidentiality filtering
- Additional condition: The task data must contain credentials or other security-sensitive information
- Attack surface: Backstage Scaffolder task-reading functionality
- Required access: An authenticated Backstage account with permission to read another user's Scaffolder task
- Trigger point: Retrieval or display of task execution data
- Why exploitation is possible: Sensitive internal execution data may be exposed through an access-controlled task view without sufficient confidentiality filtering
- Additional condition: The task data must contain credentials or other security-sensitive information
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient protection of sensitive execution data exposed through Scaffolder task access. Internal task details may include values that should remain confidential, such as credentials used by external integrations.
This maps primarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor. It is also related to CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data, because sensitive values may be included in responses or task output delivered to a user who should not receive them.
The underlying issue is insufficient protection of sensitive execution data exposed through Scaffolder task access. Internal task details may include values that should remain confidential, such as credentials used by external integrations.
This maps primarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor. It is also related to CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data, because sensitive values may be included in responses or task output delivered to a user who should not receive them.
Potential impact
- Credentials or tokens may be disclosed to an unauthorized authenticated user
- An attacker may access or modify resources in an integrated external service
- External systems may be altered, deleted, or otherwise misused
- Confidential internal execution data may be exposed
- The incident may enable broader compromise if reused credentials have excessive privileges
- Credentials or tokens may be disclosed to an unauthorized authenticated user
- An attacker may access or modify resources in an integrated external service
- External systems may be altered, deleted, or otherwise misused
- Confidential internal execution data may be exposed
- The incident may enable broader compromise if reused credentials have excessive privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on minimizing sensitive data in task execution records and enforcing confidentiality-aware access controls.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Redacting credentials, tokens, and secrets before task data is persisted or returned
- Separating operational task metadata from sensitive execution values
- Applying object-level authorization checks for every task read operation
- Restricting task visibility according to ownership, project, and role
- Using short-lived, narrowly scoped credentials for external integrations
- Preventing secrets from appearing in logs, error messages, templates, or task outputs
- Treating authenticated users as untrusted with respect to other users' task data
Mitigation generally focuses on minimizing sensitive data in task execution records and enforcing confidentiality-aware access controls.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Redacting credentials, tokens, and secrets before task data is persisted or returned
- Separating operational task metadata from sensitive execution values
- Applying object-level authorization checks for every task read operation
- Restricting task visibility according to ownership, project, and role
- Using short-lived, narrowly scoped credentials for external integrations
- Preventing secrets from appearing in logs, error messages, templates, or task outputs
- Treating authenticated users as untrusted with respect to other users' task data
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar exposure risks through:
- Static analysis and review rules for credentials included in task responses, logs, or serialized execution records
- Code review checks for missing object-level authorization on task retrieval endpoints
- Data-flow analysis tracking secrets from integration configuration into user-visible output
- Automated tests verifying that users cannot read another user's task details or sensitive fields
- DLP and secret-scanning policies applied to task logs, API responses, and persisted execution data
- Runtime monitoring for unusual cross-user task access and suspicious activity in connected services
Organizations can identify similar exposure risks through:
- Static analysis and review rules for credentials included in task responses, logs, or serialized execution records
- Code review checks for missing object-level authorization on task retrieval endpoints
- Data-flow analysis tracking secrets from integration configuration into user-visible output
- Automated tests verifying that users cannot read another user's task details or sensitive fields
- DLP and secret-scanning policies applied to task logs, API responses, and persisted execution data
- Runtime monitoring for unusual cross-user task access and suspicious activity in connected services
