Summary
A high-severity authorization flaw in PickMall Lilishop's Mobile Binding function may allow a remote attacker to manipulate the Username argument and perform actions without the required authorization. The issue is relevant where the endpoint relies on user-supplied identity information without adequately verifying ownership or privilege.
A high-severity authorization flaw in PickMall Lilishop's Mobile Binding function may allow a remote attacker to manipulate the Username argument and perform actions without the required authorization. The issue is relevant where the endpoint relies on user-supplied identity information without adequately verifying ownership or privilege.
Affected context
The vulnerability affects Lilishop deployments using the Mobile Binding functionality at /buyer/passport/member/bindMobile, including versions reported up to 4.2.4. Risk may arise when the endpoint accepts a Username value from a remote request and does not consistently verify that the requesting session is authorized to act for the referenced account.
The vulnerability affects Lilishop deployments using the Mobile Binding functionality at /buyer/passport/member/bindMobile, including versions reported up to 4.2.4. Risk may arise when the endpoint accepts a Username value from a remote request and does not consistently verify that the requesting session is authorized to act for the referenced account.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remotely accessible Mobile Binding endpoint
- Required access: Network access to the affected application; additional authentication requirements may depend on deployment behavior
- Trigger point: Processing of a request containing a manipulated Username argument
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization decisions may rely on attacker-controlled identity data rather than a trusted, server-side relationship between the session and the target account
- Attack surface: Remotely accessible Mobile Binding endpoint
- Required access: Network access to the affected application; additional authentication requirements may depend on deployment behavior
- Trigger point: Processing of a request containing a manipulated Username argument
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization decisions may rely on attacker-controlled identity data rather than a trusted, server-side relationship between the session and the target account
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an authorization design flaw in which an identity or account selector supplied by the client may influence a privileged operation without sufficient ownership or permission checks. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is also related to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, because the application may permit a requester to act with privileges associated with another user.
The underlying issue is an authorization design flaw in which an identity or account selector supplied by the client may influence a privileged operation without sufficient ownership or permission checks. This behavior maps primarily to CWE-285: Improper Authorization and is also related to CWE-266: Incorrect Privilege Assignment, because the application may permit a requester to act with privileges associated with another user.
Potential impact
- An attacker may bind or modify a mobile number associated with another account
- Unauthorized account changes or identity-linking actions could occur
- Account takeover or recovery-control abuse could become possible, depending on surrounding controls
- User privacy, authentication integrity, and downstream account operations may be affected
- An attacker may bind or modify a mobile number associated with another account
- Unauthorized account changes or identity-linking actions could occur
- Account takeover or recovery-control abuse could become possible, depending on surrounding controls
- User privacy, authentication integrity, and downstream account operations may be affected
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions from trusted server-side identity and permission state rather than client-supplied account identifiers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target account from the authenticated session where the operation is self-service
- Requiring explicit, server-side ownership checks before changing mobile or identity attributes
- Applying centralized authorization policies consistently across related endpoints
- Treating Username and similar identifiers as untrusted input
- Requiring reauthentication or step-up verification for sensitive account changes
- Limiting service and administrative privileges according to least-privilege principles
- Recording and reviewing account-binding changes and anomalous authorization failures
Mitigation generally focuses on making authorization decisions from trusted server-side identity and permission state rather than client-supplied account identifiers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the target account from the authenticated session where the operation is self-service
- Requiring explicit, server-side ownership checks before changing mobile or identity attributes
- Applying centralized authorization policies consistently across related endpoints
- Treating Username and similar identifiers as untrusted input
- Requiring reauthentication or step-up verification for sensitive account changes
- Limiting service and administrative privileges according to least-privilege principles
- Recording and reviewing account-binding changes and anomalous authorization failures
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review of endpoints that accept user or account identifiers
- Checks for authorization decisions based solely on request parameters
- Review of whether session identity, resource ownership, and required privileges are independently verified
- Policy tests covering cross-account access and unauthorized state changes
- Runtime monitoring for binding operations targeting accounts unrelated to the authenticated principal
- Automated security testing tools that compare authorization behavior across multiple user contexts
Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review of endpoints that accept user or account identifiers
- Checks for authorization decisions based solely on request parameters
- Review of whether session identity, resource ownership, and required privileges are independently verified
- Policy tests covering cross-account access and unauthorized state changes
- Runtime monitoring for binding operations targeting accounts unrelated to the authenticated principal
- Automated security testing tools that compare authorization behavior across multiple user contexts
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
