Summary
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in feelcrm-os may allow a remote attacker to influence the URL processed by the GoogleController getCurlData endpoint. If the server can make outbound requests based on that input, the attacker could access unintended network resources or retrieve sensitive data.
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in feelcrm-os may allow a remote attacker to influence the URL processed by the GoogleController getCurlData endpoint. If the server can make outbound requests based on that input, the attacker could access unintended network resources or retrieve sensitive data.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in feelcrm-os 1.0.0 within the GoogleController getCurlData endpoint. It becomes risky when externally supplied URL data is accepted by the endpoint and used for server-side requests without sufficient destination validation or network egress restrictions.
The vulnerability occurs in feelcrm-os 1.0.0 within the GoogleController getCurlData endpoint. It becomes risky when externally supplied URL data is accepted by the endpoint and used for server-side requests without sufficient destination validation or network egress restrictions.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable getCurlData endpoint - Required access: Access sufficient to submit or influence the url argument;
authentication requirements depend on the application's deployment
- Trigger point: Server-side processing of the attacker-influenced URL - Why exploitation is possible: The application may request attacker-selected
destinations without reliably restricting schemes, hosts, ports, redirects,
or access to private network ranges
- Attack surface: Remotely reachable getCurlData endpoint - Required access: Access sufficient to submit or influence the url argument;
authentication requirements depend on the application's deployment
- Trigger point: Server-side processing of the attacker-influenced URL - Why exploitation is possible: The application may request attacker-selected
destinations without reliably restricting schemes, hosts, ports, redirects,
or access to private network ranges
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an insufficient separation between untrusted URL input and trusted server-side network destinations. When application-controlled request functionality uses an attacker-influenced URL without robust allowlisting and network-layer controls, it can make requests on the attacker's behalf. This behavior maps to CWE-918, Server-Side Request Forgery.
The underlying bug is an insufficient separation between untrusted URL input and trusted server-side network destinations. When application-controlled request functionality uses an attacker-influenced URL without robust allowlisting and network-layer controls, it can make requests on the attacker's behalf. This behavior maps to CWE-918, Server-Side Request Forgery.
Potential impact
- An attacker may cause requests to internal services that are not publicly reachable.
- Sensitive response data could be exposed through the application.
- Cloud or platform metadata may be accessible if network controls permit it.
- Internal services could receive unintended requests or be probed.
- The application could be used as a pivot point for further attacks.
- An attacker may cause requests to internal services that are not publicly reachable.
- Sensitive response data could be exposed through the application.
- Cloud or platform metadata may be accessible if network controls permit it.
- Internal services could receive unintended requests or be probed.
- The application could be used as a pivot point for further attacks.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied destination data and making outbound requests secure by default. Common defensive patterns include using strict destination allowlists, validating normalized hostnames and schemes, rejecting private and link-local address ranges, controlling redirects, and limiting permitted ports and protocols. Outbound network access can be restricted with egress policies, and requests can run with minimal application privileges and narrowly scoped credentials. Response handling should also avoid exposing unnecessary remote content to callers.
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in user-supplied destination data and making outbound requests secure by default. Common defensive patterns include using strict destination allowlists, validating normalized hostnames and schemes, rejecting private and link-local address ranges, controlling redirects, and limiting permitted ports and protocols. Outbound network access can be restricted with egress policies, and requests can run with minimal application privileges and narrowly scoped credentials. Response handling should also avoid exposing unnecessary remote content to callers.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection approaches include static analysis for request APIs that consume request parameters, code review checks for URL construction and redirect handling, and tests covering private, loopback, link-local, encoded, and redirected destinations. Runtime monitoring can flag unusual outbound connections from application processes, including access to internal address ranges or metadata services. Policy enforcement may restrict egress and require review of features that proxy or fetch remote URLs. Automated review tools can help identify these patterns during development.
Detection approaches include static analysis for request APIs that consume request parameters, code review checks for URL construction and redirect handling, and tests covering private, loopback, link-local, encoded, and redirected destinations. Runtime monitoring can flag unusual outbound connections from application processes, including access to internal address ranges or metadata services. Policy enforcement may restrict egress and require review of features that proxy or fetch remote URLs. Automated review tools can help identify these patterns during development.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| github. | github.com/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
| vuldb. | vuldb.com/ |
