Summary
EnergizeLab station-middleware contains an external file path control vulnerability that allows any registered low-privilege account to read arbitrary files from the server. Successful exploitation may expose application source files, configuration data, credentials, and other server secrets when attacker-controlled paths are accepted without adequate restriction.
EnergizeLab station-middleware contains an external file path control vulnerability that allows any registered low-privilege account to read arbitrary files from the server. Successful exploitation may expose application source files, configuration data, credentials, and other server secrets when attacker-controlled paths are accepted without adequate restriction.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in station-middleware Docker deployments where an authenticated, low-privilege user can influence a file path processed by the NestJS application. It becomes risky when the application resolves or reads that path without sufficiently restricting the target location, validating the requested resource, or enforcing an approved file-access scope.
The vulnerability occurs in station-middleware Docker deployments where an authenticated, low-privilege user can influence a file path processed by the NestJS application. It becomes risky when the application resolves or reads that path without sufficiently restricting the target location, validating the requested resource, or enforcing an approved file-access scope.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: A station-middleware file-reading functionality exposed through the application
- Required access: Any registered account with low privileges
- Trigger point: A request or operation that accepts an attacker-controlled file path
- Why exploitation is possible: The supplied path can cause the server to access files outside the intended application-controlled directory
- Attack surface: A station-middleware file-reading functionality exposed through the application
- Required access: Any registered account with low privileges
- Trigger point: A request or operation that accepts an attacker-controlled file path
- Why exploitation is possible: The supplied path can cause the server to access files outside the intended application-controlled directory
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient control over externally supplied file names or paths. When user-controlled path values are passed to filesystem operations without canonicalization, allowlisting, containment checks, and authorization enforcement, the application may retrieve unintended files. This behavior maps to CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
The underlying issue is insufficient control over externally supplied file names or paths. When user-controlled path values are passed to filesystem operations without canonicalization, allowlisting, containment checks, and authorization enforcement, the application may retrieve unintended files. This behavior maps to CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read middleware source files and internal configuration
- Database credentials, API keys, tokens, or other server secrets could be exposed
- Disclosure of filesystem structure may enable follow-on attacks
- Application and operational data could be used to expand access to connected systems
- The confidentiality of the server environment could be compromised
- An attacker may read middleware source files and internal configuration
- Database credentials, API keys, tokens, or other server secrets could be exposed
- Disclosure of filesystem structure may enable follow-on attacks
- Application and operational data could be used to expand access to connected systems
- The confidentiality of the server environment could be compromised
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in file path input and limiting filesystem access to explicitly approved resources.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing user-supplied paths with opaque identifiers mapped to server-side resources
- Applying strict allowlists for permitted files and directories
- Canonicalizing paths and verifying that resolved locations remain within an intended base directory
- Separating file retrieval authorization from general account authentication
- Running the service with least-privilege filesystem permissions
- Keeping secrets outside web-accessible or application-readable directories where practical
- Returning generic errors that do not disclose filesystem details
Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in file path input and limiting filesystem access to explicitly approved resources.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Replacing user-supplied paths with opaque identifiers mapped to server-side resources
- Applying strict allowlists for permitted files and directories
- Canonicalizing paths and verifying that resolved locations remain within an intended base directory
- Separating file retrieval authorization from general account authentication
- Running the service with least-privilege filesystem permissions
- Keeping secrets outside web-accessible or application-readable directories where practical
- Returning generic errors that do not disclose filesystem details
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules for filesystem APIs receiving request parameters
- Code review checks for path concatenation, normalization, and containment validation
- Tests covering unauthorized files, alternate path representations, and boundary-directory access
- Runtime monitoring for unusual file-read requests and access to configuration or secret locations
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted resource identifiers instead of raw filesystem paths
- Automated security review tools that flag externally controlled file names and paths
Organizations can identify this class of issue through:
- Static analysis rules for filesystem APIs receiving request parameters
- Code review checks for path concatenation, normalization, and containment validation
- Tests covering unauthorized files, alternate path representations, and boundary-directory access
- Runtime monitoring for unusual file-read requests and access to configuration or secret locations
- Policy enforcement requiring allowlisted resource identifiers instead of raw filesystem paths
- Automated security review tools that flag externally controlled file names and paths
