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CVE-2026-105033

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Hardcoded Credentials (CWE-798) in EnergizeLab AI Station

CVE-2026-105033

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hardcoded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Unauthorized Root Access and Device Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) firmware includes default root credentials while leaving SSH enabled. An attacker with network access to a device may authenticate as root and gain complete control of the operating system and connected services.

The EnergizeLab AI Station (RK3562) firmware includes default root credentials while leaving SSH enabled. An attacker with network access to a device may authenticate as root and gain complete control of the operating system and connected services.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in firmware deployments where:

  • Default or shared root credentials are embedded in the device image
  • SSH is enabled and reachable over a network
  • Device owners have not replaced the supplied credentials or restricted administrative access

Exposure depends on network reachability, deployed access controls, and whether the default credentials remain valid.

The vulnerability occurs in firmware deployments where:

  • Default or shared root credentials are embedded in the device image
  • SSH is enabled and reachable over a network
  • Device owners have not replaced the supplied credentials or restricted administrative access

Exposure depends on network reachability, deployed access controls, and whether the default credentials remain valid.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible SSH service on the EnergizeLab AI Station
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the device and knowledge or discovery of the default credentials
  • Trigger point: Authentication to SSH using the supplied root account
  • Why exploitation is possible: Credentials embedded in the firmware are predictable or shared across devices, and SSH permits privileged remote login
  • Attack surface: Network-accessible SSH service on the EnergizeLab AI Station
  • Required access: Network connectivity to the device and knowledge or discovery of the default credentials
  • Trigger point: Authentication to SSH using the supplied root account
  • Why exploitation is possible: Credentials embedded in the firmware are predictable or shared across devices, and SSH permits privileged remote login

Why this happens

The firmware ships with credentials that are not unique to each device or are otherwise retained as defaults, while exposing a remote administrative service.

This maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where authentication secrets are embedded in software or firmware and can be recovered, reused, or distributed across deployments.

Permitting direct root authentication over SSH increases the consequences of credential disclosure.

The firmware ships with credentials that are not unique to each device or are otherwise retained as defaults, while exposing a remote administrative service.

This maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials, where authentication secrets are embedded in software or firmware and can be recovered, reused, or distributed across deployments.

Permitting direct root authentication over SSH increases the consequences of credential disclosure.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain complete administrative control of the device
  • Device configuration, applications, or stored data could be altered or removed
  • The device could be used to access adjacent systems or networks
  • Attackers could install persistent malware or use the device for further attacks
  • Device availability and operational integrity could be disrupted
  • An attacker may obtain complete administrative control of the device
  • Device configuration, applications, or stored data could be altered or removed
  • The device could be used to access adjacent systems or networks
  • Attackers could install persistent malware or use the device for further attacks
  • Device availability and operational integrity could be disrupted

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared secrets and reducing exposure of privileged management interfaces.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Generating unique, device-specific administrative credentials during provisioning
  • Requiring a credential change or secure enrollment before enabling remote administration
  • Disabling direct root SSH login and using a controlled administrative account with privilege elevation
  • Restricting SSH access to trusted management networks, VPNs, or explicitly authorized hosts
  • Applying key-based authentication and protecting private keys through secure provisioning
  • Limiting device privileges and separating management access from operational services
  • Monitoring for unexpected authentication attempts and administrative activity

Mitigation generally focuses on removing shared secrets and reducing exposure of privileged management interfaces.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Generating unique, device-specific administrative credentials during provisioning
  • Requiring a credential change or secure enrollment before enabling remote administration
  • Disabling direct root SSH login and using a controlled administrative account with privilege elevation
  • Restricting SSH access to trusted management networks, VPNs, or explicitly authorized hosts
  • Applying key-based authentication and protecting private keys through secure provisioning
  • Limiting device privileges and separating management access from operational services
  • Monitoring for unexpected authentication attempts and administrative activity

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar issues through:

  • Firmware and filesystem analysis for embedded usernames, passwords, keys, or authentication tokens
  • Static analysis and secret-scanning rules targeting hardcoded credential patterns
  • Code and configuration reviews that examine SSH enablement, root login policy, and provisioning workflows
  • Testing whether factory credentials are unique, rotated, and rejected after enrollment
  • Network policy checks that identify management services exposed beyond intended administrative segments
  • Automated firmware review tools and CI policy gates that block newly introduced embedded secrets

Organizations can identify similar issues through:

  • Firmware and filesystem analysis for embedded usernames, passwords, keys, or authentication tokens
  • Static analysis and secret-scanning rules targeting hardcoded credential patterns
  • Code and configuration reviews that examine SSH enablement, root login policy, and provisioning workflows
  • Testing whether factory credentials are unique, rotated, and rejected after enrollment
  • Network policy checks that identify management services exposed beyond intended administrative segments
  • Automated firmware review tools and CI policy gates that block newly introduced embedded secrets

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/xn0tsa/your-secrets-are-safe-with-me
takeonme.orgtakeonme.org/gcves/GCVE-1337-2026-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001110111111110111111111111000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001101/
theverge.comtheverge.com/tech/1010727/eiliko-robot-hack-energize-lab

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when SSH is reachable from the attacker's network position and the default root credentials remain valid. Network segmentation or firewall rules may limit exposure.

The attacker must authenticate to SSH, but the supplied default credentials can provide that authentication when they are known or discoverable.

Replace shared firmware credentials with unique, securely provisioned device credentials, disable direct root login, and restrict SSH to trusted management paths.

Use secure-by-default provisioning, scan firmware for embedded secrets, enforce credential-rotation policies, and validate remote-management exposure before deployment.

Yes, when SSH is reachable from the attacker's network position and the default root credentials remain valid. Network segmentation or firewall rules may limit exposure.

The attacker must authenticate to SSH, but the supplied default credentials can provide that authentication when they are known or discoverable.

Replace shared firmware credentials with unique, securely provisioned device credentials, disable direct root login, and restrict SSH to trusted management paths.

Use secure-by-default provisioning, scan firmware for embedded secrets, enforce credential-rotation policies, and validate remote-management exposure before deployment.

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