Summary
The EnergizeLab Eilik and EilikO AI skill upload endpoint accepts remote requests without authentication and does not sufficiently constrain uploaded file paths. An unauthenticated attacker may use path traversal to overwrite arbitrary files, including AI skill files used by the affected robots.
The EnergizeLab Eilik and EilikO AI skill upload endpoint accepts remote requests without authentication and does not sufficiently constrain uploaded file paths. An unauthenticated attacker may use path traversal to overwrite arbitrary files, including AI skill files used by the affected robots.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the FastAPI AI inference and profiling services that provide skill uploads for Eilik and EilikO robots. Risk is increased when the upload endpoint is network-accessible, accepts attacker-controlled filenames or paths, and stores files without authentication, canonicalization, or confinement to an intended upload directory.
The vulnerability occurs in the FastAPI AI inference and profiling services that provide skill uploads for Eilik and EilikO robots. Risk is increased when the upload endpoint is network-accessible, accepts attacker-controlled filenames or paths, and stores files without authentication, canonicalization, or confinement to an intended upload directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AI skill upload endpoint - Required access: No authentication or prior authorization is required - Trigger point: Processing and storing an uploaded file using an
attacker-controlled path
- Why exploitation is possible: The service does not adequately constrain
destination paths, allowing traversal outside the intended upload location
and possible overwriting of files used by robot services
- Attack surface: Network-accessible AI skill upload endpoint - Required access: No authentication or prior authorization is required - Trigger point: Processing and storing an uploaded file using an
attacker-controlled path
- Why exploitation is possible: The service does not adequately constrain
destination paths, allowing traversal outside the intended upload location
and possible overwriting of files used by robot services
Why this happens
The underlying issue is insufficient validation and confinement of a user-controlled file path. When an upload handler combines an attacker- supplied filename or path with a storage location without canonicalizing it and verifying that the result remains within an approved directory, traversal sequences can redirect the write elsewhere. This maps primarily to CWE-22, Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, and is also related to CWE-434 because the service accepts uploaded files without adequate restrictions.
The underlying issue is insufficient validation and confinement of a user-controlled file path. When an upload handler combines an attacker- supplied filename or path with a storage location without canonicalizing it and verifying that the result remains within an approved directory, traversal sequences can redirect the write elsewhere. This maps primarily to CWE-22, Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, and is also related to CWE-434 because the service accepts uploaded files without adequate restrictions.
Potential impact
- An attacker may overwrite AI skill files used by Eilik or EilikO robots.
- Robot behavior or AI inference results could be altered.
- The service may experience denial of service if operational files are damaged.
- Sensitive application files could potentially be replaced or corrupted.
- Further compromise could occur if overwritten files are later executed or trusted by a privileged component.
- An attacker may overwrite AI skill files used by Eilik or EilikO robots.
- Robot behavior or AI inference results could be altered.
- The service may experience denial of service if operational files are damaged.
- Sensitive application files could potentially be replaced or corrupted.
- Further compromise could occur if overwritten files are later executed or trusted by a privileged component.
General mitigation guidance
Defensive patterns include requiring authentication and authorization for upload operations, treating filenames and paths as untrusted data, and generating server-side storage names rather than honoring client-provided destinations. Upload handling can canonicalize paths, reject traversal components, and verify that the resolved target remains inside a dedicated non-executable directory. Strict file-type, size, and content validation, isolated storage, overwrite restrictions, and least-privilege service accounts reduce exposure. Secure-by-default deployments should keep upload services inaccessible from untrusted networks unless access is explicitly needed.
Defensive patterns include requiring authentication and authorization for upload operations, treating filenames and paths as untrusted data, and generating server-side storage names rather than honoring client-provided destinations. Upload handling can canonicalize paths, reject traversal components, and verify that the resolved target remains inside a dedicated non-executable directory. Strict file-type, size, and content validation, isolated storage, overwrite restrictions, and least-privilege service accounts reduce exposure. Secure-by-default deployments should keep upload services inaccessible from untrusted networks unless access is explicitly needed.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can include static analysis for filesystem writes that concatenate request parameters with directory paths, missing canonicalization, and upload handlers that lack authentication checks. Code review should examine filename normalization, resolved-path boundary checks, overwrite behavior, and whether upload directories are executable or shared with application components. Runtime monitoring can alert on traversal-like path input, unexpected writes outside approved directories, unauthenticated upload requests, and changes to protected skill files. Automated security review tools and policy checks can help enforce these patterns in CI.
Detection can include static analysis for filesystem writes that concatenate request parameters with directory paths, missing canonicalization, and upload handlers that lack authentication checks. Code review should examine filename normalization, resolved-path boundary checks, overwrite behavior, and whether upload directories are executable or shared with application components. Runtime monitoring can alert on traversal-like path input, unexpected writes outside approved directories, unauthenticated upload requests, and changes to protected skill files. Automated security review tools and policy checks can help enforce these patterns in CI.
