Summary
Apache Camel Karavan contains a path traversal vulnerability in its project file API, where a user-supplied project file name is used directly as a filesystem path segment. An authenticated user with any role may exploit this behavior to overwrite writable files outside the intended project directory, potentially enabling code execution in the Karavan container.
Apache Camel Karavan contains a path traversal vulnerability in its project file API, where a user-supplied project file name is used directly as a filesystem path segment. An authenticated user with any role may exploit this behavior to overwrite writable files outside the intended project directory, potentially enabling code execution in the Karavan container.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Karavan deployments that write project files to a working copy for Git commits and trust the supplied project file name as a relative path. Risk increases when the Karavan process can write application configuration files, files on the application classpath, or other security-sensitive locations.
The issue occurs in Karavan deployments that write project files to a working copy for Git commits and trust the supplied project file name as a relative path. Risk increases when the Karavan process can write application configuration files, files on the application classpath, or other security-sensitive locations.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The project file API used to write files into a Git working copy
- Required access: An authenticated Karavan account; the reported issue may be reachable by users with any role
- Trigger point: Processing and writing a project file whose name is interpreted as a filesystem path
- Why exploitation is possible: Path components containing traversal sequences can escape the intended project directory and target other locations writable by the Karavan process
- Attack surface: The project file API used to write files into a Git working copy
- Required access: An authenticated Karavan account; the reported issue may be reachable by users with any role
- Trigger point: Processing and writing a project file whose name is interpreted as a filesystem path
- Why exploitation is possible: Path components containing traversal sequences can escape the intended project directory and target other locations writable by the Karavan process
Why this happens
The underlying bug is improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory, mapped to CWE-22: Path Traversal. The application uses a caller-controlled file name verbatim when constructing a destination path, without reliably normalizing it and verifying that the resolved path remains within the permitted project directory. This insecure pattern allows filesystem boundaries to be bypassed during file creation or replacement.
The underlying bug is improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory, mapped to CWE-22: Path Traversal. The application uses a caller-controlled file name verbatim when constructing a destination path, without reliably normalizing it and verifying that the resolved path remains within the permitted project directory. This insecure pattern allows filesystem boundaries to be bypassed during file creation or replacement.
Potential impact
- An attacker may overwrite application configuration files
- An attacker could modify files loaded from the application classpath
- The Karavan container may execute attacker-controlled code
- Application integrity and availability could be compromised
- The vulnerability can enable further compromise using the container's available privileges
- An attacker may overwrite application configuration files
- An attacker could modify files loaded from the application classpath
- The Karavan container may execute attacker-controlled code
- Application integrity and availability could be compromised
- The vulnerability can enable further compromise using the container's available privileges
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating project file names as untrusted input and enforcing a strict directory boundary before any write occurs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths against a trusted base directory and reject any result outside that directory
- Allow only safe file-name formats or approved relative path patterns
- Canonicalize and validate paths before opening, creating, or replacing files
- Avoid writing user-controlled content to application configuration or classpath locations
- Run the service with the minimum filesystem permissions required for its workflow
- Use isolated working directories and read-only application resources where practical
- Apply authorization checks appropriate to project modification operations
Mitigation generally focuses on treating project file names as untrusted input and enforcing a strict directory boundary before any write occurs.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolve candidate paths against a trusted base directory and reject any result outside that directory
- Allow only safe file-name formats or approved relative path patterns
- Canonicalize and validate paths before opening, creating, or replacing files
- Avoid writing user-controlled content to application configuration or classpath locations
- Run the service with the minimum filesystem permissions required for its workflow
- Use isolated working directories and read-only application resources where practical
- Apply authorization checks appropriate to project modification operations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for path traversal risks through:
- Static analysis rules that identify user-controlled values used in filesystem path construction
- Code review checks for direct concatenation of file names with trusted directories
- Tests using encoded, normalized, absolute, and parent-directory path variants
- Runtime monitoring for writes outside approved project roots
- File integrity monitoring for application configuration and classpath locations
- Policy enforcement that restricts service write permissions to dedicated working directories
Automated code review and dependency security tools may help identify related unsafe path-handling patterns.
Organizations can look for path traversal risks through:
- Static analysis rules that identify user-controlled values used in filesystem path construction
- Code review checks for direct concatenation of file names with trusted directories
- Tests using encoded, normalized, absolute, and parent-directory path variants
- Runtime monitoring for writes outside approved project roots
- File integrity monitoring for application configuration and classpath locations
- Policy enforcement that restricts service write permissions to dedicated working directories
Automated code review and dependency security tools may help identify related unsafe path-handling patterns.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| camel. | camel.apache.org/ |
| github. | github.com/ |
| openwall. | openwall.com/ |
