Summary
Newell Brands DYMO ID can resolve its plugin Modules directory from the process working directory rather than a trusted application path. If a victim opens a specially prepared job file from a folder containing malicious modules or DLLs, the application may execute attacker-controlled code with the victim's privileges.
Newell Brands DYMO ID can resolve its plugin Modules directory from the process working directory rather than a trusted application path. If a victim opens a specially prepared job file from a folder containing malicious modules or DLLs, the application may execute attacker-controlled code with the victim's privileges.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in DYMO ID deployments that use the affected job-file handling and plugin-loading behavior. When a job file changes the process working directory to its containing folder, the application may locate modules relative to that potentially attacker-controlled location instead of using a fixed, trusted directory.
The vulnerability occurs in DYMO ID deployments that use the affected job-file handling and plugin-loading behavior. When a job file changes the process working directory to its containing folder, the application may locate modules relative to that potentially attacker-controlled location instead of using a fixed, trusted directory.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Local user interaction with a DYMO ID job file
- Required access: Ability to place or distribute a job file and accompanying module or DLL files
- Trigger point: The victim opens or clicks the crafted job file
- Why exploitation is possible: Plugin resolution depends on the process working directory, allowing application-controlled module loading from an untrusted folder
- Attack surface: Local user interaction with a DYMO ID job file
- Required access: Ability to place or distribute a job file and accompanying module or DLL files
- Trigger point: The victim opens or clicks the crafted job file
- Why exploitation is possible: Plugin resolution depends on the process working directory, allowing application-controlled module loading from an untrusted folder
Why this happens
The underlying issue is an unsafe relationship between job-file processing, process working-directory changes, and dynamic module discovery.
Resolving the plugin Modules directory relative to the current working directory allows a file-controlled location to influence which modules or DLLs the application loads. This behavior is associated with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, and also reflects CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere, because executable resources may be selected from outside the intended trusted application boundary.
The underlying issue is an unsafe relationship between job-file processing, process working-directory changes, and dynamic module discovery.
Resolving the plugin Modules directory relative to the current working directory allows a file-controlled location to influence which modules or DLLs the application loads. This behavior is associated with CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory, and also reflects CWE-668: Exposure of Resource to Wrong Sphere, because executable resources may be selected from outside the intended trusted application boundary.
Potential impact
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges.
- The application process could be compromised.
- User data or locally accessible resources could be accessed or modified.
- The vulnerability could enable follow-on activity using the victim's account permissions.
- An attacker may execute arbitrary code with the victim's privileges.
- The application process could be compromised.
- User data or locally accessible resources could be accessed or modified.
- The vulnerability could enable follow-on activity using the victim's account permissions.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on separating job-file handling from executable module discovery and reducing trust in file-controlled paths.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolving plugins from a fixed, trusted, application-owned directory.
- Avoiding changes to the process working directory based on user-controlled files.
- Allowing only explicitly approved modules and validating their origin and integrity.
- Separating data-file parsing from executable loading.
- Running the application with the least privileges needed for its normal tasks.
- Applying endpoint controls that restrict execution of untrusted DLLs and modules.
Mitigation generally focuses on separating job-file handling from executable module discovery and reducing trust in file-controlled paths.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Resolving plugins from a fixed, trusted, application-owned directory.
- Avoiding changes to the process working directory based on user-controlled files.
- Allowing only explicitly approved modules and validating their origin and integrity.
- Separating data-file parsing from executable loading.
- Running the application with the least privileges needed for its normal tasks.
- Applying endpoint controls that restrict execution of untrusted DLLs and modules.
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving current-working-directory changes followed by dynamic library or plugin loading.
- Code-review signals where user-controlled file locations influence executable search paths.
- Policies requiring module paths to be canonicalized and constrained to trusted directories.
- Endpoint telemetry showing DYMO ID loading modules from user-writable or job-file directories.
- Automated review rules that flag relative plugin paths and uncontrolled DLL search behavior.
Organizations can look for:
- Static-analysis findings involving current-working-directory changes followed by dynamic library or plugin loading.
- Code-review signals where user-controlled file locations influence executable search paths.
- Policies requiring module paths to be canonicalized and constrained to trusted directories.
- Endpoint telemetry showing DYMO ID loading modules from user-writable or job-file directories.
- Automated review rules that flag relative plugin paths and uncontrolled DLL search behavior.
Sources
| Source | Link |
|---|---|
| mediaserver. | mediaserver.newellrubbermaid.com/ |
| raw. | raw.githubusercontent.com/ |
| cve. | cve.org/ |
| dymo. | dymo.com/ |
