Summary
Kaneo contains a missing authorization vulnerability in API routes that accept project, task, label, or workspace identifiers without consistently verifying workspace membership. An authenticated user who obtains valid identifiers may access other workspaces and read, modify, or delete associated content.
Kaneo contains a missing authorization vulnerability in API routes that accept project, task, label, or workspace identifiers without consistently verifying workspace membership. An authenticated user who obtains valid identifiers may access other workspaces and read, modify, or delete associated content.
Affected context
The issue occurs in Kaneo API functionality that operates on workspace-related resources identified by client-supplied values. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can obtain identifiers through shared links, application responses, or other observable sources, while the corresponding route does not enforce membership or ownership checks.
The issue occurs in Kaneo API functionality that operates on workspace-related resources identified by client-supplied values. It becomes risky when an authenticated user can obtain identifiers through shared links, application responses, or other observable sources, while the corresponding route does not enforce membership or ownership checks.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Authenticated Kaneo API routes handling workspace, project, task, label, or comment identifiers
- Required access: A valid authenticated account and the ability to submit requests to affected routes
- Trigger point: Supplying an identifier associated with a resource outside the user's authorized workspace
- Why exploitation is possible: Some routes rely on object identifiers without consistently verifying the caller's workspace membership or resource-level permissions
- Attack surface: Authenticated Kaneo API routes handling workspace, project, task, label, or comment identifiers
- Required access: A valid authenticated account and the ability to submit requests to affected routes
- Trigger point: Supplying an identifier associated with a resource outside the user's authorized workspace
- Why exploitation is possible: Some routes rely on object identifiers without consistently verifying the caller's workspace membership or resource-level permissions
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an authorization decision that does not adequately bind the requested resource to the authenticated user's permitted workspace. API handlers may retrieve or mutate objects based on client-supplied identifiers before performing effective membership or ownership validation. This behavior maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because access-control enforcement is absent or incomplete for protected operations.
The underlying flaw is an authorization decision that does not adequately bind the requested resource to the authenticated user's permitted workspace. API handlers may retrieve or mutate objects based on client-supplied identifiers before performing effective membership or ownership validation. This behavior maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, because access-control enforcement is absent or incomplete for protected operations.
Potential impact
- An authenticated user may read projects, tasks, labels, comments, or workspace search results outside their authorized workspace
- An attacker could modify or delete tasks, labels, and comments
- Confidential workspace information could be exposed
- Project integrity and collaboration workflows may be disrupted
- Unauthorized changes could support further abuse of organizational data
- An authenticated user may read projects, tasks, labels, comments, or workspace search results outside their authorized workspace
- An attacker could modify or delete tasks, labels, and comments
- Confidential workspace information could be exposed
- Project integrity and collaboration workflows may be disrupted
- Unauthorized changes could support further abuse of organizational data
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every resource access and mutation boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the effective workspace from the authenticated session rather than trusting client-supplied scope identifiers
- Applying centralized, deny-by-default authorization checks to every project, task, label, comment, and search operation
- Verifying workspace membership, ownership, and action-specific permissions before retrieval or mutation
- Avoiding responses that disclose resource existence across authorization boundaries
- Using least-privilege roles and separating read, update, and delete permissions
- Treating shared links and object identifiers as untrusted references rather than proof of authorization
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every resource access and mutation boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Deriving the effective workspace from the authenticated session rather than trusting client-supplied scope identifiers
- Applying centralized, deny-by-default authorization checks to every project, task, label, comment, and search operation
- Verifying workspace membership, ownership, and action-specific permissions before retrieval or mutation
- Avoiding responses that disclose resource existence across authorization boundaries
- Using least-privilege roles and separating read, update, and delete permissions
- Treating shared links and object identifiers as untrusted references rather than proof of authorization
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can assess for missing authorization through:
- Static analysis and code review searches for API handlers that use client-supplied identifiers without nearby authorization checks
- Review of data-access functions to confirm that workspace or tenant scope is applied in the query itself
- Integration tests that access each resource type across users, roles, and workspaces
- Negative tests confirming that unauthorized users receive consistent denial responses without resource metadata
- API gateway or service policies requiring authenticated identity and explicit authorization decisions
- Neutral automated application-security testing tools that exercise identifier substitution and cross-tenant access cases
Organizations can assess for missing authorization through:
- Static analysis and code review searches for API handlers that use client-supplied identifiers without nearby authorization checks
- Review of data-access functions to confirm that workspace or tenant scope is applied in the query itself
- Integration tests that access each resource type across users, roles, and workspaces
- Negative tests confirming that unauthorized users receive consistent denial responses without resource metadata
- API gateway or service policies requiring authenticated identity and explicit authorization decisions
- Neutral automated application-security testing tools that exercise identifier substitution and cross-tenant access cases
